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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to determine the attention and importance 
given to population growth in the overall strategy of development 
planning. The first part of the thesis analyzes the population 
content of the national development plans of 60 developing countries.
The findings indicate a surprising dearth of demographic data 
in development plans of the Third World. With a few exceptions, 
the data found in these plans are inadequate and are not presented 
in forms easily used by planners. The recognition of population 
problems is substantial: two-thirds of the countries studied men­
tion a wide spectrum of population problems in their plans. Forty- 
three per cent of the countries studied propose some policy to re­
duce the rate of population growth. Still, the most important con­
clusion is that too few plans are preparing to accommodate for the 
inevitable growth of the population.
The second part of the thesis is an investigation of population 
and development on a national level for the countries of Pakistan 
and Bangladesh. The analysis of Pakistan’s and Bangladesh’s develop­
ment plans presents a picture of population planning in extremely 
adverse circumstances. Even though the plans did propose programmes 
to reduce population growth, implementation was difficult because of 
little demand for contraceptives, adminstrative and political obstacles 
and logistical complexities.
Four conceptual frameworks incorporating theories of fertility
decline, when analyzed for their relevance and utility in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, all reveal theoretical or practical flaws. The 
family planning approach, the policy mainly relied on, has so far 
not been efficiently administered or demographically effective.
A detailed analysis of a planning framework which incorporates 
population, income distribution and the evaluation of alternative 
development strategies illustrates the importance of the distribu­
tive aspect of development strategy, but reveals that the model 
lacks both the sophistication and the appropriate data to be analyti­
cally useful.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations World Population Conference held in Bucha­
rest in 1974 adopted a World Population Plan of Action that assert­
ed: 'Population and development are interrelated: population vari
ables influence development and are also influenced by them'. The 
Plan therefore recommended that 'population measures and programmes 
should be integrated into comprehensive social and economic plans 
and this integration should be reflected in the goals, instrumen­
talities and organizations for planning within the countries'.
This thesis seeks to determine the attention and importance 
given to population growth in the overall strategy of development 
planning. The first part of the thesis analyzes the population 
content of the national development plans of 60 developing coun­
tries. These include all plans from the Third World that were
’available to the author at the time of the study and that were rele­
vant to the 1970s.^ The second part of the thesis is an investiga­
tion of population and development planning on a national level, for 
the countries of Pakistan and Bangladesh.
National Development Plans
The decade of the 1960s was marked by a widespread prolifer­
ation of development plans. Previously, many governments planned 
no more than two years ahead for fiscal budgets, somewhat longer 
for investment projects. The five-year plan became popular be­
cause it is a more integrated and comprehensive approach to devel­
opment planning, it fulfills a need for a longer-range fiscal plan 
of public investment, it is often a prerequisite for foreign aid, 
and it has effective national and international publicity value. 
Individual development plans vary widely in objectives, programmes, 
comprehensiveness, details, types of change proposed, and degrees 
of private and foreign involvement. Each plan reflects the social 
and economic system for which it was designed and the nature and 
extent of changes desired by political elites.
Many serious questions have been raised concerning the extent 
to which development plans address themselves to the real obstacles 
to development. The degree of implementation, the inconsistent
^This study reviews plans written in the 1970s and a few that 
were published in the late 1960s but which cover periods extending 
into the 1970s. See Appendix R for the plans studied; for a more 
comprehensive list, see International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, List of National Development Plans, 4th ed. , Washing­
ton D.C., September, 1973.
objectives, the emphasis on fiscal budgets rather than on struc­
tural changes, and the role of international agencies in encourag­
ing the plans also have been debated. One must keep these ques­
tions in mind in order to understand the role of population in the 
planning framework.
It is hazardous to make cross-national comparisons of plans 
derived from different systems of development planning and applied 
to different types of economic, social, and demographic develop­
ment. Countries vary widely in the emphasis they place on develop­
ment planning, from those that develop very comprehensive plans to 
those that do almost no planning. The relationships of development 
planning to actual programme implementation and of implementation 
to actual development also cover a wide range. But a systematic 
content analysis does allow important inferences to be drawn about 
the way various aspects of population are used in actual development 
plans.
The Plan Period
There are three types of national development plans: the short-
range plan (usually for one year), the medium-range plan (from three 
to seven years but most often for five), and the long-term plan (ten 
or twenty years). The medium-range plan outlines national policies, 
programmes, goals, and targets, and serves as a guide for the impor­
tant policy decisions for the annual budgets.
The first part of this thesis focuses mainly on medium-range 
plans, though three countries studied (Costa Rica, Haiti, and Saudi
Arabia) had only short-range plans available, and two (the Dominican 
Republic and Panama) had only long-range plans. In four cases 
(Sudan, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Turkey) both medium-range and per­
spective plans were available, and these long-range plans have also 
been examined. Of the medium-range plans, the most common are for 
five years, though a few cover shorter periods.
The duration of the planning period affects the consideration 
of population matters in a number of ways. Many social services, 
including education, health, and urban development, have long-range 
lead times beyond the scope of the five-year plan to accommodate 
for future population growth. The training of a teacher, for exam­
ple, may have to begin before the birth of the student. Many cur­
rent expenditures must be based on needs of projected populations.
In the longer-range perspective the consequences of rapid popula­
tion growth are likely to become much more serious because, in addi­
tion to the rate of growth and the age structure, the sheer size of 
the population added every year may begin to place heavy burdens on 
resources.
Policies for reducing population growth through fertility de­
clines are also likely to have a long lead time before they become 
demographically effective. Moreover, the final payoff from reduced 
fertility will extend even farther into the future. The payoff in 
the education sector would not even begin until the "lower fertil­
ity" cohort reached school age, another five years later. The bene­
fits from slowing the growth of the working-age population would 
not begin for at least 15 years. Thus, if the planning period is
5limited to five years, the most important considerations in regard 
to both influencing population growth and accommodating to long- 
run growth may be overlooked.
The Unreality of Planning
Marshall Wolfe has argued that development "planning can receive 
a good deal of formal backing and publicity without any serious 
attention on the part of the national authorities to the practical 
measures needed for its implementation."^ On the other hand, Gerald 
Desmond has pointed out: "It is fashionable these days to dis­
count the effectiveness, or even the reality, of many development 
plans....In some cases these reservations are probably deserved 
and in others they may be unduly c y n i c a l . G a v i n  Jones has warned 
that the development plan should not be looked upon as the "prime 
mover in development but rather as an attempt to channel the power­
ful forces at work...in ways that will result in the greatest advan­
tage or, at worst, the least disadvantage, to the country's develop-
............. 3 ..................................................
ment efforts."
Htolfe, Marshall. 'Between the Idea and the Reality: Notes 
on Plan Implementation', International Social Development Review, 
1971, Vol. 3, p. 34.
n _
Desmond, Gerald, 'The Impact of National and Regional Develop­
ment Policies on Urbanization', in Urbanization and National Develop­
ment, ed. Leo Jakobsen and Ved Prakash, (Beverly Hills, California: 
Sage Publications) 1971, p. 70.
3Jones, Gavin, 'Implications of Prospective Urbanization for 
Development', Paper presented at the Seminar on Population and De­
velopment: The Urban Focus, sponsored by SEADAG and the Institute
of Population Studies, 1972, p. 10.
6One might well ask: What is the use of studying development
plans if most of their programmes are never fully implemented and 
they represent an unreal world--if not a Platonic ideal, than some­
thing like a collection of political campaign promises? First, 
whatever the implementation, the use of demographic data in plan­
ing is probably highly correlated with certain data that are found in 
in a plan. So the plans provide an indication of the extent to 
which these data are used and the degree of emphasis placed upon 
them. In addition, there are advantages to pulling demographic 
data out of the plans and making them available so that indepen­
dent checks can be undertaken.
Second, it important to determine the perception of various 
population problems. The pattern of problem recognition gives 
some indication of the ways in which rapid population growth is 
affecting development efforts, and sheds some light on the way pro­
grammes are being designed to accommodate population growth.
Finally, even if none of the proposals for population policies 
are fully implemented, they are of some interest in and of them­
selves. At least the scope and pattern of intervention tools are 
identified. If the scope of proposed policies is narrow (limited 
to the family planning approach, for example), that in itself is 
an important finding. If broad population policies are to be im­
plemented, they must first be proposed; and proposing them in a 
national development plan is strategically effective, since broad 
social engineering may involve the actions of more than one minis­
try or department, and the plan can provide substantial publicity
7and influence on behalf of its policies. Broad policies of this 
sort are usually effective only when they are implemented and co­
ordinated within a strategy of integrated reinforcing programmes.
At any rate, it is impprtant to know what policy was proposed and 
by whom, even if it was not fully implemented— if only to find out 
that very little was proposed to begin with. In order to evaluate 
the execution of a programme, one must know (among other things) 
what was proposed and what goals were set.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting the information 
presented in Part One of this study. It should not be assumed that 
the policies proposed have actually been implemented or that coun­
tries have been limited to the policies proposed in their plans. 
Furthermore, these countries were not filling in a systematic ques­
tionnaire when they wrote their plans. The plans were written with 
many objectives in mind, and there is no reason to assume that the 
planners felt any need to outline all their problems. They may 
have felt that some problems were self-evident. As we shall see 
later on, omissions:6f data, problems, and policies may be explain­
ed in a number of ways.
8Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is organized into two parts. In Part One findings 
are categorized into three major areas of analysis— utilization of 
demographic data, recognition of population problems, and dimensions 
of population policy.
Demographic data are essential for realistic development plan­
ning. Chapter 1 analyzes the use of eight demographic parameters 
found in national plans. The study determines which countries used 
rates of growth, estimates of fertility and mortality, and popula­
tion projections in their plans. It also looks at current and fu­
ture projections of the school-age and working-age populations. 
Countries not including such data in their national plans are iden­
tified as well.
In Chapter 2 development plans are analyzed for their recog­
nition of a number of important problems: whether the growth of
the working-age and school-age populations is viewed as a popula­
tion problem; if it is felt that economic growth is being reduced 
by population grox^ th; if there is perceived population pressure on 
social and health services, on housing, on individual or family 
welfare, or on food or agricultural systems; if the dependency
9ratio is a burden; and if high population density is viewed as 
a problem. The objective here is not to determine whether these 
problems actually exist but to determine how they are perceived 
by development planners.
Chapter 3 discusses the patterns of population policy stra­
tegy found in the development plans. Some 16 population policies 
are analyzed.^ The policies range from the specific, such as 
family planning, to the broad, such as a reduction in fertility 
as a consequence of socioeconomic development. All of them have 
at least the partial but intended aim of reducing population growth.
The supporting research notes for Chapters 1, 2, and 3 are pub­
lished as the second part of Population and Planning in Developing 
2
Nations which is being submitted as a supplement to the thesis.
It reviews all of the 60 development plans studied. Each plan 
description begins with a list of the demographic data used, pro­
blems recognized, and policies proposed in the plan. All popula­
tion projections found in a national development plan, as well as 
estimates of fertility, mortality, and rates of growth, are presented. 
Sources of estimates and methods of estimation are stated as well
^See page 6l for a full list of these policies. Although 
migration is often an extremely important demographic aspect of 
development planning, it has not been included within the scope 
of this study because of the large volume of material to be sur­
veyed. With the exception of migration, and within the limita­
tions and definitions described in Chapters 2 and 3, most of the 
explicit population problems and policies found in the plans are 
included in one or more of the categories of this study.
2
Stamper, B. Maxwell, Population and Planning m  Developing 
Nations, A Review of Sixty Development Plans for the 1970s, (New
York: The Population Council), 1977, 265p.
10
(if these were given in the plan). Simple checks were made to 
see if the demographic data were internally consistent.
All important statements about population problems and all 
relevant population policy proposals found in the national develop­
ment plans have been included in each country plan description.
A brief policy perspective is also given for each country to pro­
vide a better framework in which to view the plan and its possible 
implementation.
Chapter A begins the specific examination of population and 
development planning in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The first, second, 
and third national plans of Pakistan and the first plan of Bang­
ladesh are reviewed for their utilization of demographic data, 
their recognition of population problems, and their proposed pop­
ulation policies. The plans and their population policies are ex­
amined within the wider social^ economic, and political context in 
which they were proposed. The implementation of the population 
programmes is evaluated, and the administrative and policy obsta­
cles which impeded demographic effectiveness is also examined.
Chapter 5 investigates various theories about fertility de­
cline and analyzes four conceptual frameworks and their relevance 
and utility for development planning in Pakistan and Bangladesh: 
the family planning approach, beyond family planning measures, 
the development hypothesis and the transition theory, and the dis­
tributive hypothesis and fertility decline. Various specific policy 
interventions are analyzed in regard to their administrative feas­
ibility, economic reality,(and pqliticalacceptability, as well as 
their potential for demographic impact.
1 1
Chapter 6 is an exploratory examination of a planning frame­
work which incorporates population, income distribution, and the 
evaluation of alternative development strategies. It involves an ex­
tension of the social welfare index which attempts to incorporate 
the effects upon fertility of differential income growth. Pakis­
tani data on income distribution and family size from the years 
1963/64, 1966/67, and 1968/69 are employed in an attempt to evaluate 
the utility of the model and perhaps shed some light on the quality 
of the data as well.
12
CHAPTER ONE
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA USED IN DEVELOPMENT PLANS
Not a great deal is known about the actualusages ofdemographic data 
in the Third World. In countries experiencing rapid population 
growth, as almost all of these are, development programmes must 
take demographic changes in population size, age structure, and 
distribution into account. It is not possible to know the full ex­
tent to which these data are actually taken into account in the 
planning process, but some indication can be found by analyzing 
the content and emphases of the national development plans. Tables 
1-4 show the use of eight demographic parameters in the national 
development plans of 60 countries.
It seems likely, although not necessary, that countries seek­
ing to accommodate rapid population growth in their national devel­
opment plans would present at least a few of the eight parameters 
looked for in this study. A country's omission of one of these 
parameters may indicate that;
13
1. The planners did not have the data.
2. They had the data but felt they were not sufficiently impor­
tant, accurate, useful, or relevant to be published in the 
planning document.
3. The statistical office possessed the data but did not furn­
ish them in tabulations that could be readily used by the
planning agency.
4. The planners were inexperienced and possibly lacked demo­
graphic skill.
5. The planning models and techniques used did not readily 
accommodate demographic statistics.
6. The planners were unwilling to make demographic assumptions 
about the future or to make use of those made by others.
Rate of Population Growth
The rate of population growth is obviously one of the most important 
demographic measures used in planning and should form the critical 
basis for many policy and programmatic assumptions. Although it is 
impossible to know the full extent to which population growth rates 
are actually employed in the planning process, we can get some idea 
of their use by analyzing those that appear in national development 
plans.
Of the 60 countries studied here, 48, or about 80 per cent, 
present some type of estimate of the rate of population growth in 
their national development plans. The Asian countries are most 
strongly represented, but there is not a great deal of variation 
among regions (see Table 1). Even though a large number of the 
countries studied do include rates of population growth in their plans,
14
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it is still alarming that any country might neglect such an important 
parameter, one that influences so many aspects of social planning.
Were the development programmes of the remaining 12 countries plan­
ned without knowledge or use of growth rates, or were the rates 
simply not published in the planning documents? Clearly, some coun­
tries that make no mention of population growth rates in their plans 
have reasonably good estimates available to them. Algeria, Indonesia, 
Sri Lanka, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela fall into this category; 
the Algerian plan, in fact, presents a population projection. On 
the other hand, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Haiti, and Paraguay have 
not had high-quality demographic data, and their planners may not 
have had satisfactory estimates available to them.
In the plans that do include rates of population growth, many of 
the estimates are either unsatisfactory or of dubious quality. The 
prevalence of inaccurate estimates can almost be assumed if only 
because of the very uncertain nature of many demographic statistics 
in the Third World. Apart from the uncertainty of the data, many of 
them are unsatisfactory because they are out of date. A number of 
countries published intercensal rates of growth, but some went back 
as far as 1940. Peru, for example, published what is apparently an 
intercensal rate of growth averaged per year over the period 1940- 
1960, a time when the country experienced rapidly declining mortality. 
This rate was used for the planning period 1970-1975.
No source is given for most of the estimates published. It is 
most likely that the planning commissions obtained the estimates from 
the national statistical offices, whose data are often based on an 
incomplete vital registration system, census data, and sometimes 
sample surveys. In most plans no method of estimation is given,
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Algeria X X X
1970-1973
Botswana X X X X X
1970-1975
Burundi X X X
1968-1972
Cameroon X X X X X
1971-1976
Ethiopia
1968-1973
Ivory Coast X X
1971-1975
Kenya X X X X X X
1970-1974
Mali X X X
1970-1972
Mauritania X X
1970-1973
Mauritius X X X X X X X
1971-1975
Morocco X X X X X
1973-1977
Nigeria X X X
1970-1974
Senegal X X X X X
1969-1973
Somalia X
1971-1973
South Africa X X X
1966-1971
Sudan
1970/71-1974/75
Swaziland X X X X X
1973-1977
Tanzania X X X X X X
1969-1974
Togo X X X X ' X  " X
1971-1975
Tunisia X X X X X X X X
1973-1976
Uganda X X X X X X X X
1971/72-1975/76
Zambia X X X X X X
1972-1976
T A B LE  3 Demographic data included in  national development plans o f
1970s, Asia
Countries Ra
te 
of 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
gr
ow
th
Es
tim
at
e 
of 
fe
rt
ili
ty
Es
tim
at
e 
of 
m
or
ta
lit
y
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
of 
fu
tu
re
 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
si
ze
Es
tim
at
e 
of 
cu
rr
en
t 
sc
ho
ol
-a
ge
 
po
pu
la
tio
n
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
of 
fu
tu
re
 
sc
ho
ol
-a
ge
 
po
pu
la
tio
n
Es
tim
at
e 
of 
cu
rr
en
t 
w
or
ki
ng
-a
ge
 
po
pu
la
tio
n
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
of 
fu
tu
re
 
w
or
ki
ng
-a
ge
 
po
pu
la
tio
n
Afghanistan X X X X X X
1967-1971
Bangladesh X X X X X X X X
1973-1978
India X X X X X X X X
1974-1979
Indonesia X X
1969/70-1973/74
Iran X X X X X X
1968-1972
Iraq X X X X
1970-1974
Israel X X X X X X
1974-1978
Korea, Republic of X X X X X X
1972-1976
Laos X X X
1969-1974
Lebanon X
1972-1977
Malaysia X X X X X X X X
1971-1975
Nepal X X X X X X X
1970-1975
Pakistan0 X X X X X X X X
1970-1975
Philippines X X X X X X X X
1972-1975
Saudi Arabia X X X X X X X
1970
Sri Lanka X X X X X
1972-1976
Taiwan X X X X X X
1969-1972
Thailand .. X X X X
1972-1976
Turkey X X X X X X X X
1973-1977
Vietnam, Republic o f6 X X X X X
1972-1975
“Before the independence o f Bangladesh. 
6Before unification with N o rth  Vietnam.
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TA B LE  4 Demographic data included in national development plans o f
1970s, Latin America and the Caribbean
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Argentina X X X X X X
1974-1977
Barbados X X X X X X
1969-1972
Brazil X X X X
1972-1974
Chile X X
1971-1976
Colombia X X X X X X X X
1970-1973
Costa Rica X X X X X
1974
Dominican Republic X X X X X X X X
1968-1985
El Salvador X X X X
1973-1977
Guatemala X X X X X X X X
1971-1975
Guyana X X X X X X
1972-1976
Haiti X
1970-1971
Panama X X
1970-1980
Paraguay
1971-1975
Peru X X X X
1971-1975
Puerto Rico X X X X X X X X
1969-1972
Trinidad and Tobago X X X X X X
1969-1973
Uruguay X
1973-1977
Venezuela X X X
1970-1974
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although a number of countries do present the crude birth and death 
rates. In many cases the growth-rate figure was obtained simply by 
subtracting the crude death rate from the crude birth rate. In most 
countries international migration has a trivial demographic effect, 
but it is substantial in a few small countries, and therefore distinc­
tions are sometimes made between the rate of "natural” increase and 
the "actual" rate after migration. In no plan is the intrinsic 
rate explicitly used.
Although 26 countries give estimates of the level of fertility 
and 27 give estimates of mortality level, only a few give both esti­
mates from the same year in a comparable form so that a natural rate 
of increase can be calculated. And not in every case does the natu­
ral rate correspond with the rate assumed in the plan. This discrep­
ancy is probably due to the use of migration statistics or an inter- 
censal rate of growth.
Estimate of Fertility
Although fertility estimates are of less direct importance in develop­
ment planning than some of the other parameters studied here, they 
are a necessary component of good projections. Information on the 
number of births is useful in some specific planning contexts, and 
it is of great importance to countries that wish to reduce their rates 
of population growth.
Only 26 countries, representing 60 per cent of the combined pop­
ulation under study, include fertility data in their plans. Fertility 
information usually comes in the form of a crude birth rate and is 
discussed in the context of the rate of natural increase. In only 
a few cases is it presented ^ as the age-specific fertility rates ne­
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cessary for component projections. In some plans in which it is dis­
cussed in detail, targets for reducing the birth rate are explicitly 
introduced. Of the 26 countries presenting fertility data, 19 present 
policies to reduce fertility, and one, Argentina, proposes to increase 
it.
Of the seven African countries that provide fertility data (see 
Table 2), only two present comparative figures. Mauritius reports that 
its crude birth rate dropped from 50 in 1950 to AO in 1960 and to 27 in 
1969. Tunisia reports that its crude birth rate dropped from 46 in 1961 
to 37 in 1972 for a general fertility rate of 162, a decrease of 5 
births per 1,000 women of reproductive age between 1965 and 1971.
Of the ten Asian countries (see Table 3), Bangladesh and Laos 
have the highest crude birth rates, each with 47 births per 1,000.
India and Malaysia have the lowest, with 35. India*s plan expresses 
disappointment in the figure, since the aim of its earlier plan had 
been to reduce the birth rate from 39 in 1968 to 32 by 1974, and it 
had been assumed that the rate would then drop further to 25 by 1981. 
That goal, the 1974-1979 plan states, no longer appears "feasible.*'
Of the nine countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (see Table 
4), Argentina and Barbados report the lowest crude birth rate, 22. 
Barbados hopes to lower it further and Argentina wants to raise it.
The plan of Trinidad and Tobago reports a decline in their combined 
birth rate from 38 in 1962 to 30 in 1968. El Salvador, with the high­
est crude birth rate reported in the region, also has experienced a 
sharp drop, from 50 in 1961 to 43 in 1973.
Estimate of Mortality
Mortality data are essential for establishing health conditions as
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well as setting requirements and priorities for health programmes and, 
later, evaluating their progress and effectiveness. Not only the level 
or mortality but also the causes of death, the sex- and age-specific 
rates, infant mortality, and other measures are crucial for effective 
health planning. Data on the geographic distribution of mortality as 
well as on the population distributions and the age structure of the 
population are needed. Mortality data are, of course, necessary for 
projections of population growth.
w
Only 27 countries include data on the total level of mortality in 
their plans. Most of these countries devote at least a chapter of their 
national development plans to health services, and it is in this context 
or in a discussion of population growth that mortality data are present­
ed. In most cases only crude death rates are mentioned; seldom are age- 
specific rates or expectation-of-life figures given. Infant mortality 
measures and figures on deaths by certain major causes are sometimes 
given, but more attention is paid to medical-administrative statistics, 
such as ratios of doctors, nurses, and hospital patients to population.
Of the seven African countries that report mortality figures in 
their plans (see Table 2), crude death rates range from 25 per 1,000 in 
Senegal to less than 10 in Mauritius, and Mauritius expects its death 
rate to decline to as little as 6 per 1,000 by the early 1980s. Life 
expectancy at birth, its plan reports, was 50 years at the beginning of 
the 1950s and 60 years at the beginning of the 1960s. "It can be expec­
ted, on present trends, to increase to about 70 years by the early 1980s."
Nine Asian countries include mortality estimates in their plans 
(see Table 3), ranging from 23 per 1,000 in Laos to 7 in the Philip-
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pines. Sri Lanka reports a decline in its crude death rate from 20 
per 1,000 in 1946 to 8 in 1968.
Eleven countries of Latin America and the Caribbean provide 
mortality figures in their plans (see Table 4). Peru's figures il­
lustrate the inadequacies of and contradictions in the demographic 
data included in the plans of many Third World countries. An official 
figure of 10 deaths per 1,000 is given, but the plan estimates that 
the true figure is between 15 and 16; yet the plan goes on to present 
mortality rates by cause.
It is possible that more countries have used mortality data than 
those that publish them in their plans. Thus the use of mortality 
data cannot be completely assessed, but the information available 
indicates that they have received very little attention and emphasis.
Projection of Future Population Size
The future is the essence of planning. And yet, though most countries 
use future population projections in planning, they have not been 
salient features of development planning documents.
In this study a population projection is defined very broadly:
Any country whose plan estimates the future size of its population is 
classified as having a population projection. Forty-one countries —  
68 per cent of those studied —  present some basic population projec­
tion or some estimate of the future size of the population. Thus 19 
countries project no estimates or projections of future population 
size.
About a third of the African countries studied, representing 50 
per cent of the African population, do not give this basic information 
(see Table 2). Demographic data in these countries are notably incom­
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plete, and failure to present projections must be traceable in large 
part to this lack. Of the 14 African nations that do give this infor­
mation, Botswana gives projections through the year 2000 at varying 
growth rates. Population growth seems to be of concern to Botswana's 
planners solely for economic reasons; Each per centage point of growth 
rate, the plan notes, represents a decline of 1 per cent in the rise 
of per capita income. Morocco presents two projections for the years 
between 1971 and 1999, one assuming a "normal" decline in fertility 
and the other assuming an increased decline as a result of the country's 
family planning program.
In Asia 4 of 20 countries, representing about 13 per cent of the 
Asian population under study, give no such estimates (see Table 3).
The availability of demographic data is less of a problem in these 
countries than in Africa, and other factors must be responsible for 
their failure to publish estimates or projections of future population 
in their plans. Indeed, two of these countries, Indonesia and Saudi 
Arabia, do publish school-age projections, and Saudi Arabia publishes 
a working-age projection as well, thus indicating a projection of the 
age distribution. Sixteen Asian countries do include population pro­
jections in their plans. India gives projections for three periods 
between 1971 and 1986 by sex and age group, and details seven assump­
tions on which they are based. Nepal gives projections by age at 
five-year intervals, and also estimates future population density by 
region.
Seven Latin American countries give no projections (see Table 4), 
and they represent 22 per cent of the Latin American and Caribbean 
population under study. Among the 11 countries in this region that 
do provide population projections, Brazil notes that important
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demographic data from the 1970 census were not available for inclusion, 
but nevertheless projects a population increase of 11 million between 
1970 and 1974. In the plan of the Dominican Republic a projection 
of mortality patterns by age is incorporated into detailed projections 
of population by age and sex at five-year intervals to the year 2000.
The methods used to make these projections and the assumptions 
on which they are based are not often explained, and the reliability 
of the base data is rarely discussed. Furthermore, most of the pro­
jections are made for only one future date and one total size; a 
range of possible projections to encompass various alternatives is 
usually not given. The lengths of the projection periods vary, of 
course; most are limited to the duration of the development plan 
period. It is apparent that most projections are not based on the 
component projection method of age distribution, but are merely pro­
ducts of the current estimates of total population multiplied by the 
current estimates of rate of growth. The projections are therefore 
of little use in social and economic planning, since this requires a 
projection of the age distribution.
Of the countries presenting component systems, few stress the 
variability of the components, perhaps because of the short periods 
covered by the estimates. From the evidence in most of the plans, it 
does not appear that the projections used are designed to allow for 
future revisions to accommodate new or more complete data. This 
study found neither a widespread use of the component system of pro­
jections nor a system projecting future approximations of demographic 
situations or possible emerging trends. On the other hand, however 
limited the projections may appear, they may be based on procedures 
adequate to the given situation in the country concerned.
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Estimate of Current School-Age Population
Estimates of current school-age populations are published in the de­
velopment plans of only 35 of the 60 countries studied. The inclusion 
follows regional patterns, with 75 per cent of the Asian countries in­
cluding such data but only 55 per cent of the African countries and 
44 per cent of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
Asian countries represent over 90 per cent of the combined Asian coun­
tries under study, as compared with less than 30 per cent of the re­
spective populations for the other two regions.
It is not certain why 42 per cent of these Third World countries 
would not include such rudimentary information as size of school-age 
population. In most of them the exclusion is probably due to a lack 
of emphasis on educational planning as a part of the overall develop­
ment strategy as much as to the unavailability of data or a failure 
or unwillingness to publish them. In many African countries, however, 
these data are still likely to be unavailable.
Burundi, which provides no projection of population size, no 
current estimate or projection of working-age population, and neither 
fertility nor mortality rate, is one of the 12 African countries 
that do give figures for current school-age population. So are 
Somalia, which offers no other data among the categories under dis­
cussion here, and Mali, which otherwise notes only its growth rate. 
Both Somalia and Mali discuss their need for statistical information 
and their plans for acquiring some.
Among the 15 Asian countries that provide information on current 
school-age population, Afghanistan bases its estimate on a UNESCO 
survey. India’s statistics on school-age population are, as usual, 
sophisticated.
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Among the eight countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
that present this information are Haiti, which estimates the school- 
age population and size „ and Per cent of school enrolment but offers 
none of the other demographic data under study here, and Venezuela, 
which otherwise provides data only on future school-age population 
and current working-age population.
Of the nine countries that provide data on only one or two of 
the categories under consideration, four give estimates of current 
school-age population. Both Indonesia and Chile provide data only 
on current and future school-age populations.
Of the plans that contain school-age population data, most do 
not give these data by single-year ages, but aggregate them by pri­
mary school and secondary school, and many present them only indi­
rectly. In fact, many of the 35 plans containing school-age 
data really present only the primary school enrolment figures and 
estimates of their per centage of the primary school-age population.
Projection of Future School-Age Population
Educational planning by its very nature is one of the longest range 
planning functions for a development strategy. Its long lead time 
necessitates population projections for realistic planning of class­
rooms and teachers. Training of teachers often begins before the 
birth of the children they will teach. Educational planners cannot 
assume that the school-age population is increasing at the same rate 
as the total population; in fact, since fertility rates are high and 
mortality rates, especially of the young, are declining in these 
countries, the school-age population may be growing at a signifi­
cantly higher rate than the population as a whole. In these
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situations, an adequate demographic projection is essential for 
realistic planning.
Projections of the school-age population (in many cases only 
primary school) are published in the development plans of only 27 
of the 60 countries. The countries that do present projections fol­
low regional patterns; over two-thirds of the Asian countries include 
them but only about one-third of the nations of Africa and of Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
The school-age projections range in quality from demographic 
projections of the primary school-age groups by single-year age 
distribution to estimates of the future aggregate primary school- 
age group. The few countries that present projections of the total 
population with single-year distributions are presented in a context 
other than that of education. Some of the plans contain projections 
of enrolment. The enrolment figures and their per centage of the 
school-age population usually come from ministries of education, 
many of which may not be able to give accurate estimates of the school 
age population.
Working-Age Populations
The International Labour Office estimates that 237 million persons 
may be added to the Third World labour force during the Second United 
Nations Development Decade (1970-1980): Africa, 33 million; Asia,
178 million; Latin America, 26 million. This increase in the labour 
force is an extremely serious problem in these regions, since the 
supply of labour already outstrips demand.
Working-age population projections are the principal component 
of labour force projections. The working-age population is defined
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here as the total population between the ages of 15 and 65. The 
figure is often broken down by age and sex. The working-age popu­
lation must be distinguished from various measures of economic activ­
ity, such as labour force and employment.
Trends in the working-age population alone are not sufficient 
for projection of trends in the labour force, because the rates of 
activity vary greatly, as do the ages of those participating in 
work and the participation of women. Nevertheless, in most Third 
World countries the increase in the labour force is determined to a 
large extent by the growth of the working-age population. Therefore, 
simple projections of the labour force are usually made by multiply­
ing expected age- and sex-specific activity rates by age- and sex- 
specific working-age projections. These rates must be distinguished 
from labour-foree-demand projections, which estimate future employment 
needs in various sectors; demand projections are of economic rather 
than demographic concern, and thus are not treated at all in this 
study.
Estimate of Current Working-Age Population. Seventy-five per cent of 
the countries studied have published some kind of estimate of current 
working-age population in their development plans (see Table 1).
These countries represent almost 90 per cent of the populations of 
both Asia and the Latin American Caribbean area under study and 73 
per cent of the African population under study. The estimates vary 
in quality from regional estimates with age distributions to aggre­
gate estimates of the total population between the ages of 15 and 65. 
Most of the plans give estimates of the levels of employment and un­
employment and of employment by sector. Some plans, especially those
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of the African countries, include- projections of the managerial needs 
for each sector. The actual estimates of the current working-age 
population have not been collected in this study. Many of the 15 
countries that do not include current estimates do not have good dem­
ographic data.
Fifteen African countries include estimates of current working- 
age population in their plans (see Table 2). Algeria breaks down 
its working-age population only into agricultural and nonagricultural 
sectors. Togo notes that of its current working-age population of 
921,000 (1970), 667,000 are gainfully employed.
In Asia 17 of the 20 countries include these estimates. India's 
plan includes estimates of both working-age population and participa­
tion rates by age, sex, sector, and residence. Indonesia notes that 
its working-age population is unequally distributed, with resulting 
high unemployment in some sections and labour shortages in others. 
Iran includes children from the age of 12 in its estimates. South 
Korea notes that although its population under 14 declined from 41.2 
per cent of total population in 1966 to 39.4 per cent in 1970, the 
working-age population grew from 32.1 per cent to 33.3 per cent in 
the same period.
Thirteen of the 18 Latin American and Caribbean national plans 
include this information. Costa Rica notes that its working-age 
population grew from 47 per cent of the population in 1963 to 52 
per cent in 1973. Guatemala, estimating its working-age population 
for 1970, notes that "in accordance with the experience of past 
mortality," only 70-75 per cent of those born in 1955 can be expected 
to survive to reach the age of 15 in 1970, or 110,000-120,000 young 
people. Of these, "not less than 45,000 young people exert pressure
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on the work force per year." Since the level of educational attain­
ment is not high, it would appear that Guatemala's large Indian popu­
lation exerts little pressure on the work force. Venezuela's plan 
shows a steadily decreasing per centage of population between the ages 
of 15 and 59 from 1950 to 1969.
Projection of Future Working-Age Population. Sixty-seven per cent of 
the countries in this study, representing 85 per cent of the popula­
tion under study, have published some form of future working-age 
population projection in their plans. The quality of the projec­
tions varies considerably; most of them do not present regional or 
single-year age estimates. In all, 19 countries present no estimates 
of future working-age populations —  all 15 of the countries that 
present no current estimates plus Swaziland, Senegal, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela.
Only 13 of the 22 African countries include projections of working- 
age population in their plans (see Table 2). Botswana's plan gives 
projections of both working-age population and wage employment, and 
expresses dismay at their implications. Even the most optimistic 
assumptions, it is noted, indicate a progressively decreasing per 
centage of the working-age population that can be absorbed into wage 
employment unless the population growth rate can be significantly re­
duced. Although Ivory Coast provides no figures on working-age 
population, either present or future, it anticipates that the demand 
for manual labour will outstrip the supply and therefore expects to 
absorb an increasing number of immigrants, who already were estimated 
to comprise about 25 per cent of the population in 1965.
In Asia, 17 of the 20 countries provide working-age projections
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(see Table 3). India's plan notes that a decline in the population 
growth rate "affects the growth of the labour force only after a lag 
of about 15 years." By that time India's labour force is expected 
to grow by 65 million, which "alone is more than three and a half 
times the present level of employment in the entire organised sector, 
including both public and private sectors." In making these pro­
jections the planners omitted from their calculations those under the 
age of 15 who were shown as workers in the 1971 census, as "it has 
been assumed that child labour will be abolished." Malaysia notes 
that a rapidly increasing working-age population is already placing 
a heavy burden on the economy, and expects that the high rate of growth 
in this cohort will continue through the 1970s.
Eleven of the 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries provide 
projections of working-age populations in their plans (see Table 4). 
Barbados expresses concern that its increasing working-age population 
will not continue to be absorbed in agriculture, and deplores the 
lack of capital and skills that would "permit sufficient alternative 
employment in other sectors. The situation is made more difficult by 
the small size of the population base, which acts as a brake on in­
dustrial development." Thus Barbados sees its population as at once 
too large and too small. Peru gives a projection of the "economically 
active population," but it is unclear whether this represents the pro­
jected employed population only or whether it also includes those who 
participate in the market economy but are not formally employed, or 
whether the figures are based on the projection of working-age 
population.
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CHAPTER TWO
POPULATION PROBLEMS RECOGNIZED BY DEVELOPMENT PLANNERS
Ten types of population problems are discussed in this study. The 
term is defined here as any current or future situation that is view­
ed by planners as a problem and whose causes are recognized in the 
plan as having some major demographic components. The objective, 
then, is to determine the perception of the development planners 
rather than to determine whether in fact the country has a popula­
tion problem.
Several necessary qualifications arise from this definition. 
Some plans directly refer to a demographic situation as a problem 
or discuss the problematic implications of the situation. For ex­
ample, a high dependency ratio or a rapidly increasing school-age 
population may be described as a strain on resources or a burden on 
the labour force or a hindrance to educational goals. Such a refer­
ence is considered an indication that the planners have recognized a
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population problem. A demographic situation discussed objectively 
in a plan without any such reference is not classified as a pro­
blem unless the overall thrust of the plan’s text implies recognition 
of a problem. Such judgments inevitably involve a subjective factor, 
but the need for them has arisen in only a few cases, and any errors 
could not have significantly overstated the level of problem percep­
tion. The possibility also exists, of course, that some planners 
have perceived certain situations as population problems but for 
some reason have intentionally or unintentionally not so described 
them in the plans.
Another qualification concerns the treatment of situations that 
have been recognized as problems but have not been clearly recognized 
as population problems. Obviously the problems dealt with by devel­
opment planners are complex in causes and consequences. The causes 
themselves are complex and are perceived in various ways according to 
one’s ideology, training, interests, and experience. What may seem 
to some to be unemployment caused by population growth is likely to 
be perceived by others as the surplus labour assumed to be inherent 
in a capitalist society or, more commonly, as a shortage of jobs 
rather than an excess of people. Thus in this study a situation is 
classified as a population problem only when the development plan it­
self makes a causal link between population growth or age structure 
and a social or economic problem, or if a population component is 
mentioned explicitly as one of several factors contributing direct­
ly to a social or economic problem.
Shortages Perspective
One of the most important advantages of medium- and long-range plans
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over short-term plans is that they permit .long-term trends to emerge 
more clearly, and a broader perspective on various problems may be 
gained. If it is estimated, for example, that x per cent of a 
country*s population is presently without adequate housing, and that 
some very large number of housing units will have to be built within 
the next five years merely to keep that percentage from increasing, 
one may easily conclude that the problem does not reside wholly in 
a laggard construction industry. Yet many such social problems dis­
cussed in medium-range development plans are still perceived as the 
results of shortages —  shortages of jobs, schools, doctors, and so
on. There are indeed shortages, but the reasons for them are often
not fully examined or related to needs created by a growing popula­
tion, even over the period covered by the plan. Why should this be,
if, as has been said, medium-range plans provide perspective on emerg­
ing trends? The answer seems to lie primarily in population projec­
tions or the lack of them. When population projections are lacking 
or inadequate, it is all too easy to restrict one*s view of a short­
age of houses, say, to the obvious reasons —  lack of money to pay 
for them, lack of jobs that would provide that money, lack of invest­
ment that would provide those jobs, and so on. The role of rapid 
population growth is less immediately evident. Countries that make 
strong use of population projections, on the other hand, are less 
inclined to view social problems as the results of shortages and 
more likely to view them in a framework of multiple causes, in which 
emerging trends, including those of population, are taken into 
account.
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Severity and Breadth of Problems
The perceived severity of population problems cannot be directly 
measured by this classification system. It is partly for this rea­
son that extensive excerpts from the plans are presented in Part 
Two of Population and Planning in Developing Nations, A Review of 
Sixty Development Plans for the 1970s. The plan excerpts are not 
included in the thesis because they were too lengthy. The Bangladesh 
plan, for example, not only recognizes a broad range of problems but 
also perceives them as critical obstacles to development and devotes 
much attention to them. A country's recognition of the severity of 
a particular problem cannot be reflected in this study's classifica­
tion system. However, we can make inferences about the breadth of 
a country's problem recognition by examining the range of population 
problems the country specifically recognizes (see Tables 5-8).
Ommission of Problems
What can be inferred from a plan that omits any mention of specific 
or general population problems? It is not always easy to discover 
whether the omission is meaningful or not. This study's systematic 
content analysis of 10 types of problem, 8 demographic parameters, 
and 16 policy dimensions provides a framework for evaluating a 
particular omission. The breadth of problem recognition in a par­
ticular country may be compared with the breadth of its demographic 
data and population policies. Specific problems or omissions of 
problems can in some cases be compared with corresponding demographic 
parameters. For example, nonrecognition of a school-age population 
problem gains in significance if it is accompanied by estimates of 
current and future school-age population. But inferences are limited
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when one is restricted to the contents of a plan.
Why might members of a planning commission omit mention of popu­
lation problems from their national development plan?
1. They did not have a population problem.
2. They had a population problem but did not realize it.
3. The planning was not taken seriously —  it was carried out
only for political or publicity reasons.
4. They realized there was a problem but either intentionally 
or unintentionally failed to mention it because:
(a) They were powerless to resolve it by either influencing 
the growth rate or accommodating to it.
(b) It would have been a political liability to do so.
(c) The situation was viewed as a social problem, and they 
were more interested in planning for the growth of the 
economic sectors.
(d) They were not reviewing problems, but outlining pro­
grammes and budgets.
Recognition of Population Problems
Of the 60 development plans studied, 38 recognize some type of popu­
lation problem (as defined in this study). These countries represent 
81 per cent of the combined population of the countries under study. 
The 12 African countries —  55 per cent of these studied —  also repre­
sent 55 per cent of the African population under study. The 15 Asian 
countries —  75 per cent —  represent 97 per cent of the Asian popu­
lation under study. The 11 countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean form only 26 per cent of the population of that area under 
study.
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Algeria
1970-1973
Botswana
1970-1975 
Burundi
1968-1972
Cameroon
1971-1976 
Ethiopia
1968-1973 
Ivory Coast
1971-1975
Kenya
1970-1974
Mali
1970-1972
Mauritania
1970-1973 
Mauritius
1971-1975 
Morocco
1973-1977
Nigeria
1970-1974 
Senegal
1969-1973 
Somalia
1971-1973
South Africa 
1966-1971 
Sudan
1970/71-1974/75
Swaziland
1973-1977
Tanzania
1969-1974
Togo
1971-1975 
Tunisia
1973-1976
Uganda
1971/72-1975/76
Zambia
1972-1976
X X  X
X  X
X  X
X
X
X
X  X
X  X
X  X  X  X  X  X  X
X X  X
X X  X  X X  X
X
X X  X X
X  X  X  X  X  X
X  X  X  X  X
x x x x x  x x x x
X  X  X  X  X  X  X
X X X  X  X
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TA B LE 7 Population problems recognized in national development plans of
1970s, Asia
Countries
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Afghanistan
1967-1971
Bangladesh X X X
1973-1978
India X X X
1974-1979
Indonesia X X X
1969/70-1973 /74
Iran X
1968-1972
Iraq X
1970-1974
Israel
1974-1978
Korea, Republic o f X
1972-1976
Laos
1969-1974
Lebanon
1972-1977
Malaysia X X
1971-1975
Nepal X X X
1970-1975
Pakistan a X X X
1970-1975
Philippines X X X
1972-1975
Saudi Arabia
1970
Sri Lanka X X
1972-1976
Taiwan X X
1969-1972
Thailand X X X
1972-1976
Turkey X X
1973-1977
Vietnam, Republic o f6 X
1972-1975
X  X  X  X  X  X X
X X X  X  X
X  X
X  
X
X
X X X  X  X  x  X
X  X  X  X  X X
X  X  X X X  X
X X X  
X X  X
X  X  X  X  X  X  X
X  X
X
‘'Before the independence o f Bangladesh. 
^Before unification with North  Vietnam.
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TABLE 8 Population problems recognized in national development plans o f
1970s, Latin Am erica and the Caribbean
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Argentina
1974-1977
Barbados
1969-1972 
Brazil
1972-1974 
Chile
1971-1976
Colombia
1970-1973 
Costa Rica
1974
Dominican Republic
1968-1985 
El Salvador
1973-1977 
Guatemala
1971-1975 
Guyana
1972-1976 
Haiti
1970-1971
Panama
1970-1980  
Paraguay
1971-1975 
Peru
1971-1975
Puerto Rico
1969-1972 
Trinidad and Tobago
1969-1973 
Uruguay
1973-1977 
Venezuela
1970-1974
X  X
X
X  X
X X X
X X X
X  X
X  X  X  X
X  X  
X  X
X  X
X  X  X  X
X  X
X  X
X X X
X
X X  X
X  X X
X
X  X  X  X  X  X
X X  X  X X X
X
“Argentina described its population growth rate as too low.
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The ten population problems, plus a recognition of "any type of 
population problem," are listed in Tables 5-8.
Growth of Working-Age Population Viewed as a Population Problem 
Almost all of the countries studied recognize unemployment as a pro­
blem —  but how is the role of population growth perceived in relation 
to unemployment? An attempt has been made to assess this perception, 
to note whether or not the development plan drew a direct causal 
link between the growth of population and unemployment. Unemployment 
in this study is classified as a population problem only if a national 
plan assesses population growth as one of its component causes.
If, for example, a plan merely discusses unemployment in relation 
to surplus labour or jobs that could be created, those planners do 
not appear to perceive a population problem.
Twenty-six countries, or 43 per cent of the countries studied, 
cite rapid population growth as a component of their unemployment 
problems 45 per cent of the African countries (see Table 6), 50 
per cent of the Asian countries (see Table 7), and 33 per cent of 
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (see Table 8).
In most of the countries under study the level of unemployment 
and underemployment is high and growing. Planning for full employ­
ment has not been undertaken, although some special projects for 
increasing it have been planned. The establishment of employment 
targets is seldom based on a projection of labour-force growth.
The plans usually emphasize production rather than employment.
Ten African countries recognize working-age population growth 
as a population problem. Botswana states flatly, "The analysis of 
the labour force and the projected expansion in wage employment •..
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indicates clearly that, even on the most optimistic assumptions con­
cerning long-term economic growth, the percentage of the labour force 
in wage employment will continue to fall unless the rate of growth of 
population is curbed significantly." Togo links its estimates of 
the working-age population with unemployment, and although the 
population components of unemployment are not discussed further, the 
plan does state that they make visible one of "the most important 
problems in Togo."
Among the ten Asian countries that view working-age population 
growth as a population problem, Bangladesh and Pakistan list it as 
one of a number of problems that they propose to attack vigorously 
by an array of population strategies, while Indonesia compares the 
growth rate with the rate of economic expansion and is concerned 
about the unequal distribution of the working-age population, which 
it links with "the limited absorption capacity of the available culti­
vated land," which "causes a population increase in towns which cannot 
offer jobs so that the underemployment in rural areas extends to 
urban areas where it becomes full unemployment ...."
Colombia, one of six countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
that recognize this problem, explores the impact of population growth 
on employment and the economy, which it views as increasingly serious. 
Since a decline in fertility can have no effect on the labour market 
for 15 years, Colombia proposes to implement its population policy 
with strategies to reduce urbanization as well as fertility. The 
impact of working-age population on employment is the only population 
problem recognized in Costa Rica's plan.
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School-Age Increase Viewed as a Population Problem
The changing age distribution of a population affects both the demand 
for education and the capacity of a society to supply the demand.
The age composition of a population is usually predominantly deter­
mined by past fertility rather than past mortality. Most of the 
countries in this study have had high levels of fertility, which have 
resulted in extremely young age structures. In addition, infant 
mortality rates are declining in many of these countries, contribut­
ing further to young age structures. Under these conditions both 
the absolute size and the proportion of the population in the school- 
age groups are increasing dramatically. Even if a moderate decline 
in fertility is assumed, the number of school-age children in the 
Third World will nearly triple by the year 2000. Just to maintain 
the present unsatisfactory standards of education, the number of 
teachers and schools must be tripled.
At the same time, there is a declining proportion of the popula­
tion in the working-age cohorts that must support the ever-increasing 
young populations educational needs. Thus societal capacity for 
even maintaining past per-student educational expenditure is reduced.
The increasing school-age population is recognized as a problem 
by only 23 of the 60 countries studied or 38 per cent. Thirty-two 
per cent of the African countries studied (see Table 6), 40 per cent 
of the Asian countries studied (see Table 7), and 44 per cent of the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean studied (see Table 8) 
recognize such a problem. Although there is not much difference 
in the percentage of countries in each region that recognize this 
problem, about four-fifths of the combined populations of the coun­
tries both of Africa and of Latin America and the Caribbean live in
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nations that do not discuss the increasing school-age population in 
their plans.
Six of the seven African countries and five of the six countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean that include projections of the 
school-age population in their plans recognize the increasing school- 
age population as a problem. Only 6 of the 14 Asian countries that 
use such projections, however, discuss the problem of increasing 
school-age populations.
Burundi, which has no policies or programmes designed to limit 
fertility, proposes to deal with Mthe rapid increase of the primary 
school-age population” by constructing 300 new classrooms. -Mauritius, 
on the other hand, recognizes that "a high proportion of children in 
the population means that a high proportion of public expenditure . 
needs to be devoted simply to maintaining the level of social services, 
in particular education •.. instead of being available for an improve­
ment in those services, not least for the benefit of the children 
themselves. A population policy for Mauritius must aim at reducing 
fertility rates ... in order to improve the age structure of the 
population .... To state the obvious, a population policy ... must 
be concerned with the dynamics of population growth and not with the 
absolute levels of population.” It is obvious to Mauritius but it 
seems less clear to most of the other countries whose development 
plans are explored in this study.
Nepal computes the number of children at the primary, middle, 
and higher education levels in 1981 on the basis of its population 
projections and states that ”if the estimated growth of population 
were to take place ... it would be more and more difficult to fulfill 
the increasing needs in the field of education.” Thailand's plan
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notes that "since the birth rate cannot be instantly slowed down, 
the number of students will greatly increase each year at every 
educational level, while the budget for educational development will 
not increase at the same rate. Under these circumstances, educa­
tional development, both in quantity and quality, might not be 
achieved as fast as planned."
The only population problem discussed in Puerto Rico*s plan 
is the increase in the school-age population. Guatemala discusses 
its rapidly increasing school-age population in detail, and recog­
nizes that "school-age" does not necessarily mean "school-attending." 
The sheer numbers of children under 15 "obligates the use of ele­
vated proportions of family investment" for their care and "neces­
sitates the employment of young children, restricting their neces­
sary education, which is a decisive factor for social and economic 
progress on a large scale."
Economic Growth Reduced by Population Growth
Twenty-three countries, 38 per cent of those studied, present state­
ments to the effect that their economic growth has been reduced by 
population growth. A few plans discuss intermediate variables to 
explain how economic growth is influenced by population growth, 
but most either simply observe that population growth reduces per 
capita income or do not comment further on the relationships.
In most of these plans, the relationship between population and 
the development process (excluding the demands upon governmental 
services) is not treated at all. But in several plans a capital- 
output ratio is introduced, and the investment needed to offset the 
population growth's "deterrence" on per capita income is calculated.
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For example, if the country's total, income is increasing at 6 per 
cent per year, its population is increasing at 2 per cent per year, 
and its marginal capital-output ratio is 3 to 1, then 6 per cent of 
the total income must be invested each year just to maintain the 
current level of per capita income. For every increase of 1 per 
cent in per capita income, 3 per cent of the total national income 
must be invested. This kind of analysis has serious deficiencies, 
of course. A few plans go further to look at the effects of the age 
structure on dependency and social overhead costs, and at ways in 
which these effects influence the potential for higher investment 
levels and more directly productive uses for that investment. Other 
plans mention the pressure of population on resources, especially in 
certain sectors such as agriculture.
Seven African countries discuss such problems in their plans 
(see Table 6). They represent 32 per cent of the African countries 
under study and 45 per cent of the population. Botswana's,plan 
states that at the country's present stage of development, "economic 
growth is in no way assisted by the rising population." Morocco 
suggests a relationship between the need to reduce the population 
growth rate and "matters of production" but does not elaborate. 
Mauritius, as always, takes the large view. Stating flatly that the 
island "has become overpopulated," the plan goes on: "The population
of Mauritius cannot be contained within the present structure of the 
economy. A population policy cannot in this situation be a substi­
tute for the structural changes that are needed in the economy; it 
needs to be an integral part of a strategy for the economic and social 
development of the people of Mauritius."
The 11 Asian countries (see Table 7) total 55 per cent of the
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Asian countries studied but represent 88 per cent of the population. 
Iran recognizes that its economic development has been adversely 
affected by population growth and considers the implementation of a 
family planning programmtfessential." The Philippine plan states that 
considerable resources that could otherwise be used for direct devel­
opment projects must be diverted for educational and other services 
required by the country’s large dependent population.
In Latin America and the Caribbean area only five countries, 
or 28 per cent of those studied in the region, mention the effects 
of population growth on economic growth (see Table 8). These countries 
represent only 16 per cent of the population of the area. Guatemala's 
plan states, "Development is a slow process, difficult and expensive, 
and the rapid increase in population constitutes one of the most ser­
ious obstacles."
Thus in most of these 23 plans, population growth is viewed as 
a hindrance but not as an overwhelming obstacle to development.
Several plans, however —  Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Thailand —  view population growth as the critical obstacle to devel­
opment. Not a single plan explicitly states that economic growth is 
being reduced because population growth is too low. Argentina wants 
a larger population, but that is because it has "frontier" regions 
that it wants settled. Barbados, as we have seen, feels that its 
population is at the same time too small aid too large —  that is, 
its high density does not permit continued absorption of the growing 
labour force in agriculture, but at the same time the smallness of 
its population is felt to act "as a brake on industrial development" 
by limiting large-scale production. No arguments are found in any 
other development plan in support of rapid population growth to pro-
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mote economic development.
Population Pressure on Social Services
The increasing population, as well as the increase in the number of 
children, is cited as a problem affecting the cost, adequacy, and 
nature of government social and welfare services in 22 countries, or 
37 per cent of those studied (see Table 5). The population pressure 
from migration into urban areas, where such services are most often 
provided, is also discussed in many plans. Plans including only 
pressures from migration are not included in this classification, 
however•
In many respects this category encompasses the other classifi­
cations of health, education, and housing, but discussion of these 
factors in a plan is not sufficient to qualify the plan for inclusion 
here. A discussion of either other welfare programmesor/social ser­
vices in general has been required for inclusion in this category.
The six African countries that mention population pressures on 
social services in their development plans (see Table 6) represent 27 
per cent of the African countries under study and 16 per cent of the 
African population under study. Uganda's plan claims that if the 
population growth rate were reduced (it does not say how much), the 
government would be able to "increase, by about one-third, per capita 
expenditure on the social services." Zambia says that the projected 
high rate of population growth accentuates "the need for accelerat­
ed social services development."
The nine Asian countries (see Table 7) account for 45 per cent 
of the Asian countries under study and 76 per cent of the Asian popu­
lation under study. Nepal, concerned about the density of population
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in the Katmandu Valley, says that *'it will be more and more difficult 
to arrange necessary social and economical infrastructure (such as 
education, health, housing, culture and recreation) because of the 
increase in population." Turkey states that its population growth 
rate of 2.7 per cent "leads to a great amount of expenditure in ... 
various social services."
The seven countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that ex­
press concern about population pressure on social services represent 
39 per cent of the area's countries under study but only 22 per cent 
of their population. Colombia regards the expansion of social ser­
vices in rural areas as essential as a means of drawing people from 
the overcrowded cities and encouraging the present inhabitants to 
remain. Trinidad and Tobago assert that population pressure on social 
services is placing a "tremendous burden on Government recurrent 
expenditure."
High Dependency Ratio
The dependency ratio is the ratio of the population considered in­
eligible for productive activity to the population that is considered 
to be in the prime working ages. The productive years are commonly 
considered to be 15-65. Countries with the higheset levels of fertil­
ity generally have the highest dependency ratios. The higher the de­
pendency ratio, the greater the burden on society, although one of 
the positive effects of a high dependency ratio may be a younger, 
healthier, and more productive labour force.
Nineteen countries, or 32 per cent of those studied, recognize 
high dependency ratios as problems in their development plans; these 
countries account for 62 per cent of the combined population of the
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countries under study.
The four African countries (see Table 6) account for 18 per 
cent of the African countries under study but 36 per cent of the pop­
ulation. While Nigeria recognizes that the "high youth-dependency 
ratio is, of course, serious from the viewpoint of mobilizing domestic 
saving and of growth-inducing capital formation,*' at the same time 
it considers that it "offers an opportunity for innovations in social 
organization, designed to harness the energies of the youth more pur­
posefully for the development process." Tanzania considers it "very 
good to increase our population, because our country is large and 
there is plenty of unused land. But it is necessary to remember that' 
the increasing numbers of children born every year will be babies 
in arms, not workers .... It is obvious that just as the number of 
our children is increasing, so-the burden on the adults —  the work­
ers — is increasing."
The eight Asian countries concerned about high dependency 
ratios (see Table 7) account for 40 per cent of the Asian countries 
under study but 75 per cent of the population. Bangladesh states 
that if its high rate of population growth continues, "the percentage 
of dependent population will further increase, aggravating the already 
unfavourable population structure." Such a high dependency ratio is 
not conducive to the growth of the economy, as it will neutralize 
many of the gains obtained by the country's development efforts. 
Thailand points out that "for every 100 Thais of working age the 
number of dependents 15 years or under is as much as 89. This repre­
sents a heavy burden and limits the improvement of living standards 
for many large families."
The seven countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (see Table
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8) comprise 39 per cent of the area's nations under study but only 
22 per cent of their population. Venezuela notes that its popula­
tion under 15 rose from 42 per cent in 1950 to 47 per cent in 1969, 
while the 15-59 age group fell from 54 per cent to 49 per cent.
"The proportion of adults will continue to decline, with a corres­
ponding elevation in the coefficient of dependency and a decline 
of the level of participation, which has diverse repercussions, social 
and economic ...." Guatemala states that "the population under 15 
years of age constitutes a serious problem in the short term, inde­
pendent of future changes in fertility pattern, for now those al­
ready b o m  require education at all levels and assistance in the 
area of health, including nutrition, for the next 15 years."
Population Pressure on Health Services
Many of the same factors that put pressure on education and social 
services are mentioned in the plans as affecting health services.
It is often felt that rapid population growth, increased aspirations 
for medical services, and urbanization ensure the failure of current 
medical facilities to meet the demand for them. Some countries re­
cognize that their health services need to be greatly expanded just 
to maintain the current inadequate ratios of the services to popu­
lation. They also recognize that high-fertility populations with 
a large proportion of infants require increased medical facilities. 
Public health measures implemented on a large scale are, of course, 
credited for dramatic declines in mortality. Personal health ser­
vices are viewed as inadequate and necessary, though costly.
Nineteen countries, or 32 per cent of those studied, mention 
population pressures on health services in their development plans;
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they represented only 22 per cent of the combined population under 
study. The nine African countries (see Table 6) account for 41 per 
cent of the African countries under study and represent 45 per cent 
of the African population under study. Mauritius notes that free 
or low-cost services provided by the government, in particular the 
health agencies, "are an important part of the consumption of the 
lower income groups, which in Mauritius include the great mass of 
the population." A great increase in expenditures for these ser­
vices "has resulted in the level of these services being barely main­
tained.” Swaziland calculates that "if current fertility rates 
remain unchanged, an average of 60 new beds in general hospitals 
will have to be provided each year until the year 2000 to ensure that 
the bedjpopulation ratio has not deteriorated by then .... Such 
demands would require additional physical facilities and personnel 
which are well beyond the reach of Swaziland's limited resources.”
The six Asian countries that express concern about population 
pressure on health services (see Table 7) account for 30 per cent of 
the Asian countries under study but only 20 per cent of the popul- 
lation. Sri Lanka states that any further increase in the birth rate 
would place "inordinate strains” on hospitals and other services, "and 
in such a situation, it is only by a shift of investment from pro­
ductive activities that it would be possible to maintain these ser­
vices even at present levels." Pakistan, which in 1970 had only 
one doctor for 6,000 persons, one hospital bed for about 3,000, 
and one nurse for 1,500, says that it is committed to providing its 
people with adequate health care, but that every gain it managers 
to make in this area is "swallowed by the rapidly growing popula­
tion."
53
The four countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that 
mention population pressure on health services (see Table 8) repre­
sent 22 per cent of the area's countries under study but only 10 
per cent of the population. The Dominican Republic says that unless 
family size is reduced in the poorest, neediest sectors, expenditures 
for health services must increase, "reducing the amount available 
for the economic development that these same families need."
Population Pressure on Housing
Although acute housing shortages are recognized in a number of plans, 
housing data from precise studies are usually not available. A 
number of plans discuss housing problems, but only 14 countries (23 
per cent of those studied) assert in their plans that housing con­
struction cannot keep up with the increase in population or the rate 
of new family formations. Plans that discuss housing shortages 
only in terms of migration and urbanization are not included in 
this classification.
The three African countries (see Table 6) that recognize popu­
lation pressure on housing as a problem represent 14 per cent of the 
African countries under study and 9 per cent of the population. 
Tunisia estimates that even if "old and unhealthy real estate" is 
renovated, roughly 59,000 new housing units will still be required 
each year to accommodate the population increase. Zambia declares, 
"The overcrowding in urban areas in general and in the squatter areas 
in particular is intensified by ... the high rate of demographic 
growth."
The seven Asian countries that are concerned about population 
pressure on housing (see Table 7) represent 35 per cent of the Asian
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countries under study but 72 per cent of the population. South 
Korea's plan states that although there were 50,000 more housing 
units in the country in 1970 than in 1966, there was still an unfill­
ed demand in 1970 for 1.2 million residences. This meant that 22 
per cent of total housing demands were not being met. Korea's 
planners blame the housing shortage on population growth, the dis­
solution of the extended family system, urbanization, and the rising 
costs of land and construction materials, in that order.
The four countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that ac­
knowledge population pressure on housing (see Table 8) represent 
22 per cent of the area's countries under study but only 5 per cent 
of the population. Guatemala estimates that during the decade of 
the 1970s its population growth will require a minimum of 320,000 
new houses and as many as 403,000 if the growth rate is not reduced. 
Trinidad and Tobago declare that housing construction cannot keep 
up with population growth and the formation of new families.
Population Pressure on Individual or Family Welfare 
Eleven plans (18 per cent) mention the effects of population groxjth 
on either individual or family welfare; for example, health of moth­
ers and children and distribution of scarce resources among members 
of large families. Often these pressures are discussed in conjunction 
with a rationale for family planning service. A number of other 
countries indirectly imply population pressure on individual and 
family standards of living in their discussions of other population 
problems.
Four African countries (18 per cent of those under study) re­
cognize population pressure on individual and family welfare (see
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Table 6), Swaziland's planners, after discussing the ill effects 
of population growth on employment and health services, state, 
nperhaps even more significant, however, as far as the individual is 
concerned, are the effects of such rapid rates of population growth 
on the welfare of the family .... If current fertility rates are 
not reduced, the number of children in the 0-14 age group will almost 
treble by the end of the century. This situation can only have ser­
ious detrimental effects on the health of mothers and children. 
Maternal death rates are known to increase sharply as the number of 
pregnancies goes beyond three, while the inadequate spacing of births, 
itself a direct cause of nutritional deficiency in mothers, also 
exposes their children to inadequate nutrition and care which may 
permanently stunt their growth and development.”
Four Asian countries (20 per cent of those studied) express 
concern about population pressure on individual and family welfare 
(see Table 7). Indonesia's plan notes that the health and welfare 
of families and their individual members have not yet reached "pro­
per” levels, largely because families are too large to give their 
members adequate clothing, health care, education, and living con­
ditions in general. Thailand states that its high birth rate has a 
harmful effect on living conditions and on the quality of the labour 
force.
Three countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (17 per cent) 
are equally concerned about this problem (see Table 8). Typical in 
this regard is the plan of Trinidad and Tobago, which says that "it 
has been found necessary to reduce considerably our rapid rate of 
population growth" in keeping with the government's policy of rais­
ing the standard of living of the entire population.
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Population Pressure on Food or Agricultural Systems 
One of the great shortcomings of development plans is the scanty 
attention often paid to food and agricultural development. This 
seems surprising in view of the near-famine conditions in some 
countries. It is also unfortunate because the great majority of 
people in the Third World live in rural areas, and agricultural pro­
ductivity may well be the key to development in most nations. Too 
often development planners emphasize the modern sectors and high- 
prestige, capital-intensive manufacturing projects at the expense 
of agriculture. Still less has been done on the complex relations 
between agriculture and population.
Only ten countries, or 17 per cent of those studied, recognize 
population pressures on food supplies or on agricultural systems in 
their development plans. They do, however, represent almost half 
(49 per cent) of the combined population under study. The three 
African countries represent 14 per cent of the African countries 
under study but only 10 per cent of the population. Burundi notes 
that "the need of a growing population for space decreases the avail­
able land for cultivation." Togo notes that "the rate of increase 
of the production of cereals has been particularly slow and sometimes 
below the rate of demographic growth." Tunisia also voices concern 
about the pressure exerted by a growing population on food production.
Five Asian countries (25 per cent) mention this problem. 
Bangladesh states that as population grows, more land is needed to 
grow more food, and the country simply does not have enough land to 
satisfy the competing demands being made on it by a rapidly in­
creasing population. Thailand feels that rapid population growth 
tends to reduce the average size of farms and thus slows the agri-
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cultural development required to feed the additional mouths.
Only two of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
under study voice concern about this problem. Guatemala, which re­
cognizes nine of the ten population problems dealt with here —  
only three other countries, all of them in Asia, recognize as 
many —  mentions this one too. Trinidad and Tobago also discuss 
"the need for a high rate of increase in the production of food*' 
to feed their expanding population.
High Population Density Viewed as a Population Problem 
This investigation has aimed to determine which plans perceive the 
population density to the entire country as a problem. A number 
of countries mention problems with urban or regional population den­
sities, but these were excluded from the study. So, of course, was 
the one plan (Argentina's) that expressed the view that the density 
was too low.
The plans of only five countries, representing 8 per cent of 
those studied and 6 per cent of the combined population under study, 
recognize high population density as a problem. The two African 
countries, Burundi and Mauritius, represent 9 per cent of the Afri­
can countries under study but only 2 per cent of the population.
The Burundi plan calls its population density "exceptional for Africa." 
Mauritius, a small island, discusses its high density in relation to 
its size and to the fact that its agricultural technology, already 
at a high level, cannot employ an ever-increasing labour force.
The two Asian countries, Bangladesh and Nepal, represent 10 per 
cent of the Asian countries under study and 8 per cent of the popu­
lation. The language of the Bangladesh plan leaves no doubt about
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the seriousness with which population density is viewed there:
"The present 3 per cent growth rate of its population will double it 
in 23 years and' treble it by the beginning of the next century.
Even a doubling of population on the limited land space of Bangla­
desh is a disturbing prospect. A trebling of the population is 
simply frightful to visualise." Nepal states that its overall pop­
ulation density is 173.2 persons per square mile* In view of the 
country's mountainous terrain, the amount of habitable land, and the 
amount of land under cultivation, "the density of population seems 
to be quite high," and the population density of the Katmandu 
Valley is much higher. "It seems desirable," Nepal's planners 
say, "to launch a programme resettling some people from the highly 
densely populated region to the less densely populated regions ...."
In Latin America and the Caribbean, only Barbados clearly re­
cognizes a density problem. Its high population density on such a 
small amount of land, its planners say, will not permit the continu­
ed absorption of the labour force in agriculture, and a lack of capital 
and skills prevents its absorption elsewhere.
CHAPTER THREE
POPULATION POLICIES PROPOSED IN DEVELOPMENT PLANS
The population policies treated in this study are rather select:
They are limited to specific policies or programmes that are design­
ed to reduce fertility and have at least partially a demographic 
rationale. The study does not deal with policies involving migration 
(internal or international) or with policies influencing mortality. 
Policies that may have an unintended consequence upon fertility are 
also excluded, but policies that may have indirect effects on fertil­
ity are included if they have been proposed or discussed in the con­
text of fertility reduction. A search was made for pronatalist 
policies in development plans but only one was found, in the Argentine 
plan.
Policies designed to accommodate to population growth have 
been excluded from the study. Although they might rightfully be 
regarded as population policies, they are too broad and too implicit
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in other policies to be studied in this context. Accommodation 
policies are in some ways reflected in the sections analyzing the 
use of demographic data and the recognition of population problems.
This study is concerned only with population policies that 
have been proposed in the national development plans; it does not 
attempt to evaluate fully their actual implementation or demographic 
effectivenss. In order to assess a country*s population policy fully, 
one must study various other dimensions, many of which are outside 
the planning process and the development plan. Many of the popula­
tion policy programmes outlined in plans are never implemented; 
on the other hand, some countries implement programmes not mentioned 
in their development plans. Planning is an ongoing process and 
plans are quickly outdated, especially in regard to population, since 
so many countries have only recently adopted population policies.
Plans are also made obsolete when governments change; this has hap­
pened to several of the plans considered in this study.
While a development plan may contain some hollow policy state­
ments, it may also neglect to mention policies that a country in 
fact pursues. A policy may be unstated because it is an obvious and 
commonly accepted objective, such as lowering mortality; or the policy 
may be intentionally unstated because it is politically divisive.
I
Government officials may have every intention of extending family plan­
ning programmes, for example, but may consider it wiser to talk only 
of expanding maternal and child health services. As discussed in 
the introduction, the reality of planning is often not very concrete; 
yet, if the contents of national development plans are interpreted 
very cautiously, they can yield important information about population 
policy.
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Algeria
19~0—1973
Botswana
19*0-1975
Burundi
1968-1972
C am eroon
19~1—1976 
Ethiopia
1968-1973  
Ivory Coast
19“ 1 —197 5 
Kenya
19“0—1974 
Mali
19*0 -1972  
Mauritania v
19“0—1973
Mauritius
19“ 1—1975 
Morocco 
19*3-1977  
Nigeria
1970-1974  
Senegal ""
1969-1973  
Somalia
1971-1973  
South Africa
1966-1971
Sudan
1970/71-1974/75
Swaziland
1973-1977
Tanzania
1969-1974
Togo
1971-1975  
Tunisia
1973-1976
Uganda
1971/72-1975/76
/Gambia
1972-1976
X X X X  X
X X  X
X  X X X
X X X
X  X
X  X
X
X  X  X  X
X  X
X
X  X
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TA B LE  11 Population policies in national development plans o f 1970s, Asia
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Afghanistan
1967-1971 
Bangladesh
1973-1978 
India
1974-1979 
Indonesia
1969/70-1973/74
Iran
1968-1972 
Iraq
1970-1974 
Israel
1974-1978 
Korea Republic of
1972-1976
Laos
1969-1974 
Lebanon v
1972-1977
Malaysia
1971-1975 
Nepal
1970-1975
X  X X X X X X X X X X X X P X  
X  X X X X X X X X X  X X  X  
X  X  X  X  
X X  X
X  X  X  X  X
X  X  X  X  X  ?
X
Pakistan0 
1970-1975 
Philippines 
1972-1975 
Saudi Arabia 
1970 
Sri Lanka 
1972-1976 
Taiwan6 
1969-1972 
Thailand
1972-1976  
Turkey
1973-1977
Vietnam, Republic oP X  X  
1972-1975
X  X X X  
X  X
X X  X
X
X X X
X X X  X  
X  X
X
“Before the independence of Bangladesh.
Taiwan's family planning progranrfand population policies are not presented in its five-year 
economic development plan, but they are outlined in its ten-year health plan (1966-1975). 
'Before unification with North Vietnam.
? = Policy as stated in plan does not fit category precisely.
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T A B LE  12 Population policies in national development plans o f 1970s, Latin
America and the Caribbean
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Argentina X
1974-1977
Barbados X  X X X  X X  X
1969-1972  
Brazil
1972-1974  
Chile
1971-1976
Colombia X  X X  X
1970-197?
Costa Rica
1974
Dominican Republic
1968-1985  
El Salvador
1973-1977
Guatemala X  X
1971-1975
Guyana
1972-1976  
Haiti
1970-1971  
Panama X  X
1970-1980  
Paraguay
. 1971-1975
Peru
1971-1975  
Puerto Rico
1969-1972
Trinidad and Tobago X  X  X  X  X X  X
1969-1973  
Uruguay
1973-1977  
Venezuela
1970-1974
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This study looks at 16 dimensions of policy found in national 
development plans (see Tables 9-12) and discusses them in order of 
their frequency. The policy classifications provide a framework for 
a systematic review of the plans* contents. They are not meant to 
imply approval or advocacy of any particular policy in all cases.
Support of Family Planning for Demographic Reasons 
Of the countries that propose or support family planning programmes 
in their national development plans, nearly all do so with the expres­
sed intention of reducing the rate of population growth. This demo­
graphic rationale is often listed among such other goals as family 
well-being and maternal and child health, but every country studied 
supports such a policy at least partly from a demographic point of 
view. In all, the development plans of 25 of the 60 countries, or 
42 per cent, support family planning for demographic reasons. These 
countries represent 74 per cent of the combined population under study 
but, of course, only a fraction of this population is actually covered 
by such programmes.
In Africa, 8 of the 22 countries, or 36 per cent, support family 
planning programmes for demographic reasons (see Table 10); they 
represent 44 per cent of the combined African population under study. 
The Botswana plan expresses the hope that, partly with the help of 
the International Planned Parenthood Federation, a network of maternal 
and child welfare clinics can be established at which family planning 
advice will be available. The plan states that the country "can 
ill afford to allow a population explosion to outstrip the economic 
expansion." Kenya supports a family planning programme partly for 
demographic reasons and partly in the context of rising unemployment;
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plans of its programme expansion are outlined. Mauritius reports "a 
dramatic decline in fertility" and supports expansion of its family 
planning programme to reduce the island's fertility further. The 
plan contains a full chapter on the country's demographic situation, 
including details of programmatic implementation and population growth 
targets. Morocco continues to support its family planning programme 
for demographic reasons and presents a new population growth target. 
The plan also discusses "the weaknesses of past efforts." Nigeria 
proposes the integration of its family planning programme with the 
health ministry as a part of its overall population policy. It also 
announces that the government will establish a national population 
council to oversee the country's family planning and population activ­
ities and to coordinate external aid support for them. Swaziland 
discusses at some length the problems caused by rapid population 
growth and concludes that a family planning programme would be highly 
beneficial; however, no details of implementation are presented. The 
Tunisian plan outlines in detail the population growth targets of 
Tunisia's family planning programme, including the number of births 
to be averted by various future dates. Uganda supports family plan­
ning services because of the social, economic, and health problems 
arising from high birth rates. In addition, a population growth 
target is given for the programme.
In Asia, 12 of the 20 countries, or 60 per cent, support family 
planning programmes for demographic reasons in their plans (see Table 
11); they represent 91 per cent of the combined Asian population under 
study. The Bangladesh plan states in detail the country's plans for 
implementing its family planning programme. sri Lanka urges continued 
support for family planning but stresses that not nearly enough is
67
being done to come to grips with its severe population problems. The 
Thai planners outline in some detail their government's strengthened 
support of its family planning programme, and hope that it will 
substantially reduce the rate of population growth over the plan's 
duration. The South Vietnam plan, written before the end of the 
Vietnam war, mentions only a proposal to establish a family planning 
unit in every hospital, with the goal of limiting the rate of popula­
tion growth to 3 per cent.
In Latin America and the Caribbean 5 of the 18 countries, or 28 
per cent, support family planning programmes for demographic reasons 
in their plans (see Table 12); they represent 14 per cent of the com­
bined population of the 18 countries under study. The Barbados plan 
gives continued support to family planning in the hope that the birth 
rate will be reduced and the rate of population growth will be no 
greater than 1 per cent. In the Colombian plan there is some ambi­
guity about direct support of family planning. Although Colombia 
does have a policy of reducing fertility for demographic reasons and 
does urge that information and medical services be made available 
in this connection, it does not outline programmatic details or use 
the words "family planning." It does, however, outline a number of 
family planning and "beyond family planning" measures to be taken.
The Guatemala plan discusses several of its population problems and 
then identifies as its best alternative a family planning programme 
formulated in light of traditional attitudes and with respect for 
human life. No details of implementation are discussed. The Panama 
plan recommends that family planning be included as a part of its 
overall development strategy so that, over the long run, more funds 
will be available for direct economic development in place of expendi­
68
tures on health and education for a .larger population. The Trinidad 
and Tobago plan presents programmatic details for family planning ser­
vices that it is hoped will considerably reduce the rate of population 
growth and halve the birth rate in a decade.
Integration of Family Planning With Health Services 
A number of countries seeking to extend their provision of family 
planning have emphasized its integration with the national health 
system. This may or may not result in more effective or more utilized 
service; but if such integration is emphasized in the plan, it has 
been done at least partially with this end in mind. Since several 
of the countries under study have already fully integrated their 
family planning programmes with their health services, and some 
countries that do not officially sponsor family planning programmes 
nevertheless make family planning services available as a health 
measure in government health facilities^
^conclusions about the residual countries cannot be based only 
on the information given here. In all, 17 of the 60 countries, or 
28 per cent, mention in their national plans the integration of family 
planning with their health services; they represent 67 per cent of 
the combined population under study.
Five of the 22 African countries, or 23 per cent, mention in 
their plans the integration of family planning with health services 
in some form (see Table 10); they represent 30 per cent of the African 
population under study. Botswana urges the establishment of a net­
work of maternal and child health (MCH) clinics at which family 
planning advice would be available. Mauritius proposes that family 
planning services be made available in 50 health clinics, 30 of which
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are to be built during the plan period. Nigeria advocates the inte­
gration of various voluntary family planning schemes with the health 
and social welfare ministry. Swaziland stresses that family plan­
ning services could be implemented most effectively by being inte­
grated with the public health service, and especially with the regular 
MCH clinics. Uganda advocates the gradual administrative take-over 
of the family planning programme by the Ministry of Health and the 
training and equipping of the health staff for this service.
Eleven of the 20 Asian countries, or 55 per cent, support this 
integration in their plans (see Table 11), and they represent 88 per 
cent of the Asian population under study. The Bangladesh plan em­
phasizes that the Ministry of Health and Family Planning will supply 
contraceptive materials and services through its multipurpose field- 
workers. India aims at increasing the integration of family planning 
services with those for general health, MCH, and nutrition. Indonesia 
endorses government support for family planning activities by the MCH 
clinics, but the integration of nongovernment programmes with the 
health ministry is not mentioned in the plan. Iran proposes that 250 
counseling and MCH centers be converted into family welfare centers, 
where family planning services would be provided along with other 
health services. Malaysia proposes the integration of the family 
planning service with the rural health service system. Nepal says 
its family planning efforts have been intensively operated within the 
family planning and MCH project and that special family planning 
training has been given to its regular health personnel. Pakistan 
urges that whereever multipurpose rural health centers are available, 
family planning workers will be induced to integrate the services.
The Sri Lanka plan states that family planning services are provided
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in 40 per cent of the MCH clinics on the island but still in isola­
tion from most of their antenatal and postnatal activities. The 
plan asserts that provision is being made for family planning services 
to be well integrated with MCH activities throughout the island. The 
Thai plan proposes the integration of family planning services with 
100 hospitals and 4,000 health clinics. Turkey supports family 
planning in provincial health units as part of an integrated system 
of health care. The South Vietnam plan, written before the end of 
the war in Vietnam, proposes a family planning bureau at every hospit­
al .
Of the 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries studied, only 
one, Trinidad and Tobago, mentions this integration in its develop­
ment plan. It proposes to establish a family planning unit within 
the Ministry of Health. In addition to administering such activities, 
the unit would create a climate within the health services conducive 
to the provision of family planning services as an integral part of 
the country’s health care.
Population Growth Targets
It is important for development objectives to be quantified lest they 
become completely meaningless and impossible to evaluate; yet many 
of the early attempts to quantify population growth targets proved 
to be overly optimistic and highly impractical. Part of the problem 
arose because the planners often set targets without examining the 
assumptions (demographic as well as programmatic) that were necessary 
for their achievement.
Fifteen of the countries studied here, or 25 per cent, present 
some form of population growth target; they represent 55 per cent of
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the combined population, but only because Asia so outweighs the 
other regions. Although the targets are expressed in various para­
meters —  birth rates, rates of growth, gross reproduction rates, 
birth averted, and so on —  and over a range of time periods, all 
of them represent reductions in growth rates. Argentina, the only 
country trying to increase its growth rate, sets no specific target.
The plans of five African countries mention population growth 
targets (see Table 10). They represent 23 per cent of the African 
countries under study but only 14 per cent of the population. Botswana 
has a goal of reducing its 3.0 per cent rate of growth to 2.5 per 
cent per year averaged throughout the decade of the 1970s. It is 
hoped that this can be accomplished through the establishment of a 
network of MCH clinics that will provide family planning services and 
also through a programme of family planning and population education. 
The Mauritius plan establishes the goal of reducing the gross repro­
duction rate from 1.9 in 1969 to 1.2 in 1980-1985. Morocco hopes 
that its birth rate can be decreased from 49 per 1,000 in 1972 to 43 
in 1977. Tunisia hopes for a reduction in its general fertility 
rate from 162 in 1971 to 138 in 1981. The Ugandan plan presents the 
goal of reducing the rate of growth to 3 per cent in 1979. The plan 
suggest that a 10 per cent fertility decline would reduce the crude 
birth rate to 45 per 1,000; with a crude death rate of 15 per 1,000, 
the 3 per cent goal would be achieved.
In Asia, eight countries, or 40 per cent, have population growth 
targets (see Table 11), and they represent 74 per cent of the popula­
tion. Bangladesh sets the goal of a reduction in its rate of increase 
from 3.0 per cent to 2.8 per cent during^the plan period, 1973-1978.
The projected goal is a decline in the crude birth rate from 47 to 43
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per 1,000 along with a decline in the crude death rate from 17 to 
15 per 1,000 by the end of the plan period. The Fifth India Draft 
Plan discusses an earlier plan's goal of reducing the birth rate from 
39 to 32 by the end of the Fourth Plan period and then to 25 in 
another five to seven years. The planners expected that by the begin­
ning of the Fifth Plan period (1974) the birth rate would be around 
35, but that a drop to 25 by 1980-1981 was not feasible. The new 
target is to lower the rate to 30 by the end of the Fifth Plan period 
(1979) and then to 25 by 1983-1984. Contraceptive acceptor targets 
are proposed in order to link programme efforts with these goals. 
South Korea proposes to reduce its population growth rate from 1.8 
per cent in 1970 to 1.5 per cent in 1976. Malaysia proposes to re­
duce the rate of population growth from 3 per cent to 2 per cent by 
1985. The specific goal during the five-year plan period is a reduc­
tion in the birth rate from 35 per 1,000 to 32 by 1975. Malaysia 
also links its contraceptive acceptor targets to this goal. Nepal 
aims to reduce its birth rate from around 40 births per 1,000 by 
bringing about social and economic changes, and through providing 
family planning to at least 15 per cent of married couples. Pakistan 
aims to reduce the crude birth rate from 45 to 40 during the plan 
period (the plan was drawn up before the independence of Bangladesh). 
The Philippine planners set a goal of 50,000 contraceptive acceptors 
per month; if this goal is attained, they are reasonably confident 
that it will reduce the rate of population growth from 3.1 to 2.0 per 
cent per year. The objective of Thailand is to bring the growth rate 
down from 3.0 to 2.5 per cent by the end of the plan period (1976).
Only two countries of Latin America and the.Caribbean, or 11 per 
cent, have population growth targets (see Table 12); they represent
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less than 1 per cent of the population. The objectives of the Barbados 
plan are to bring the birth rate down from 22 in 1967 to no more than 
20, and the rate of increase down to no more than 1 per cent per year. 
Trinidad and Tobago aims to reduce the birth rate by 50 per cent over 
a period of ten years. Contraceptive acceptor targets are also pre­
sented in the plan.
Extension of Family Planning Services
Among the national plans that express support of family planning for 
demographic reasons, a few place special emphasis on its extension 
to a greater proportion of the public, to the population in the rural
areas, or to low-income groups.
In Africa, Botswana proposes to establish a network of MCH clinics 
with family planning services. Kenya proposes to double the existing 
130 family planning clinics (outside of Nairobi) and to more than 
double to 700 the number of part-time family planning workers. The 
plan*s proposed intent is to serve "most of the adult population." 
Mauritius proposes family planning services for 50 health clinics;
30 of the clinics are to be built during the plan period, with 20
located in the towns and 30 in the rural areas. Tunisia proposes to
advertise its family planning programme more intensively but does 
not indicate whether its family planning services will have to be
expanded if its campaign is successful in attracting acceptors. Uganda
proposes the use of mobile units to enable the programme to reach "all 
areas of the country."
In Asia, Bangladesh proposes a broad extension of services and
also aims to reach women under the age of 30 as well as older women.
India also proposes a broad extension of services with emphasis on
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younger as well as older women, taking into account the preferences 
for different methods by women of different ages. A special effort 
is to be made in the poorest urban areas and tribal areas through the 
disadvantaged-area scheme. Indonesia proposes an emphasis in the urban 
areas because facilities and personnel are available there and be­
cause the motivation to accept the services is highest there. The 
programme would first be instituted in the large cities and provincial 
capitals, then in the district capitals, and finally, in the last few 
years of the plan, in the rural villages. Malaysia discusses its re­
cent integration of family planning with the rural health service in 
selected areas; the planners hope that effective programmatic approaches 
will be developed in these selected areas and then be used in the 
remaining rural areas. Another objective is an increase in the number 
of acceptors in the urban areas. The possibility of government sup­
port for a programme in Sabah and Sarawak is also mentioned. Nepal 
proposes the establishment of 260 family planning and MCH clinics;
60 such clinics were reportedly opened during the previous plan per­
iod. It is hoped that these clinics will provide services to 15 per 
cent of the married couples in the country. The Sri Lanka plan states 
that the family planning activities have been "insignificant in re­
lation to the magnitude of the problem,” and that only 40 per cent 
of the MCH clinics provide family planning services. The plan pro­
poses a special emphasis on the population in the lowest income groups. 
Thailand proposes to aim its family planning programmes at the low- 
income groups and to extend them to the rural areas through the health 
stations.
In the Caribbean, Barbados plans to concentrate its efforts on 
the lowest income groups and to attempt islandwide coverage through
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four full-time and seven part-time clinics. Trinidad and Tobago 
also has a goal of islandwide availability of family planning ser­
vices.
Socioeconomic Development and Fertility Decline
It has been argued that, in the long run, development is the most im­
portant way of reducing fertility. The aims of this section are to 
determine which governments discuss socioeconomic development in its 
relationship to a decline in fertility and to what extent it is as­
sumed that development x^ ill itself result in fertility decline. Are 
countries without explicit population policies assuming that develop­
ment will reduce their fertility? Perhaps they are; over the long 
run it is certainly not an unreasonable assumption. But out of 60 
countries studied, 34 have no explicit policy to reduce fertility in 
their plans, and of those, 22 recognize no population problems in 
their plans (see Figure 5 ). Presumably these 22 countries are not 
waiting exclusively for development to reduce their fertility; it is 
possible, though, that they do not recognize any problems because 
they anticipate that development will reduce their fertility or at 
least enable them to accommodate to it.
Of the remaining 12 countries that did recognize a population 
problem but had no policy in their plans, 4 have officially adopted 
population policies and programmes outside the plan, thus not waiting 
exclusively for development, and 4 others actually support family 
planning programmes for nondemographic reasons. Thus only 4 remain­
ing countries (Burundi, Togo, Zambia, and Guyana) recognize a popu­
lation problem in their plans but have no specific policy to reduce 
it or give support to an official family planning programme. None
76
of the 34 countries explicitly states that development would result
in a decline in fertility or a slower rate of population growth,
although they may tacitly assume that is would.
Of the 26 countries that do have a policy to reduce the rate of
population growth in their plans, only 9 explicitly state that develop­
ment will result in a decline in fertility, though again some of the 
others may tacitly assume so. Surprisingly, perhaps, only one plan 
with a policy to reduce fertility explicitly argues that fertility 
will decline sufficiently by itself as long as development progresses. 
Every plan that explicitly assumes that its development will result 
in declining fertility also gives support to a family planning pro­
gramme, although only 8 countries do so for demographic reasons.
Thus, with the possible exception of Turkey, none of these countries
explicitly rejects all other population policies and then proposes 
only development as an exclusive approach to reducing its rate of 
population growth.
It is argued by some that a key to sustained fertility decline 
is not merely economic growth but broad development that improves the 
income equity of the poorest and often the most fertile popula­
tions. In some plans governments do design development strategies '
with a real emphasis on improving the distributional aspects of 
government programmes and improving the welfare of the rural poor.
But this is done, at least ostensibly, for its own sake, and any 
presumed consequence of reduced fertility is not explicitly mentioned.
Kenya feels that the rising standard of living as well as its 
population policies will, over the long run, result in some decline 
in the rate of population growth. Morocco hopes its population 
policies will accelerate what it calls a "normal decline" in fertility
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due to "cultural progress," social changes, and attitudinal changes.
In Asia, Bangladesh discusses the linked roles of development 
and fertility and proposes that a population study centre be estab­
lished for the study of development efforts in relation to population 
growth. The India draft plan suggests that, in addition to India's 
population policies, urbanization and "socio-economic constraints” 
may be contributing to the reported decline in fertility. South Korea 
attributes its fall in fertility to a rise in income, to rapid urban­
ization, to education, and "particularly to the family planning 
programme." The Nepal plan emphasizes that the prerequisites for 
reducing fertility are changes in the socioeconomic conditions, "cul­
tural patterns, and aspirations of the common man." Another need is 
a family planning programme that will consolidate the changes in 
motivation brought about by earlier development. The Turkish plan 
supports family planning as a health service but not ostensibly for 
demographic reasons. It does explicitly state the expectation that 
a decline in fertility will occur as a consequence of changes in 
socioeconomic conditions.
In a discussion of its population policy the Barbados plan men­
tions that need for general development, rising standards of living, 
and increased education to reduce fertility; however, it calls these 
measures slow, expensive, and difficult because "habits and tradi­
tions of the people die hard.” The solution, it argues, must be 
found in the whole strategy of economic and social development that 
improves the standard of living, increases industrialization, expands 
educational facilities, and improves the understanding of sociolog­
ical development. It further argues that family planning programmes 
should be included in this strategy.
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Family Planning Acceptor Targets
This study attempts to identify countries that have proposed some sort 
of family planning acceptor target; such a policy is important be­
cause it ties in population growth targets with programme efforts. 
Quantification of this sort allows one to examine the feasibility 
and assumptions of a plan's population targets, and later to eval­
uate the implementation of the programme. There is considerable 
debate, however, about the validity of assessing the programme's 
demographic effects and births averted merely by the analysis of 
acceptor rates from service statistics.
In Africa, only Tunisia presents a contraceptive acceptor tar­
get. The programme began in 1971 with 50,000 women, and a target 
of 160,000 women is set for 1981. Tunisia hopes that by that time 
some 300,000 births will have been averted.
Seven Asian countries (35 per cent) discuss acceptor targets 
in their plans * In Bangladesh, which hopes to lower its birth rate 
from 47 to 43 by 1978, the target population consists of women under 
30, who contribute 82 per cent of all births. The draft of India's 
Fifth Plan states that 15 million couples had been protected under 
the family planning programme at the time the Fifth Plan was drawn 
up, and expresses the hope that the number will be raised to 19 
million by the end of the "current” (Fourth?) plan period. The 
Fifth Plan (1974-1979) has targeted 18.0 million sterilizations,
5,9 million IUD insertions, and 8.8 million conventional contra­
ceptive users. Indonesia expresses the hope that its policies will 
help prevent 600,000-700,000 births by reaching a target of 3 mil­
lion contraceptive acceptors. Malaysia plans to reduce its birth 
rate from 35 to 32 by 1975; the family planning programme has been
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given a five-year target of 600,000 new contraceptive acceptors.
The Pakistan plan outlines in detail the government*s present and 
past goals for contraceptive acceptors and births averted; the tar­
get for the Fourth Plan (1970-1975) was 9.6 million births averted.
It is indicated that the Third Plan (1965-1970) proposed 5 million 
births averted, but that only 3.3 million were reportedly averted, 
almost entirely by IUDs. The Philippine plan proposes a target of 
50,000 contraceptive acceptors per month; it is hoped that this will 
result in a drop in the population growth rate from 3.1 to 2.0 per 
cent per year. Thailand anticipated that some 2.5 million family 
planning acceptors could be reached during the plan period, 1972- 
1976, and hoped that this would reduce the rate of growth from 3.0 
to 2.5.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, only Trinidad and Tobago 
sets a contraceptive acceptor target. In order to reduce the birth 
rate by half in ten years, the island nation aims to provide free 
contraceptives to more than 100,000 women per year.
Family Planning Education
Family planning education programmes are mentioned in the develop­
ment plans of only ten of the countries under study. In most of these 
plans the coverage is limited to one or two sentences and includes 
no detailed plans for implementation.
In Africa, Botswana stresses that, without efforts to improve 
knowledge of family planning while medical services are improved, 
its rate of population growth may rise above 3 per cent. Morocco 
supports the establishment of a family planning information campaign. 
In Uganda, information on family planning is reported to be dissem-
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inated by government publicity agencies and through ministry offices 
in contact with the people in the rural areas. Tunisia recommends 
that information about its family planning programme be more widely 
disseminated among mothers during the postpartum period.
In Asia, the Bangladesh plan proposes that the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting disseminate family planning informa­
tion. It also suggests that such information be included in the 
nutrition-agricultural extension education programmes of the Minis­
tries of Agriculture and Rural Development and in the social work 
programmes of the Ministries of Labour and Social Welfare. India's 
draft plan proposes a number of family planning educational ap­
proaches through individual and group contacts and audiovisual media.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Barbados plan mentions 
a recent six-week family planning publicity and education drive, 
and proposes to supply funds to its Family Planning Association for 
a yearly education drive. Colombia proposes to make information 
on family planning available and to raise the general educational 
level "with the aim of developing greater parental responsibility."
The Trinidad and Tobago plan expresses the hope that the family 
planning education programme will "orient the thinking of the popu­
lation towards a more enlightened acceptance of our Family Planning 
policies ...."
Population Education
Education about population issues, distinguished here from family 
planning education, forms a part of the population policies of 
seven development plan.
In Africa, the Botswana plan urges the education of the whole nation
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about the "issues involved,” presumably both population issues and 
family planning methods.
Bangladesh devotes more attention to population education than 
any other Asian country. It urges a major educational campaign to 
draw attention to the seriousness of population growth and proposes 
to set up group discussions in villages, factories, schools, and 
colleges. The plan urges political leaders, teachers, social workers, 
and intellectuals to voice their concern about the high rate of growth. 
It proposes that the Ministry of Education introduce population edu­
cation into the curriculum at all levels. The Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting is to use radio, television, newspapers, posters, 
and pamphlets to transmit information on both population problems 
and methods of family planning. The Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare is to stress population and family planning through rele­
vant social work programmes. The plan expresses the hope that these 
measures will at least bring about a climate that will permit the 
"possiblity of more drastic measures, such as compulsory sterili­
zation of either husband or wife after the second child, legalization 
of abortion and the establishment of abortion clinics for performing 
abortion free of cost, social measures to bring about women's eman­
cipation, etc ”
The Indian draft plan only remarks that the population education 
will be given greater emphasis in radio and other mass media. The 
Malaysian plan mentions the recent government decision to introduce 
population-related subject matter into the curricula of the public 
schools. The Philippines proposes to integrate information on popu­
lation and family planning with school curricula and to promote 
understanding of the consequences of differing rates of population
82
growth upon family and national well-being. The national develop­
ment plan of Thailand urges programmes to promote understanding of 
the country's population problems, especially among the young. It 
is suggested that these programmes be brought into being by curricu­
lum changes in the areas of adult education, nursing, and midwifery, 
in teacher training programmes, and in-some areas of higher education.
Barbados considers the solution of its population problems to lie 
in, among other things, "expanded educational facilities and a deeper 
understanding of our sociological development."
Delay of Marriage To Reduce Fertility
Delayed marriage and reduction in the proportion of the population 
that does marry will obviously reduce overall fertility rates.
Policies designed to encourage changes in marriage patterns for 
demographic reasons are discussed in only a very few national plans.
Tunisia considered raising the minimum legal age of marriage 
for women from 17 years to 18 years in order to reduce fertility, 
but the proposal was rejected, largely on the grounds that it would 
create other social problems and hardships for the 30 per cent of 
women who now marry as soon as they reach 17 and for the thousand or 
so who marry below the current legal age (with special authorization) 
each year. A further stated reason for the rejection of the proposal 
was that it had been estimated that such a change in policy would 
avert only 2,000 births a year (no method of estimation is discussed).
In a single sentence the Bangladesh plan mentions that measures 
to promulgate a law raising the legal age of marriage will be under­
taken by the relevant ministries during the plan period. The policy 
is raised in the context of reducing the rate of population growth,
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but no details of implementation are .given.
The Iranian planners deem as "essential ... the establishment 
of relative equilibrium of the lower age groups in the population 
during the Fourth Plan period by means of the strict enforcement 
of Article 1041 of the Civil Law concerning the prohibition of mar­
riage for women under 16 years of age."
The Colombian plan suggests that such measures as longer reten­
tion in the educational system, youth movements, and voluntary or 
obligatory social services for women should be taken to encourage 
later marriages.
Use of Mass Media for Family Planning Information 
Of the countries that propose family planning education, only four 
discuss the use of mass media. The subject is often limited to one 
or two sentences and is presented without detailed plans for imple­
mentation. There is some ambiguity about whether an information 
campaign (discussed under family planning education) may also imply 
use of the mass media, but only countries that actually mention public 
or mass media are included in this category. The distinction has been 
made for the purpose of making visible what may be a qualitative 
difference in the overall impact of family planning education.
No African."plans specify the use of the mass or public media for 
family planning education, although it may have been implied in the 
information campaigns proposed in Botswana, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Uganda.
In Asia, Bangladesh proposes the use of radio, television, news­
papers, posters, and pamphlets in addition to the proposed educational 
schemes of various ministries. The Indian draft plan proposes the
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use of radio and television as part of the overall information 
campaign.
In Latin America and the Caribbean only the Barbados plan and 
the Trinidad and Tobago plan mention the use of radio broadcasts 
to support family planning information campaigns.
Motivation Schemes for Smaller Families
While a number of countries have discussed publicity campaigns 
and even monetary incentives to induce people to accept contrac- 
ceptives or sterilization only three discuss policies designed either 
to motivate people to desire smaller families or to penalize those 
who have large families.
The Tunisian plan proposes an investigation into the impact 
that could be achieved by a change in the family allowance system 
that would discourage couples from having more than three children 
by providing greater payments to small families and to single per­
sons. The planners acknowledge that this scheme would not have a 
significant demographic impact, but they feel that it would at 
least bring consistency to family planning policies.
The Bangladesh plan urges the consideration of ’’progressively 
increasing punitive measures against additional children after the 
second child on all couples.” The possibility of restricting ration 
cards to a maximum of two children per family is raised, as well 
as the idea of prohibiting couples with more than two children from 
using the fair-price shops. These measures are discussed more as 
long-range possibilities than as immediate policy proposals. The 
Malaysian plan proposes that maternity benefits for government work­
ers be allowed for the first three children only.
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There are many other intervention policies that a country might 
propose, especially within the context of its national development 
plan, but these issues have not been discussed in the development 
plans under study here.
Policies On Abortion
Only three national plans discuss abortion;
Tunisia’s plan states that if the country is to reach its "demo­
graphic objective," it must avert more births each year than can be 
averted by its family planning effort. The "supplementary ’saving' 
of births ... should reach 15,000 in 1981.” To reach this "supple­
mentary" target, about 30,000 pregnancies must be interrupted by 1981. 
At the time the plan was written, Tunisia’s laws authorized "social" 
(nontherapeutic) abortions only for women who already had at least 
five living children. The plan announced that this legislation would 
be revised to permit realization of Tunisia's demographic objective.
The Bangladesh plan asserts that the legalization of abortion 
is probably one of the best and most effective strategies for con­
trolling population growth, and it declares that, "while keeping in 
mind the question of social acceptability, all efforts must be made 
to allow this method to play its proper role in controlling the growth 
of population in Bangladesh."
The India draft plan mentions in only a single sentence India's 
increased facilities for "medical termination of pregnancy”; the 
plan asserts that abortion may have some demographic impact on the 
national birth rate.
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Family Planning Incentive Schemes
Various monetary incentive schemes for encouraging people to use 
birth control have been proposed in the Third World, and a consid­
erable debate has developed over their ethical and practical impli­
cations. Only Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, however, give any 
attention to such incentives in their development plans. Bangladesh 
stresses that its incentive scheme led to corruption and inflated 
acceptance reporting, which distorted the perspective of the programme 
and actually reduced its effectiveness by overburdening administra­
tors with disbursement duties. The plan proposes a new system of 
incentives for vasectomies, tubal ligations, and abortions, with 
demographic impact forming its basis rather than acceptance of con­
traceptives. The India draft plan supports the continuation of 
"compensation** payments for sterilizations and IUD insertions. De­
tails of the incentive scheme outlined in Pakistan's plan need not 
be reviewed here because it is significantly outdated, having been 
written before the independence of Bangladesh.
In addition to family planning incentive schemes designed for 
the individual, Bangladesh and India propose schemes for incentives 
on the community level. Bangladesh proposes a zonal award through 
priority in funding for community facilities. India proposes a
"package of community incentives and awards." No elaboration is given
in either plan about implementation of such programmes.
Bangladesh apparently proposes to end incentive payments to 
family planning workers (based on the number of recruits) because 
they lead to corruption and programmatic ineffectiveness. India 
proposes to discontinue incentive payments to doctors and family
planning workers gradually and to institute instead a community
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awards system.
Improved Status of Women and Fertility Decline 
Measures to improve the roles and status of women, for their own 
sake or in connection with a presumed negative effect on fertility • 
or for their inputs to development, are all but absent from the 
national development plans reviewed in this study. Only the plans 
of Colombia and Guatemala make any mention of women's roles in con­
nection with reducing population growth*
The Colombian plan urges that its population policies be accom­
panied by the creation of equal opportunities for women in all aspects 
of life, including jobs traditionally reserved for men, equal salaries, 
and increased social mobility. It also proposes that women be in­
volved in social services on either an obligatory or a voluntary 
basis. No details of implementation are given, however.
The Guatemalan plan, in one phrase of a single sentence, urges 
that a policy of full employment include increased participation of 
women. This statement is made at least partly in the context of 
advocacy of some general type of population policy, but again no 
details of implementation are given.
Bangladesh expresses the hope that its population education 
campaign will create a climate in which a number of "drastic** mea­
sures may someday be considered, among them compulsory steriliza­
tion, legalized abortion, and "social measures to bring about women's 
emancipation•"
Comprehensive Population Strategy
The plans of only two countries, Bangladesh and India, substantially
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integrate their proposed population policies into a comprehensive 
population strategy. Both countries attempt, in their plans, to use 
other concurrent and reinforcing programmes, to use a broad range 
of population policies, to work through a number of ministries and 
departments, and to strive toward some consistency in related policies. 
These sections of the plans offer only proposals for policy strat­
egies; actual implementation is perhaps quite another story.
Most of the countries have made little effort to integrate com­
prehensive population strategies with the various economic and social 
sectors of their plans• Appendix D lists the countries according to 
the number of policies proposed in their plans, to give some indi­
cation of the breadth and comprehensiveness of their population 
strategies.
Pronatalist Policies
Only one country of the 60 studied advocates a pronatalist policy in 
its national development plans Argentina. This pronatalist and 
proimmigration policy stems from Argentina's desire to populate its 
frontier regions. Argentina feels that the population is in "regional 
disequilibrium," and that the situation is made worse by migration 
from the frontier regions to the urban areas. The plan's goal is 
simply stated: "to increase births." No explanation of ways in
which more births may be encouraged is given. The plan also aims 
at reducing mortality, increasing international immigration, de­
creasing emigration, and promoting internal migration to the southern, 
northeastern, and central provinces.
Brazil, a country that has expressed some pronatalist arguments 
elsewhere, presents none in its national development plan. An early
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plan of Ethiopia (1963-1967) described its rapid population growth 
as "encouraging," but the more recent plan (1968-1973) does not dis­
cuss any population problems or policies.
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CHAPTER FOUR
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POPULATION POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF PAKISTAN 
AND BANGLADESH
The previous chapters have analyzed the population content 
and policies in development plans alone. The following three chap­
ters examine population concerns and development planning for Pak­
istan and Bangladesh in broader contexts. Chapter Four examines 
the population policies proposed in the plans, and the extent to 
which they were implemented and effective. The administrative, 
political, social, and economic realities affecting the population 
programmes are briefly assessed.
The First Five Year Plan (1955-1960)
The First Five Year Plan (1955-1960) had all sorts of diffi­
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culties;^ it was not commissioned until 1955, some eight years 
after independence; it was not published until December 1957 —  
midway through the plan period; and not authenticated by the govern­
ment until 1958. It was moralistic and libertarian in tone and 
deliberately published many false estimates to make the develop­
ment setting look more optimistic. The Plan itself never became 
2
operational; and the rest of the government's development efforts 
during that period are generally regarded as a complete failure, 
and the country's poor agricultural performance ensured that de­
velopment targets would not be met.
Of course, the political setting for the First Plan could hard­
ly have been worse. Prior to independence, the Muslim League was 
so involved in its fight for partition and against Hindu dominance
^In April of 1958 Pakistan's prime minister stated: "I was
staggered to learn that until a few days ago the Five-Year Plan 
had not even been authenticated by the Government for publication. 
With hardly two more years to go, the Plan continues to be regard­
ed as routine departmental file, meant only for recording of pro­
lific notes and cross-notes. Even a properly coordinated machin­
ery for the implementation of the Plan has not yet been evolved.” 
(Quoted in Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, 
Pakistan Publishing House, Karachi, 1959, P* 6>8.)
2
"The first five-year plan was commissioned in 1955, full 
eight years after independence. It did not receive formal appro­
val of the government till 1957. During these years there was a 
total neglect of the primary sector of our economy —  agriculture; 
we squandered the windfall surpluses of the Korean war boom in 
buying, on open General Licenses, European cosmetics and radio­
grams. It is not only that we failed to develop basic heavy in­
dustries. We did not even make any provisions for their future 
establishment; not even to the extent of starting to get our men 
trained in basic technologies. And, lastly, we completely neglect­
ed the exploitation of our minerals. Not even a survey was under­
taken." (An address by Professor Abdus Salam, President, XIII 
Annual All Pakistan Science Conference, Dacca, 11 January 1961.)
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that no social or political programmes were articulated (unlike 
the Indian Congress), Islam was the answer. It was clearly in the 
class interest of the Muslim League and those who came to power 
not to make social change the issue. Following the death of Jinnah 
in 1948, the break-up of the League, and the assassination of Ali 
Khan in 1951, various groups competed not for principles and pro­
grammes but openly for the spoils of corruption. Unabashed cor­
ruption continued and became so pervasive that by the time the 
First Plan was published, just prior to Ayub Khan's take-over, 
Pakistan's Chief Minister admitted that "from top to bottom, there 
was hardly a person who was not corrupt."^
The Pakistan Civil Service, maintaining some colonial tra­
ditions, did manage to restore law and order from the near anarchy
2conditions of independence. But more than law and order was need­
ed for development and such a law and order mentality was inimical 
to social change and land reform. The Pakistan Civil Service was 
neither willing nor able to undertake serious social reforms or
^Pakistan Times, August 26, 1958.
2
"So far as law and order, administration of justice and col­
lection of revenues...are concerned, the system continues to serve 
the country reasonably well. The efficiency of the system within 
this essential field invests it with a factitious appearance of 
adequacy for all purposes, including the new and supremely import­
ant task of planned development. This, on the one hand, creates 
a psychological atmosphere of complacence unfavourable to reform, 
and, on the other, increases the inertia of the system, its power 
of resisting change." Pakistan, National Planning Board, The 
First Five Year Plan, 1955-60, Karachi, December, 1957, Vol. I, 
p. 99.
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properly plan for development.^- This arrangement of stability 
without land and other egalitarian reforms was clearly in the in­
terests of the wealthy classes whose ranks were now being swelled 
by the corrupt civil service.
The First Plan gave substantial attention —  an entire chap­
ter —  to the growth of the population and the labour force. Al­
though the demographic estimates were not adequate, the Plan did
deliberately underestimate the rate of population growth so that
2
it would convey a more optimistic tone. Serious population pro­
blems were recognized however ("Pakistan, with other countries in 
Southern Asia, confronts a serious population problem"...Cthere 
are3"...dangers of population growth outpacing growth in national 
income.") A half million rupees were appropriated in the 1957-58 
central budget to support private family planning programmes ("main­
ly by private agencies, for carrying out family planning work in 
a few big cities."). This policy was supported both for demogra-
According to the National Planning Board's Chief Economist 
in 1955s "It is...probable that the per capita income after 1954- 
55 would be less than what it was about seven years ago. Inequal­
ities in income have increased. A smaller national income, rel­
ative to the size of the population, more unequally distributed 
than before, implies that the living standards of the masses of 
the people which were already very low, have deteriorated still 
further." (M. L. Qureshi, Conference of the Pakistan Economic 
Association, Peshawar, 1955, p. 11.)
2
"When the Five-Year Plan was being framed I urged, and suc­
cessfully too, that the rate of growth should not be shown as 
higher than 1.4%. This was to keep despair away. We are, how­
ever, all convinced that population is growing faster than that. 
But as has been said, 'Hope builds sooner than knowledge des­
troys'". Said Husan, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the 
Institute of Development Economics, quoted by M. L. Qureshi, ed., 
in Population Growth and Economic Development, Summary Report of 
a Seminar, 8-13 September 1959, Karachi, p. vii.
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phic reasons as well as "better health for the mother and better 
care and upbringing for the children." The Plan also stated:
We realize that a visible effort of such measures can be felt 
only after some years. It is also realized that negligible 
results would be achieved until the family planning programme 
reaches a large proportion of the population. Nevertheless 
measures to this effect should be initiated now so that evils 
of under-feeding and over-crowding may not undo the efforts 
for the provision of a better life to the nation. The coun­
try must appreciate that population growth is a rock on which 
all hopes of improved conditions of living may founder. It 
admits of no approach except that the rates of growth must be 
low. (Pakistan, The First Five Year Plan. 1955-60, p. 192)
But the Plan was still very cautious in its approach and re­
flected the general government position taken in 1952 by the Report 
of the Economic Appraisal Committee: "...the suggestion of family
planning is neither easy nor generally acceptable, and in any case
it will take years to show effects. The problem, however, requires
1
careful consideration." Ayub's takeover in 1958 greatly changed the of­
ficial approach to population.2 He mentioned population growth and family
^-Pakistan, The Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Report of the 
Economic Appraisal Committee, 1952> p. 77.
2 ......................
In 1959 the Ayub Government issued a pamphlet outlining its
new policies. "The watchword of the New Regime is 'face your pro­
blems.' They are not hampered by fhe timidity of the politicians 
who shelved all reforms for fear of unpopularity. Parts of Pak­
istan are heavily overpopulated, and whatever the improvements 
may be in the means of production, they cannot keep pace with the 
rapid increase in the numbers to be fed. The politician knew this 
full well, but was afraid to tackle the problem, as this would have 
made him unpopular with the conservative section of the public.
The new Government, however, squarely faced the problem and has en­
couraged and actively helped the Family Planning Association of 
Pakistan to undertake rigorous measures in the interest of the 
well-being of the nation, to educate the masses on the need for 
family planning and population control. An appeal has also been 
made to the religious leaders to cooperate with the population con­
trol movement." (Pakistan, Government of, Pakistan under the new 
Regime, a Period of Reconstruction, Karachi, 1959, p. 19.)
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planning in nearly all major speeches and the subject was given a 
much higher priority in government programmes. In a speech re­
ported in March 1959 Ayub stated that he had "...impressed upon 
the Minister of Finance the need for allocating more and more funds 
for the movement of family planning." As for religious objections 
to birth control he said he "...could not visualize that any good 
religion could advocate human misery. Religion was for the bet­
terment of mankind, and no good religion could stand in the way 
of human progress and happiness."
The Second Five Year Plan (1960-1965)
The new military junta substantially upgraded the Planning 
Commission, which critically evaluated the First Plan and then de­
vised the Second Plan 1960-65. The new Plan gave prime attention 
to agriculture and education and aimed to increase the national in­
come by some 20 pei/cent by 1966. The setting for the new Plan was 
much improved as corruption was actually reduced for a time; and 
more importantly, the harvests were good and were supplemented 
with major food imports from the United States.
In fact, nearly all the agriculture and economic targets of the 
Second Plan were achieved or surpassed including the 24 per cent 
increase in the national income over the period. But this was 
still growth without development. The new land reform laws were
not really implemented and perhaps only 2 per cent of cultivated
2
land was actually redistributed. Even the Governor of the State
^Population News (London), March 1959.
2
The Economist, London, December 2, 1961, p. 935.
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Bank reported in 1964 a "wide spread feeling that disparities in 
income and wealth in Pakistan have tended to increase.^
The Second Plan devoted considerably more attention to pop­
ulation problems stating that population growth threatened "to 
wipe out the gains of development*.."
Since population growth can threaten to wipe out the gains of 
development, the Plan clearly recognizes the paramount need 
for a conscious population policy and its implementation. A 
population policy, however, must take into account many im­
plications of population growth for other aspects of planning. 
The existing pressure of population leads to an intense strug­
gle for the means of life at subsistence levels. Inadequate 
diet results in a prevalent malnutrition that cannot be cured 
by public health measures alone. Apathy is the companion of 
malnutrition and ignorance. Under these conditions people 
have meagre reserves of energy to strive for wider understand­
ing and improvement. (The Second Five Year Plan (1960-1965), 
p. 335)
The Second Plan represented a considerable change of emphasis in 
its population policy over the earlier First Plan. It lamented 
the meagre efforts of the First Plan stating "practically nothing 
was done." The Second Plan expanded its population programme pro­
posing Rs. 30 million for family planning services to be establish­
ed at hospitals and other medical dispensaries. Family planning 
workers were to be trained; research was to be undertaken; and 
publicity, education, and motivational efforts for smaller fami­
lies were proposed. The Plan suggested that if "any measure of 
prosperity is to be gained from the developmental effort, it is 
essential that family planning receive high priority." The Plan 
continued:
The Times (London), September 4, 1964.
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The First Plan contained a small provision for family plan­
ning but practically nothing was done except some pilot work 
by the family planning associations. Since a declining trend 
in fertility must be sought over a long period, the Second 
Plan health programme is primarily designed to influence so­
cial attitudes and practices in favour of family planning.
It also seeks to provide the necessary medical and other fa­
cilities. Clinics will be established in all general hospi­
tals, dispensaries and maternity centres. Provision is also 
made for educational and other materials, training programmes 
and research. Publicity and education programmes will be or­
ganized through all available media, with the assistance of 
voluntary organizations, Village AID and community development 
units. Arrangements will be made for the training of doctors, 
nurses, health visitors, midwives and medical administrators 
in family planning methods. Research will be initiated on re­
productive behaviour, on factors which motivate parents to have 
large or small families, and on the acceptability and effective­
ness of different methods of birth limitation. The Plan pro­
vides Rs. 30 million for family planning. (The Second Five 
Year Plan (1960-1965). p. 360)
The programme was to be developed within the existing Health Ser­
vices with a new National Family Planning Directorate and Direc­
torates within each province. In West Pakistan the National Re­
search Institute of Family Planning (NRIFP) was established in 
K a r a c hi and the Training-cum-Research Institutes (TCRI) were 
established at Hyderbad and Lahore. The Second Plan allocated 
some Rs. 30.5 million for the family planning programme but the 
amount of money actually spent on family planning was only half 
that budgeted in the Plan. Nevertheless, the programme at least 
appeared to be reasonably well planned and fairly comprehensive, 
and optimism about its success continued through the First Mid-Plan 
Review of the Second Plan in 1963 which stated:
The family planning programmes received an increasing measure 
of attention. 1,573 centres were established in both wings of 
the country; of these 553 centres were established in East Pak­
istan and 1,020 centres in West Pakistan. 605 doctors, 446 
health visitors/nurses and 4,800 V-AID workers and Ansars were
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trained. Two medical social research projects were set up at 
Lahore and Dacca with the assistance of the Population Council 
of New York. Four films were produced on family planning.
Seven persons were sent to the USA for higher training in dem­
ography, statistics and maternal and child health education.
In East Pakistan, construction of 3 child welfare centres was
completed. (Mid-Plan Review of Progress in 1960-61---1969-62
under Second Five Year Plan, p. 42)
But before the Second Plan period was completed in 1965 it was ob­
vious that the programme was an administrative failure and was not 
having a demographic impact. Administratively, the scheme had 
many shortcomings: only half the funds were allocated and there
were many shortages of supplies and personnel. The programme was 
carried out within the existing health services which only reached 
a pitifully small proportion of the population and ignored most of 
the rural areas. In addition, the health personnel largely ignored 
family planning because they were faced with much more serious and 
compelling clinical cases.
The question then arises, could the programme have been demo- 
graphically effective if it had been fully and adequately adminis­
tered? Probably not. Besides the overwhelming administrative dif­
ficulties a more fundamental problem was the lack of motivation 
to use contraception, which will be discussed later in detail.
By 1965 the Third Plan (1965-1970) had been formulated and it 
was obvious that the earlier programme had failed:
The achievements of this programme have on the whole fallen 
below expectations. The allocation was too small to permit 
adequate supplies and proper distribution aid the motivational 
barriers outlined earlier were not consciously tackled. Be­
sides the programme was administered as a normal function of 
the existing personnel running these^ services who were over-burden­
ed with clinical work and could not Sive adequate attention to 
family planning. (The Third Five Year Plan (1965-1970), p. 267)
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The failure of the Second Plan's programme was also assessed in 
an international conference earlier in May 1964 which founds
(i) Lack of motivation in the general masses (ii) unsatisfac­
tory arrangements for the distribution of contraceptives (iii) 
inadequate education and information of the masses in family 
planning (iv) shortage of administrative personnel; the pro­
gramme was administered as a normal function of the existing 
health services with the result that doctors and other health 
personnel running those services were over-burdened with clin­
ical work and could not give adequate attention to family plan­
ning. (Pakistan, Consultative Committee of Colombo Plan, 1965)
The Third Five Year Plan (1965-1970)
By the time of the Third Plan (1965-1970) rapid population 
growth and policies to reduce that growth were receiving substan­
tial attention from the highest political levels.^- The importance 
of reducing population growth was certainly recognized by the plan­
ners, for example. :
^Ayub Khan while inaugurating the Family Planning Association's 
National Seminar in Lahore on 10 March 1964 stated: "If the birth
rate goes on as before, which is happening now-a-days, the popula­
tion is bound to grow by leaps and bounds. This is happening in 
actual fact all over the world and particularly in our country.
This rapid growth of population creates frightening prospects for 
those looking into the future. If our numbers go on multiplying 
at this rate, I have grave doubts whether all our efforts for the 
development of our country and the amelioration of the lot of our 
people, would have any meaning whatsoever. Our planning, our sac­
rifices and our hard work for the progress of the country would 
be neutralized by the rapid growth of population. If nothing is 
done to check the rate of growth, I shudder to think of what will 
happen after a few decades. My only consolation is that I shall 
not be there to face that situation. But my country and my people 
would be faced with it. And the coming generations would not for­
give us for landing them in such a bad mess." (Cited in Pakistan, 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Social Welfare, Family Planning 
Scheme for Pakistan, During the Third Five Year Plan Period, 1965- 
1970. (Rawalpindi, n.d.) the foreword)
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The size of population, estimated at 112 million for 1965, is 
expected to grow at an annual comptjfid rate of about 2.6 per 
cent during the Perspective Plan (1965-1985). With the planned 
improvement in health facilities and nutritional standards, the 
mortality rate is likely to decline fairly rapidly. Unless it 
is checked by a fall in the fertility rate, the population growth 
rate could easily be pushed beyond 3 per cent per annum. If 
this happens, population will double itself by 1985. Such an 
increase would defeat any attempts to raise per capita incomes 
by a significant amount. One of the basic assumptions of the 
present projections is that the rate of growth of population 
will decline after 1975 owing to a decrease in the fertility 
rate. In other words, it is assumed that declining fertility 
will more than offset declining mortality. The population in 
1985 is thus projected at 187 million. A vigorous and broadly 
based programme of family planning is, therefore, an integral 
part of the strategy for the Perspective Plan. (The Third 
Five Year Plan (1965-1970), p. 24)
Moreover, the present 2.6 per cent growth rate of population may 
well increase in future. Pakistan is in a phase of demographic 
transition; of declining mortality rate unaccompanied by a 
corresponding decline in fertility. The mortality rate is pro­
jected to decline from 29 to 15 over the period of the Perspec­
tive Plan. To prevent a population explosion which may imperil 
most of the targets of the Perspective Plan, from tripling per 
capita income to universal literacy, the Plan assumes that birth 
rates will decline from 55 to 35. Thus, the growth rate in 1985 
is expected to decline to 2 per cent and the overall growth rate 
during the period is estimated at 2.6 per cent.
Clearly, if the increases of per capita income postulated in the 
Perspective Plan are to be achieved, a decline in fertility is 
a necessary condition. The availability of modern medicines 
and related health facilities has been and continues to be the 
main determinant of the dramatic decline in mortality rates.
The supply of contraceptive devices and extension of family 
planning facilities is similarly called for if fertility rates 
are to be contained. (The Third Five Year Plan (1965-1970), 
p. 265)
There was great enthusiasm by some because the Third Plan appear­
ed on the surface to face up to the problems of population growth 
by presenting in detail an ambitious family planning scheme to co­
ver the entire country. This programme seemed to contain much more 
than pious statements and unrealistic goals. It had real details 
for implementation - nearly 200 pages of instructions were published
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in conjunction with the Plan by the Ministry of Health, Labour
and Social Welfares Family Planning Scheme for Pakistan, During
the Third Five Year Plan Period, 1965-1970. The cost of this total
scheme was to be some 280 million rupees though the Third Plan al-
0
located some 166 million rupees.
The family planning scheme for the Third Plan was ambitious, 
in fact, excessively ambitious. The Plan aimed to reduce the crude 
birth rate by some 20 percent in five years from 55 per thousand 
to 45. The Plan estimated that nearly all of the women in the re­
productive ages, some 20 million couples by 1970, would be involved 
in the scheme which would over the five year duration of the Plan 
cover all of East and West Pakistan.
The principal objective of the new programme is to bring down 
the birth rate from 55 per thousand to 45 per thousand. To 
achieve this target, 20 million couples, who represent almost 
all the women in the reproductive ages in 1970, will be induced 
to practice family planning in one form or another. The scheme 
is to be launched in 36 districts of West Pakistan and 16 dis­
tricts of East Pakistan during the Third Plan period. Two- 
thirds of the districts will be covered in the first two years 
and the remaining one-third in subsequent years. (The Third 
Five Year Plan (1965-1970), p. 267)
One of the crucial aspects of the scheme was thought to be its 
introduction of a monetary incentives programme for IUD insertions, 
vasectomies, and tubectomies. More than 26 million rupees were 
budgeted for payment to both the recipient and to the programme 
staff as well as to the many part-time and volunteer personnel on 
whom the scheme heavily depended.
For each vasectomy both doctor/lady health visitor/dai and the 
client will be paid Rs. 25. Insertions of IUDs will be free for 
the client. For each insertion doctors will be paid Rs. 8 and
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trained nurses/midwives/dais Rs. 4. Besides, dais will be paid 
Rs. 2.50 and other Rs. 2 for referring cases leading to an in­
sertion. A 50 per cent rebate on the cost of contraceptives 
will go as commission to the sellers. (The Third Five Yoar 
Plan (1965-1970), p. 268)
The elaborately planned administrative detail was nearly over­
whelming. An entire chain of command was outlined from the Central 
Family Planning Council, to the Provincial Family Planning Boards, 
to the District Family Planning Boards to the Thana and Union Coun­
cils and so on to the village dais. The scheme was to be widespread 
thirty-seven full-time clinics were proposed in the urban areas and 
718 part-time clinics (318 in the West and 400 in the East). The 
local village dais were to have a major role and less emphasis was 
paid to the established health centres and clinics.
There will be a Family Planning Council at the Centre and Fam­
ily Planning Boards at the Provincial and District levels. All 
the Union Councils in East Pakistan and Thana Councils in East 
Pakistan will be associated with the programme. The family plan­
ning work at these levels will be looked after by a Family Plan­
ning Supervisor (one for 3 Union Councils) in West Pakistan 
and Thana Family Planning Officer (one for 3 Union Councils) in 
West Pakistan and Thana Family Planning Officer (one for each 
Thana) in East Pakistan. At the bottom of the hierachy will 
be the village dai. She will perform such functions as motivat­
ing the people and distributing contraceptives. At the national 
level the programme will be supervised by the Family Planning 
Commissioner who heads a new Division in the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Social Welfare to be called the Family Planning Di­
vision. (The Third Five Year Plan (1965-1970), pp. 268-269)
The Administrative set-up at the Central, Provincial and Dis­
trict levels has been considerably strengthened. The Scheme 
provides for 1,000 Family Planning Supervisors in West Pakistan 
who will work with the Union Council Secretaries. In East Pak­
istan 400 Thana Family Planning Officers have been provided.
One general assistant, one female assistant and one male as­
sistant will be attached to each Thana Family Planning Officer.
A total of 50,000 village dais will be employed. 30,000 in 
East Pakistan and 20,000 in West Pakistan at the rate of one 
dai for two villages or 1600 population in East Pakistan and 
one dai for two villages in West Pakistan. About 2,400 part-
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time family planning doctors at the rate of 6 for each Tehsil 
in West Pakistan and 3 for each Thana in East Pakistan will 
be registered and appointed for the purpose of IUD insertions 
and clinical sterilization, (The Third Five Year Plan (1965- 
1970), pp. 268-269)
Within municipal, town committee and cantonment limits in 
West Pakistan the functions assigned to the Family Planning 
Supervisors and Union Council Secretaries will be performed by 
the District Family Planning Board through its whole-time staff 
and other personnel available already to Deputy Commissioners, 
Union Committees and the Civil Surgeon/Medical Superintendent.... 
In 16 cities of West Pakistan 21 urban clinics will have suf­
ficient staff to cover the urban areas of those districts. Fur­
thermore, the West Pakistan Family Planning Board may b y  reap­
propriation allocate up to 10% of the provision made for Family 
Planning Supervisors to rural areas to provide them for urban 
areas at the rate of one per 100,000 population and at least 
one for every district headquarters....So far as East Pakistan 
is concerned, the entire area (inclusive of Municipal, Town 
Committee and Cantonment Areas) will be covered by the whole­
time Thana Family Planning Officers and the male and female 
assistants appointed there. (Family Planning Scheme for Pak­
istan during the Third Five Year Plan 1965-1970, p. 8)
In 1966, following the publication of the Plan and the Family 
Planning Scheme, Warren Robinson in a perceptive analysis of the 
new strategy pointed out many areas of potential difficulty.^" The 
geographic scope of the scheme was impossibly vast. Rather than 
consolidating gains and building a durable organization in areas 
where motivation to accept contraception was high - urban areas, 
for example - and then gradually expanding a successful operation 
with proven 'demonstration' effects; the Plan chose to cover vir­
tually the entire country in five years. Even the sheer logistics 
of getting contraceptives supplied throughout the entire countryside 
every month is an overwhelming problem which was not carefully
^"Warren C. Robinson, 'Family Planning in Pakistan's Third 
Five Year Plan', The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, 
Summer 1966, pp. 285, 281.
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planned for in the Plan or the Scheme Plan.
The scheme did attempt to rely on existing political and ad­
ministrative structures— union council secretaries, deputy district 
commissioners and thana development officers. While this strategy 
avoided the Second Plan's problem of reliance on the over-worked 
Health Ministry, it did impose itself on political administrators 
who had only a secondary interest in it at best. Nearly all the 
staff in the Scheme were to work for free, or for small fees, or 
for some part-time wage, only a very few actually were employed 
full-time on family planning.
The local dais were in many ways crucial to the success of 
the programme, even though little was known about how they would 
undertake a 180 degree change in their maternity role. In rely­
ing on the dais, the entire approach of the Scheme was thus female- 
oriented, which of course it must be to some extent because of 
Purdah. But in this traditional rural Muslim society the sole re­
liance on the female-orientation may not be effective, since con­
traceptives will probably only be used if the husband also favours 
their use.
Robinson^ also argued that the scheme placed too much emphasis 
on "non-clinical" methods of contraception and that more attention 
should have been given to clinical methods, especially the IUD.
Despite the great attention in the plans to evaluation, Robinson 
points out that the type of evaluation was unrealistic to the goals 
of the programme. The evaluation of service statistics for the 
number of contraceptives distributed or the number of training
^Warren C. Robinson, op. cit.
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seminars held may be useful in measuring administrative discipline; 
but it will not measure the programme’s real aim— a demographic 
impact.
It was also argued that publicity for the programme was insuf­
ficient, partly because this was to be undertaken at the district 
level which would overemphasize printed material and posters while 
underutilizing the more important mass media of radio, newspapers, 
and cinemas.
Despite these notes of caution, the ambitious Scheme was begun 
in mid-1965 (after a short delay because of the Indian conflict); 
and as the Third Plan period progressed, glowingly optimistic ser­
vice statistics were reported. By 1968 some observers (Bean and 
Bhatti, 1969) reported an apparent striking success while the of­
ficial reports^” claimed that the rate of growth was slowing and that 
the various targets might be surpassed.
In three years of activities the programme appears to be strik­
ingly successful: about four-fifths of the population have
been covered by the programme in which over 90,000 persons are 
engaged in family planning activities in some direct fashion 
as full-time, part-time, cut-piece workers or programme agents; 
more than 1.6 million IUDs have been reported as inserted; 
over 296 million conventional contraceptives are reported as 
distributed; and over 320,000 vasectomies or tubal ligations 
have been performed. The programme has proved to be both
^Pakistan, Family Planning Division, Ministry of Health, Year 
Book for 1967/68. (Karachi: Family Planning Division, Ministry
of Health, Government of Pakistan, 1968); and Pakistan, Planning 
Commission, Mid-Plan Review of the Third Five-Year Plan. (Raw­
alpindi: Government of Pakistan Press, April, 1968).
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flexible and imaginative. For example, clinical methods have 
proved to be acceptable and as a result receive far more at­
tention than originally anticipated. Where medical personnel 
have been in short supply, the programme has successfully 
trained paramedical personnel to insert IUDs. ^
Service statistics based on reports from the Pakistan Family
Planning Council were analyzed by Bean and Bhatti (1969) and they
reported the successful spread of the programme geographically
to "at least 79 percent of the population" by mid-1968. They also
found few difficulties in staffing the nonmedical positions of the
2
scheme (though much of their actual performance was minimal) but 
serious shortages of medical personnel especially in the then East 
Pakistan were found.
Assuming the validity of the service statistics, and making
Bean, L.L., and A.D. Bhatti,'Three Years of Pakistan’s New National 
Family Planning Programme,' The Pakistan Development Review. Spring, 1969, 
pp. 34-35.
2
Even if the service statistics are assumed to be correct, 
there were serious problems of inefficiency in particular with the 
dais in their new role as preventers of births. Bean and Bhatti 
reports "...if one assumes that agents and dais sell an equal 
number of contraceptives and are responsible for all sales, their 
performance is minimal. Assuming the employment and distribution 
figures to be accurate, the agent or dais would on the average, 
during the last six months of the period, sell or distribute 
only 10 dozen conventional contraceptive units during a month and 
as units are presently computed in the programme this might mean 
the sale, for example, of only three to four bottles of foaming 
liquids. If one assumes that the dais are responsible for moti­
vating women to accept an IUD insertion, the staff performance 
record is even more depressing; on the average, other things 
being equal, a dai is able to motivate only two women per month 
to accept an IUD." Bean and Bhatti, 1969, p. 51.
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some other heroic assumptions, Bean and Bhatti estimated that 
as of mid-1968, "as much as 11 per cent of the eligible popula­
tion in Pakistan may now be practising family planning."
2
The performance of the dais proved to be very unsatisfactory. 
Tbese illiterate women were obviously incapable or unwilling to 
change the fertility practices of others; their monetary incen­
tives were ineffective or insufficient; and they were largely 
unable to convince husbands of the benefits of contraceptives.
Another major programmatic setback was the disrepute of the 
IUD which was the major contraceptive method in the programme. 
Following unhygienic or faulty insertions, there were many reports 
of bleeding and rumoursquickly spread making the IUD a largely un­
acceptable method. There were few follow-up services and the drop­
out rate was extremely high.
^"The..."as much as 11 per cent..." estimate is apparently a 
reduced figure from the sum of 7.5% for conventionals, 4.5% for 
IUDs, and 1.5% vasectomies and tubal ligations. "Assume that 
ten units monthly are employed by the average couple using con­
ventionals on a regular basis and that roughly one-third of all 
units distributed are defective, accepted by non-regular, inef­
ficient users, or simply wasted. Under these assumptions the 
distribution figures suggest a million regular users, or 5 per 
cent of the married couples in the country, or roughly 7.5 per 
cent of the married couples where the wife is not pregnant, other 
things being equal....Using Grecent IUD follow-up studies in 
East and West Pakistan} it is estimated that 940,000 women of the 
1,612,000 reported receiving an IUD may still be wearing the IUD 
at the end of the third year, or roughly 4.5 per cent of the eligi­
ble women....Assuming that all of the men having a vasectomy or 
women having a tuba 1 ligation are still living and in the child­
bearing years, an additional 1.5 per cent of the eligible popu­
lation is protected against the risk of childbearing." Ibid., 
p. 54.
2
Wajihuddin Ahmad, Field Structures in Family Planning, 
Appraisal and Search, Islamabad: Pakistan Family Planning
Council, 1970.
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Inexpensive oral contraceptives were to be distributed with­
out prescription to rural women; but this xvas countermanded just 
before the programme was to begin because of the fear of side ef­
fects, though this was later reversed again and they were made 
available within two years. But at the time, the programme was 
left with only conventional contraceptives, mainly the condom.
There were other institutional difficulties as well. The pro­
gramme's implementation had not been adequately planned. There 
were disputes with the Ministries of Health and Education. Other 
departments were grasping for the large family planning budget 
and they were able to obtain some of the funds after Ayub Khan's 
opponents castigated the programme.^ Later a Continuous Motiva­
tion Scheme was developed using both a man and a woman in a team 
to go to each household and talk to parents. While many plans 
were made for this, it was never really implemented. There were 
many reasons: the political changes from 1969 and onward, the
new provincial changes in the country and the beginning of the 
Civil War, and a severe cutback in national funds for foreign 
assistance. All combined to virtually shut down the programme. 
Thus, the population policy of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-
^See Shahid Javed Burki, 'Pakistan: A Demographic Report*,
Population Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 4, Washington D.C.: Popula­
tion Reference Bureau, 1973; and a personal communication from 
Burki, 1974, cited in Tine Bussink, 'Major Aspects of Family 
Planning in Pakistan', Prologue to Development Policy and Pop­
ulation Policy - The Pakistan Experience, Population Planning 
Division, Government of Pakistan and the I.C.P. Smithsonian 
Institution, 1975, p. 47.
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1975) written prior to the independence of Bangladesh is not re­
viewed here.^
In Pakistan in 1972, the then Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto 
instituted a Special Committee which developed a Two-Year Scheme 
that was to have a broader approach to population and was to in­
tegrate demographic considerations into development efforts. The 
Family Planning Programme was now dubbed the Population Planning 
Programme. A budget of Rs. 20A million was proposed. The Con­
tinuous Motivation Scheme was to be expanded to cover nine million 
fertile couples. New population growth targets were set. A 
Demographic Policies and Action Research Centre has been estab­
lished in order to integrate a so-called ’population planning 
bias* into the planning for education, welfare, employment and 
manpower, rural development, housing, and other sectors.
The U. S. Agency for International Development has made a 
grant of 7.5 million U. S. (Rs. 75 million) for contraceptive 
supplies. It is hoped that this programme will saturate the 
country with low cost contraceptives given out by all health 
clinics, family planning workers, and some 20,000 commercial dis­
tributors.
The implementation of the latest plans has not yet been in­
vestigated by this writer; but since the success or failure of 
the efforts may depend largely upon the people's motivation to 
control reproduction as well as administrative strength, it seems
^Stamper, B. Maxwell, Population and Planning in Developing 
Nations, (New York: The Population Council), 1977, pp. 171-174.
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unlikely that these programmes will be demographically effective.
In addition, one might speculate that under the present political 
circumstances in Pakistan, the administrative efficiency of govern­
ment efforts may not be high.
BANGLADESH
The First Five Year Plan (1973-1978)
Much has been written about the tragic circumstances of Bang­
ladeshi struggle for independence. A desperately poor country 
hit by a cyclone and tidal wave in 1970, it fought a war of inde­
pendence in 1971 that killed many and left almost ten million re­
fugees. Even if the new government had not been grossly incompe­
tent, there would have been great difficulties in rebuilding the 
country. And following all this came the great famine of 1974.
In November 1973, The First Five Year Plan was published.
The Plan was extremely optimistic in most respects, and it naively 
assumed that the rate of economic growth of the late 1960s would 
soon return. It failed to consider the real severity of the dis­
rupted economy. Like many plans, it was a political document writ­
ten to encourage the national and international audiences with 
what might have been possible - in theory only. With the benefit 
of some luck, several years of excellent harvests, a huge amount 
of aid, and effective leadership, the economy might have recuperat­
ed somewhat within a few years had it not been for the rise in im­
port prices.
Ill
But the harvests were not good, nor was the weather, nor the 
political leadership; and, furthermore, there was a fantastic 
rise in import prices which completely ruined any reality of the 
plan and devastated any chance of a smooth management of the economy. 
This ultimately resulted in severe production cutbacks through 
shortages in imports. Things were made even more difficult in 
1973-74 because the export performance^" fell short of the Plan and 
the additional foreign aid was less than anticipated.
Unfortunately, Bangladesh's limited modern sector is extremely 
dependent upon heavy foreign trade and critical imports. When im­
port' prices rose, critical imports were curtailed. Petroleum 
imports were about one-third less than planned; cement and ferti­
lizer were reduced by about half; 2.2 million tons of foodgrains, 
valued at U. S. 213 million, were planned for 1973-74 but the ac­
tual imports were more like 1.6 million tons, but at a price of 
U.S. 296 million - nearly twice the 100 per ton estimate.
Customs and excise duties account for a substantial proportion 
of government revenue, thus the curtailment of imports substantial­
ly lowered expected government revenue which had been earmarked 
for development expenditure.
The First Five Year Plan presents an entire chapter detailing 
its population planning programme. The plan utilizes considerable 
demographic data and presents projections of the total population,
"^The Plan placed critical importance upon the jute manufactur­
ing industry and in the early years of the Plan period the annual 
production deteriorated. According to the Annual Plan for 1974-75 
and The White Paper on Economic Situation in Bangladesh, the an­
nual production of jute textiles was 561 thousand tons in 1969/70;
446 in 1972/73; 500 in 1973/74; and 450 in 1974/75.
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school-age population, and working-age population.
The plan recognizes a broad range of problems that are ex­
acerbated by rapid population growth: economic development; unem­
ployment; increasing school-age population; high dependency ratio; 
population pressure on health services, social services, housing, 
and food production; and the effects of population density upon 
physical infrastructures, recreation space, roads, and land.
The planners state that rapid population growth is ’likely 
to continue unless radical preventive steps are taken,* and urge 
that the nation's programmes for population control be critically 
reviewed and that a new programme be formulated with 'a set of 
bold and, if necessary, drastic policies for vigorous action with 
a view to reducing this high rate of population growth within a 
reasonable time. Failure in this critical area would frustrate 
all our development efforts. Therefore, the programme for popu­
lation planning is given a place of high priority in the develop­
ment plan'.
The plan's population policy falls basically into five cate­
gories: (1) a campaign for both population education and contra­
ceptive education; (2) the integration of family planning and pop­
ulation education programmes with the various ministries; (3) 
the voicing of public concern about rapid population growth by 
political leaders, educators, social workers, and student organ­
izations; (A) an increased role for abortion; and (5) the serious 
national consideration of the 'imposition of progressively increas 
ing punitive measures against Cfamilies withj more than two chil­
dren' .
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The planners evaluate past efforts to reduce population growth 
and credit them with bringing about a new awareness of the problems 
of population growth, an organizational structure for the family 
planning programme, and a new environment conducive to other fer- 
tility-control programmes. A number of weaknesses of the past pro­
gramme are also discussed, including unrealistic targets that, with­
out extensive supervision, led to fictitious reporting and to abuses 
of the cash incentive programme. The underemphasis of such nonclin- 
ical methods as oral contraceptives and condoms is also viewed as 
a weakness. Past programmes, the planners say, were limited too 
strictly to family planning; better defined population policies 
would adopt more non-family planning strategies for fertility 
control. A number of organizational drawbacks are also discussed, 
including the untrained and part-time working staff, conflicts a- 
mong supervising staff members, and problems of coordination.
The plan sets the demographic target of reducing the rate of 
population growth, estimated to be 3 per cent, 'by at least 0.2 
per cent at the end of the plan period' (i.e., from 3.0 to 2.8 
per cent)♦ Two projections of future populations are given, one 
based on the assumption of a decline in the birth rate from 47 
births per 1,000 population to 43 by 1978. This projection is 
based on the assumed effect of the family planning programme.
The other projection of total population is based on an assumption 
of no family planning programme. It is not evident frcm the pub­
lished data if there is any decline in fertility in the second 
projection. No method of projection or source of data is pre­
sented and neither projection gives a distribution by age and
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sex. The rate of growth assumed in the plan is three per cent, 
based on (CBR = 47) - (CDR = 17) = 30 per 1,000, but other rates 
are given in connection with the population policies' anticipated 
effects. No source of data is given for any of these rates. Long­
er range projections are discussed in the plan, with four different 
paths of reduction in fertility to the year 2003. The details of 
the assumptions as well as the age distributions are not published.
The plan presents a comprehensive population strategy for re­
ducing fertility, indeed more comprehensive than any other national 
development plan surveyed. It is comprehensive in the range of 
policies considered and proposed, and it is a broad strategy involv­
ing more than six different government ministries. It attempts 
to integrate the policies and programmes and to make them consis­
tent, cogent, and reinforcing. There is an attempt to integrate 
these efforts at the highest levels of government with a national 
population council which oversees the efforts by various ministries.
The Ministry of Health and Family Planning is to carry out 
the bulk of the programme, of course, by supplying contraceptives 
and attempting to motivate their acceptance by the activities of 
health and multipurpose field workers. The Minister of Rural De­
velopment is to promote women cooperatives for increasing literacy 
and employment potential, and it will also promote family plan­
ning education. The Ministry of Education is to introduce popu­
lation education into the school and adult education curriculum.
’The Ministry of Agriculture will incorporate family planning into 
its nutrition education of its extension programmes. The Ministry 
of Information and Broadcasting will have programmes about both
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population and family planning in its radio, t.v., newspapers, 
posters, pamphlets, etc.. The Ministry of Labour and Social Wel­
fare is to promote population and family planning information, 
education, and motivation in its relevant social work programmes. 
Various student organizations are encouraged to carry out similiar 
activities and political leaders, educationalists, social workers 
and intellectuals are urged to voice their concern and advocate 
fertility control.
Does all of this mean anything? It is clear from the plan 
that an attempt is being made to produce programmes which reinforce 
each other. This would have a greater potential than programmes 
set up in isolation. But the extent to which they in fact do rein­
force each other depends upon their implementation at the village 
level.^ It may well be that these programmes will be implemented 
at the top levels of government, but will they be integrated at 
the bottom? There are thousands of villages in Bangladesh. In­
tegration at the top is easy but integration at the bottom of 
a long chain of command in a newly created bureaucracy is diffi­
cult. And it would be difficult even if it were not plagued 
with widespread corruption. At best, different levels of govern­
ment are likely to have different priorities.
Furthermore, for most ministries, population programmes are 
outside the scope of their main functions and it seems unlikely 
that peripheral functions will be maintained and run with any
^Paul Demeny, Observations on Population Policy and Popu­
lation Program in Bangladesh, 1960-74', Population and Development 
Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 1975, pp. 307-321.
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vigour*,especially down through the bureaucracy.
It is hoped that all-purpose field workers will be a key to 
integration of a population policy at the bottom of the hierarchy. 
But will these mostly middle class women really be successful at 
the village level? Can they really relate to the villagers?
The population programme, along with most other government 
programmes, was brought to a virtual standstill during the civil 
war, and it has been only partly reestablished. IUD insertions, 
the major method of the former programme, were near nil in 1971.
By 1974, only 35,000 were reported - less than 10 per cent of the 
number reported in 1968. Oral contraceptives were introduced in 
1973 and more than 750,000 cycles were distributed in 1974. Ster­
ilizations in 1974 were only about 20 per cent of the number carried 
out in 1968.^
The plan does not outline specific targets for the number of 
contraceptive acceptors or births to be averted, but it does give
a proportional allocation to each method: orals, 20-25 per cent;
IUD, 20-25 per cent* 
condoms, 25-30 per cent; vasectomy, 20-25 per cent;/other, 10-12
per cent. To obtain the plan’s crude birth rate target of 44 per
1,000 (with a crude death rate of 15) by mid-1978, it has been
2
roughly estimated that some 620,000 births must be averted.
A number of population projects are currently under way, backed
Hi. Ataur Rahman and Lincoln C. Chen, 'Bangladesh', Family 
Planning Programs: World Review 1974, Walter B. Watson and
Robert J. Lapham, eds., Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 6,
No. 8, August 1974, pp. 248-251.
2Ibid.
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by almost all of the large international population donors. UNFPA 
and USAID have committed some U.S. 10 million each during the plan 
period. The World Bank has established a U.S. 46 million IDA 
credit for a national population programme in the same period.
The population programme is officially stated to be the second 
national priority - after agricultural development - and one member 
of the Planning Commission is quoted^ as explaining:
When we say that population control should be our second 
priority, what we mean is that we will spend the next four or 
five years concentrating on agriculture, and then we will take 
up population control in a big way. For the present, we really 
haven't had time to think about it - besides, it is probably a 
subject that is best left in the background until our people 
are ready for it.
Following the publication of the plan, the population programme 
was reorganized under the new Population Control and Family Planning 
Division within the Ministry of Health, Population Control, and 
Family Planning, which was to implement the new programme by in­
tegrating it with the MCH services. But given the recent political 
changes, the policies and development strategy of the new government 
cannot be told with any certainty.
^Marcus F. Franda, 'Perceptions of a Population Policy for 
Bangladesh*, American University Field Staff Reports, South Asia 
Series, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1973.
CHAPTER FIVE
ISSUES AND THEORIES OF FERTILITY DECLINE IN PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH
Assuming the validity of the goal to reduce the rate of popu­
lation growth in Bangladesh and Pakistan; and further recognizing 
that a substantial reduction in fertility is the only feasible or 
acceptable approach; then, how can the various theories about fer­
tility decline be utilized in development planning?
In looking for a conceptual framework for Bangladesh and Pak­
istan's population policies we shall briefly mention several basic 
approaches and discuss their utility and limitations. A simple 
typology of these approaches would include the following:
1. The family planning approach.
2. Beyond family planning measures.
3. The development hypothesis and the transition theory.
4. The distributive hypothesis and fertility.
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The Family Planning Approach
There is a widespread disillusionment with the family planning 
approach as the principal policy instrument for reducing fertility. 
After all these years of effort, the 1975 Pakistan fertility Sur­
vey, conducted as a part of the World Fertility Survey Programme, 
found no evidence of a fertility decline.^ In Bangladesh, an an­
alysis of the 1974 Census and its special survey on fertility found
2
no evidence of a decline in fertility. Nevertheless, the family 
planning approach remains the chief policy instrument for reducing 
the rate of population growth.
Two fundamental problems lie at the heart of the family plan­
ning failure in these countries: an extremely difficult setting
for the administration of such a programme, and insufficient mo­
tivation to control reproduction. The setting for the Pakistan 
family planning programme is exceedingly adverse; in fact, if the 
family planning approach can succeed in Pakistan and Bangladesh,
3
it most certainly can succeed anywhere m  the world. Enver Adil, 
the Pakistan Commissioner of Family Planning in 1965, gave the fol­
lowing reasons for the continued high fertility: (1) Early and
^Population Council of Pakistan, Pakistan Fertility Survey:
First Report, Lahore: Directorate of Production and Publication,
1976, 110p.
^Bangladesh, Census Commission, Bangladesh Population Census, 
1974, Provisional Results Bulletin, Dacca, 1975.
3
Enver Adil» 'Pakistan', Family Planning and Population Programs: 
A Review of World Developments, Bernard Berelson, et al., eds.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966, p. 124.
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near universal marriage with an average female age of marriage of 
between 15 and 16, and nearly 100 per cent of the women marrying 
by the end of their reproductive ages. (2) Early childbearing 
within marriage. (3) The remarriage of widows. (4) A predominate­
ly (near 90 per cent) rural population with perhaps three-quarters 
of the population working in agriculture. (5) Very high illiter­
acy rates. (6) General isolation of the population. (7) A very 
low standard of living with per capita incomes of less than U.S.
100. (8) A traditional extended family organization. (9) A degree
of fatalistic attitudes. (10) A lack of economic incentives to 
limit family size. Dudley Kirk^ has also argued that Islamic so­
cial values have tended to favour high fertility. Additional rea­
sons for the adverse setting for the family planning programme were 
cited by Warren Robinson: infant mortality is still so high that
a high fertility is perceived as being necessary; the proportion 
of the population which is educated is extremely low and among wo­
men it is exceedingly low; the population is predominately rural; 
in Bangladesh travel and communications are extremely difficult; 
and finally, male dominance and Purdah make it very difficult to 
introduce contraceptive information. Robinson goes on to say, "This 
totality of socio-economic-psychological barriers, the combination 
of poverty, ill-health and deprivation with strong religious and 
social values in favour of high fertility and strong resistance to 
any change, probably make the ’setting* in Pakistan one of the most
^"Dudley Kirk, ’Factors Affecting Muslim Natality', Family 
Planning and Population Programs, Bernard Berelson, et al., eds., 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, pp. 561-579.
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difficult in the world for the successful introduction of a sudden 
large-scale family planning scheme"
Given the adverse setting in Pakistan, the family planning pro­
gramme may have been expected to fail. The best that can be said 
is that it may not have failed worse than other programmes. Social 
programmes have not done very well, certainly health and educational 
services have been a disaster, and few of the development goals 
have been met. Family planning as an organizational feat may have 
succeeded better, or at least failed less than many other programmes.
What can we learn from the failure of the family planning ap­
proach to actually reduce fertility? Should the effort be continued 
or strengthened or discontinued? Part of the answer may lie in the 
fact that too much is expected from the programme; and if less were 
expected, it might not be judged a failure so quickly. In the his­
torical European setting changes in fertility took generations; 
but in Pakistan if changes in the birth rate are not measured from 
year to year, then some charge that the effort is a failure and 
should be abandoned. Despite a long period of activity in family 
planning, serious efforts only started in 1965 and lasted until 1969. 
So at best there were only four years of strong programme efforts.
It might also be argued that rather than family planning, it is 
the failure of development efforts - and no one wants to abandon 
them - that has hindered a reduction of fertility. It could also
^Warren C. Robinson, 'Family Planning in Pakistan's Third Five 
Year Plan', The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 
1966, p. 275.
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be said that it is the failure of these development efforts that 
has hindered the family planning programme itself. Defenders of 
this approach claim that the programme may accelerate the accept­
ance, adoption, and diffusion of birth control-practices, if not 
initiate a decline in fertility. Even if the programme fails to 
initiate a general decline in fertility it will, nevertheless, 
provide services for those who are motivated. Thus, any given level 
of motivation for reducing fertility will result in more effective 
fertility control. Any "natural decline" in overall fertility 
would probably be accelerated if a national family planning pro­
gramme were established. It is also argued, and generally agreed, 
that family planning is a basic human right; that people, and espec­
ially women, should have the right to control their own family size; 
and that a population which controls and spaces its fertility will 
generally have better maternal and child health* and better health
through the reduction of dangerous illegal abortions. It is also
2
argued by Bernard Berelson that this approach is acceptable and 
feasible while most other population policies which go beyond fam­
ily planning are either politically unrealistic, morally unaccept­
able, or administratively infeasible.
There is some consensus that the family planning approach should
*While most agree that family planning is worthwhile in terms 
of health and as a basic human right, some would argue that it has 
been "actively nurtured at the cost of the general health services 
particularly in the rural areas". D. Banerji speaking of India, 
in D. Banerji, 'Health Services and Population Policies', Economic 
and Political Weekly, Vol. 11, Nos. 31-33, August 1976, p. 1251.
^Bernard Berelson, 'Beyond Family Planning', Studies in Family 
Planning, Vol. 1, No. 38, February 1969, pp. 1-16.
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not be abandoned; that it is necessary; and that perhaps it should 
even be strengthened, though it must be recognized that the approach 
is not at all sufficient to significantly reduce population growth. 
Planners should not be misled into thinking that this approach 
alone will have a meaningful demographic impact.
Demand for Family Planning
It is evident that there is little motivation to control re­
production. Either it is not within the range of conscious choice 
to limit fertility, or it is not perceived to be an economic or 
social advantage to do so. Sirageldin and others^ in studying 
the 1968-1969 National Impact Survey for Bangladesh found that 
only 3.7 per cent of the population were currently using contracep­
tives and only 6.4 per cent had ever used contraception. They 
further argue on the basis of the Impact Survey that the demand for 
reduced fertility is not at all sufficient to have a major impact 
upon population growth. They report that if one takes "all current 
use and expected future use based on reported intentions, this to­
tal expected demand was and is not large enough to generate the
2
desired fertility reductions in Bangladesh."
To what extent does the demand for children reflect the eco­
nomic advantages to the family? In a micro-study of the economic 
activities of children in the village of Char Gopalpur in north-
^Ismael Sirageldin, Monowar Hossain, and Mead Cain, 'Family 
Planning in Bangladesh; An Empirical Investigation', Bangladesh 
Development Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1975, p. 6,
2Ibid, p. 24.
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central Bangladesh, Mead Cain found that from the point of view of 
the parents, high fertility and many children were economically 
"rational".^ Children put in long hours of work and by the aver­
age age of twelve, male children were net producers; by the aver­
age age of fifteen, they had compensated for their own cumulative 
consumption. Because of the rigid division of labour by sex, fe­
male children did not compensate for their consumption, but Cain 
found that by the age of 22, male children had compensated for their 
sisters' cumulative consumption as well as their own. The ages 
at which children compensated for their consumption varied accord­
ing to economic class. Children of landless households were of 
the least economic value to their parents because the children had 
less return for their labour and parents had less control over the 
income.
The study was essentially limited to the work contributions 
of children and since the costs of child rearing were not thoroughly 
analyzed, the study's conclusions must remain somewhat tenuous.
In addition, the study did not attempt to measure changes in the 
average productivity and employment with different numbers of chil­
dren in the household. This could be a serious limitation since 
fertility decisions might be different if the average productivity 
of children declined as the number of children in the family in­
creased. Cain suggests that in the case of male children the aver­
age productivity may not be affected by the number of brothers in
^Mead T. Cain, 'The Economic Activities of Children in a 
Village in Bangladesh*, Population and Development Review, Vol.
3, No. 3, September 1977, pp. 201-227.
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the household. If there is sufficient labour to operate the farm 
the relatively well-to-do can diversify the household enterprise 
via trade and wage employment or by the education of one or more 
sons. The constraints to employment among the poor are external 
to the household and these constraints will not be changed by the 
number of sons. However, the average productivity for an increas­
ing number of daughters may well decline since the amount of house­
hold work is limited and the opportunities for productive work out­
side the household are extremely limited for women.
Although high fertility may be economically "rational” from 
the point of view of the family, it is clearly not economically 
rational from the point of view of the village; and Cain reports 
that "continued rapid population growth is likely to intensify 
the pressure on resources and erode overall economic welfare".^
Thus, there exists the serious dilemma between the competing in­
terests of the family and the society. Because the costs of high 
fertility are being externalized and are paid by the community, 
high fertility is economically rational from the family viewpoint. 
Demeny argues that "...unwittingly, people are locked in a compet­
itive race, in which almost everybody wins, yet by the same token
almost everybody loses as society pays the price for rapid popu- 
2
1ation growth".
*Cain, op« cit., p. 202.
^aul Demeny, ’Observations on Population Policy and Popula­
tion Programs in Bangladesh', Population and Development Review,
Vol. 1, No. 2, December, 1975, 316. For a further treatment of 
this issue see Paul Demeny, 'The Economics of Population Control', 
Rapid Population Growth, National Academy of Sciences, Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 199-221; and Geof­
frey McNicoll, 'Community-Level Population Policy: An exploration',
Population and Development Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 1975,
pp. 1-21.
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If high fertility is economically rational from the family 
viewpoint, then no matter how effective the family planning pro­
gramme is, the demand for its services will only be marginal. 
Essentially, the family planning programme is only a supply mech­
anism which subsidizes the cost of contraceptives, improves the 
ease of access, and provides relevant information. If there was 
sufficient demand for contraceptives, the private market could 
supply them. If sufficient demand existed for contraceptives, 
even a restrictive government policy could not prevent the black 
market from supplying them, as it now supplies everything from il­
legal drugs to bicycles, and in so doing it overcomes the most dif­
ficult transportation problems.
The new Bangladesh and Pakistan population schemes are en­
visioned to be more than a supply system; it is hoped that they 
will be able to create demand as well. But it seems questionable 
that these middle class motivators will be able to create the 
demand for their services if to do so runs against the economic 
interest of the average family. Information and motivation cam­
paigns of this sort may have some small effect, but they are not 
likely to have a significant demographic impact. To the extent 
that they are not demographically effective, government policy 
options will be limited to disincentives and policies to intern­
alize externalities; or to more stringent measures; or to broad 
structural measures which will indirectly alter how families per­
ceive the costs of their children.
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Beyond Family Planning Measures
A number of policies have been advocated to reduce fertility 
which go beyond the family planning approach and attempt to direct­
ly influence the demand for reproductive control and contraceptives. 
Policies aiming to reduce the demand for additional children have 
ranged from the provision of old age support, to monetary incen­
tives for reduced fertility at the family and community level, and 
even to stringent and coercive measures.
Fertility and Old Age Support
It is generally agreed that one motivational reason for high 
fertility is the parents* need to have enough children in order to 
support them in their old age. This may be a powerful' and long 
term motive for having children which is not easily influenced by 
short term government policies. In an attempt to deal with this 
phenomenon Ridker and Muscat^ have proposed a scheme in which the 
payment of a pension to a couple is linked with the number of sur­
viving children. This scheme was developed for Malaysia but its 
authors claim that it is, with suitable modifications, applicable 
to many other Third World countries as well. No payments would be 
made for parents with four or more children; but for those with 
fewer children, payments would vary inversely with the number of 
surviving children. Many variations of the scheme and the scale 
of incentives are possible. Its authors argue that these schemes
^■Ronald Ridker and Robert J. Muscat, ’Incentives for Family 
Welfare and Fertility Reduction’, Studies in Family Planning,
January 1973.
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force the state to pay substantial sums only if they produce re­
sults - that is, if there are fewer surviving children and the 
rate of growth is actually reduced. The payment would be delayed 
for many years and would be presumably be paid at a time when in­
comes were higher. Many people would remain ineligible since they 
had four or more surviving children. At the current age structure 
only about seven per cent of the population is aged 60 or over.
But this represents about 15 per cent of the fflnployed population 
aged 15 to 59. Reduced fertility would, of course, increase their 
proportion of the total population, but the total dependency ratio 
would continue to decline until the reduced fertility cohorts mov­
ed well into their working ages.
Even if such a scheme were feasible in Malaysia it is doubt­
ful that it would work in Bangladesh or Pakistan. Malaysia has a 
population of only eleven million and a per capita income of some 
U. S. 430 - this compares with Bangladesh's 80 million people and 
per capita income of only U. S. 70. In this writer's view, this 
and similar schemes have several fatal flaws. The scheme would 
be open to fraud on a massive scale. This would be true even if, 
somehow, there was suddenly a complete vital registration system 
for all births and deaths and a register for migrants. Such a 
scheme would require an effective governmental administration
i
and also the long-term confidence of the people in that govern­
ment. This is hardly what one would expect under the political 
circumstances in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
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Fertility Decisions at the Community Level
The new Bangladesh Plan does call for the immediate adoption 
of a programme giving awards to communities on the basis of the 
demographic impact; that is, 'priority in providing community and 
public facility' for areas where fertility is reduced. Geoffrey 
McNicoll^ argues for such an approach where communities and not 
individuals would be the target of policies aimed at internalizing 
the costs of high fertility. This might be a reasonable approach 
providing it happens within the context of a unified community de­
velopment programme. Certainly, the success of these sorts of
2
efforts in China are notable, as Pi-chao Chen reports:
A Ward ("Street") Committee or Commune may suggest as a target 
that the crude birth rate be brought down a few points from 
that of the previous year, perhaps from 25/1000 to 22/1000; 
this reference point (not binding at lower levels) would be 
passed down through administrative channels. The eligible 
couples would meet in their production team, residents' 
group, or factory to plan how to meet such targets. Taking 
into account their population size, they calculate the num­
ber of births which would yield the proposed birth rate, 
then proceed to "allocate" the births among themselves - 
deciding who should have a child in the coming year. In do­
ing this they follow certain priorities in the following 
order: 1) newly marrieds are free to bear their first child
without delay. (In some areas they may not even get birth 
control education until after the first child); 2) couples 
with only one or two children; 3) couples whose youngest 
child is closer to five years old. The couples thus allo­
cated a turn will refrain from using contraception while the 
others practice contraception. Obviously adjustments have to 
be made for failure to conceive within the year, unexpected 
pregnancies, and situations where the husband works away 
from home; these are made by discussion and mutual agreement.
^Geoffrey McNicoll, 'Community-Level Population Policy: An
Exploration*, Population and Development Review, September 1975, 
Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-21.
2
Pi-chao Chen, 'The 'Planned Birth' Program of the People's 
Republic of China', mimeograph, 1974, cited in McNicoll, Ibid.
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This is certainly a straightforward and effective population policy, 
but it seems highly unlikely that even a much less radical and 
watered-down version of this approach would be workable in Bangla­
desh and Pakistan under the present social structure. This approach 
implies a consensus within the community, but given the hostilities 
between the landowners and the landless it seems doubtful that fam­
ily fertility decisions will move into the community arena.
With the apparent failure of voluntary family planning, some 
have urged stronger methods to reduce fertility. But the case- 
wise incentive system for both the acceptor and the family plan­
ning worker used in Pakistan was rejected in the Bangladesh Five 
Year Plan for the following reasons: The scheme led to corruption
and inflated reporting of contraceptive acceptance; it kept the 
supervisory field officers deskbound making disbursements and 
keeping records; it distorted the perspective of the programme, 
and its demographic impact was low.
Any scheme which pays recipients for irreversible steriliza­
tion raises difficult political and ethical issues which would have 
to be carefully resolved in light of the Indian experience.
Stringent Fertility Policies
The Bangladesh Plan called for "...a set of bold and if neces­
sary drastic policies for vigorous action with a view to reducing 
this high rate of population growth..."^ It goes on to say that
^Planning Commission, Government of the People's Republic of 
Bangladesh, The First Five-Year Plan, 1973-78, Dacca, 1973, 
p. 537.
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"No civilized measure would be too drastic to keep the population 
of Bangladesh on the smaller side of 15 crores (150 million) for 
sheer ecological viability of the nation".*
The Plan entertains the idea of punitive measures against 
large families without actually calling for its immediate adoption.
We must consider the imposition of progressively in­
creasing punitive measures against additional children after 
the second child on all couples. Once the programme gets 
well under way it may be worthwhile, for example, (i) to 
restrict ration cards in statutory and modified rationing 
areas to a maximum of two children; (ii) to debar couples 
from enjoying the benefit of fair price shops for more than 
two children per family. All couples should be required 
by law to register with the family planning organization.
The first phase of launching a major educational and 
motivational drive, if successful, should, at least, create 
a climate where the possibility of more drastic measures, 
such as compulsory- sterilization of either husband or wife 
after the second child, legalization of abortion and establish­
ment of abortion clinics for performing abortion free of 
cost, social measures to bring about women's emancipation, 
etc., may be considered.2
Some stringent policies have been theoretically justified 
to some as an attempt to internalize externalities. That is, if 
many of the costs of high fertility are being externalized or paid 
at the community or national level, it will be cheaper to have 
higher fertility from the family point of view. If the family is 
forced to accept the true costs of high fertility, their external­
ities will be internalized; and the costs of high fertility will 
be greater.
However, policies aimed at internalizing the cost of high
^Planning Commission, Government of the People's Republic of 
Bangladesh, The First Five-Year Plan, 1973-78, Dacca, 1973, 
p. 537.
2Ibid.
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fertility upon large families would have adverse distributional 
implications. The large families, already poor, would be made 
poorer by paying the direct costs of educating their children, for 
example. These sorts of policies would have an inverse welfare 
effect, and would directly penalize the children in large fami­
lies who, after all, had no involvement in the decisions regarding 
their own existence. Such policies are likely to be viewed as 
morally unacceptable as well as politically impractical and ad­
ministratively infeasible. Furthermore, the demographic effec­
tiveness is questionable.
Compulsory population policies have now been implemented in 
India, and all the world knows the result. Without a well-defined 
national policy, the Indian state governments began instituting 
drastic policies of compulsory birth control. Overzealous bureau­
crats proposed a number of compulsory birth control laws which 
harassed the poor into irreversible sterility. Early in 1976 the 
Haryana government passed legislation to punish the parents giv­
ing birth to a third child with forced sterilization and a fine.
A few days later the Punjab government was reported to have ap­
proved legislation making it an offense to have more than two 
children. This crime was to be punishable with imprisonment and 
a fine. The Maharashtra government had announced its planned 
compulsory family planning. The state chief minister proclaimed 
that people with "communicable diseases" would be forcibly ster­
ilized. He did not specify which communicable diseases or what
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would be done in the event the disease was cured.
The district magistrate of Varanasi reportedly ordered that 
government employees in the district would not be paid their sal­
aries in March 1976 if they did not "persuade” two persons to 
accept vasectomy or tubectomy operations. It was reported that 
the Delhi administration had forced every teacher it employs to 
bring five persons to be sterilized in order to obtain their teach­
ing salary for the month of March 1976. In some talukas of 
Aurangabad, district teachers had been "advised" to be sterilized 
and to "bring some cases for operations". On 30 March 1976 the
Maharashtra government proposed legislation in the state assembly
2which authorized m  certain conditions forced sterilization.
Years ago Frank Notestein wrote that such compulsory policies 
will bring down the government before they bring down the birth 
rate. They did bring down the government; but they also abused 
the poor and powerless with irreversible sterilizations, and they 
damaged the viability of the voluntary family planning programmes 
as well.
The Development Hypothes-fs And The Transition Theory
What is the relevance of the demographic transition theory for
^"'Drastic Solutions’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XI, 
No. 13, March 27, 1976, pp. 479-480.
2Ibid.
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development planners in Bangladesh and Pakistan? At a time when 
the demographic transition theory had been discredited by demo­
graphers, it was adopted by many others, including important policy 
makers, as a key assumption in the so called population-development 
debate throughout the Third World and, particularly, at the U.N. 
Bucharest conference in 1974.
...in a developing country where fertility is initially high, 
improving economic and social conditions are likely to have 
little if any effect on fertility until a certain economic 
and social level is reached; but once that level is achieved, 
fertility is likely to enter a decided decline and to continue 
downward until it is again stabilized on a much lower plane.
2
It has truly been said that the best contraceptive is development.
Development goals generally have an effect on the socio-economic 
context of reproductive decisions that tend to moderate fer­
tility levels.
4
Take care of the people and population will take care of itself.
There is no need to take steps to affect fertility directly; 
all our resources should be directed to accelerating develop­
ment, not preventing births
These statements take as a presupposition the theory of the 
demographic transition, which itself is largely based upon the his­
torical experiences of Europe. The Princeton European Fertility
^United Nations, Population Bulletin of the United Nations,
No. 7, New York* United Nations, 1963, p. 143.
^Karan Singh, Statement made at the World Population Conference, 
Bucharest, August 1974, Mimeograph.
3
World Population Conference, World Population Plan of Action,
New York: United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/5585.
(E/CONF. 60/19).
4
Action Pack, Distributed by the World Population Year Secre­
tariat of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 1974.
^National Academy of Sciences, et al., In Search of Population 
Policy* Views from the Developing World. Washington D.C.s National 
Academy of Sciences.
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1
Studies found very few generalizations that could be made about 
the specific causal mechanisms which reduced fertility in Europe, 
Furthermore, in some cases, fertility was found to have declined
prior to mortality. Of the generalizations that remain, Ansley
2
Coale offers three preconditions for a sustained decline m  
marital fertility: 1) fertility control must be a matter of con­
scious choice, 2) it must be perceived as a social or economic 
advantage, and 3) birth control methods must be known, accepted, 
and used.
Strictly speaking, the demographic transition theory is not 
a scientific theory at all. The transition theory is too grand a 
generalization; it lacks a measurable and specifiable causation 
mechanism —  it does not "explain"; it lacks a definite time scale; 
it is of little predictive value; and furthermore, it does not even 
accurately describe the experiences of Europe and Japan much less 
Pakistan and Bangladesh,
Nevertheless, this grand generalization remains fundamental 
to many assumptions upon which population and development policies 
are based. The theory itself is based largely upon the historical 
experiences of Europe which differed greatly from that of present 
day south Asia. The following section analyzes these differences, 
some of which might in general postpone a decline in fertility, and 
some which might accelerate such a decline.
^Ansley Coale, 'The Demographic Transition Reconsidered',
In International Population Conference, I.U.S.S.P., Liege, 1973, 
Vol. 1, pp. 53-72.
2Ibid.
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Mortality and Fertility Decline
Mortality declined slowly in Europe over a long period of time, 
and it was brought down largely by the improvement in the standard 
of living. Naturally, declining mortality would have a positive 
effect upon family size because there would be more survivors.
But the improved standard of living also had the important effect 
of increasing people's aspirations, which in turn improved their 
reproductive control, both directly and through changes in mar­
riage patterns. At the same time, these increased aspirations 
followed an intergenerational pattern and people acted in ways
that would prevent a decline in their standard of living. Thus,
changed
they may have reduced their marital fertility or their marriage 
patterns in an attempt to maintain themselves at their parents' 
standard of living.^"
See D. V. Glass, 'Population Growth and Population Policy', 
Public Health and Population Change: Current Research Issues,
Mindel C. Sheps and Jeanne Clare Ridley, Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press., 1965, pp. 3-24.
137
The decline in mortality in Pakistan and Bangladesh was caused 
largely by technological advances transferred from the West and not 
so much from any improved standard of living. These declines were 
not only quicker but brought down the level of mortality below 
that of early industrial Europe; and, thus, much higher rates of 
population growth have ensued. But the mechanism which probably 
did most to bring down fertility in the West —  an improved stan­
dard of living —  is still absent in Pakistan.
Warren C. Robinson has identified four phases of mortality 
decline in Pakistan.^ The first was during the period between 
the turn of the century and the 1920s when sharp fluctuations in 
mortality caused by famine and epidemics were controlled. Then, 
during the 1920s and the 1930s, smallpox, plague, and cholera 
were brought under greater control. At the time of Partition, 
typhoid, malaria, tuberculosis and maternal mortality were the 
major causes of death; but deaths from typhoid and malaria were 
quickly reduced. Robinson sees the fourth phase occurring in the 
mid-1960s when malaria and typhoid deaths continued to decline 
along with a rapid decline in tuberculosis^rrelated deaths; but 
with maternal and infant mortality rates remaining high —  aver­
aging between 172 and 211 deaths per thousand^
‘SSTTcrude death rate of around 15 to 18 per 1000 
population. In addition, there have been a great number of major 
disasters including the 1974 famine, the 1971 War of independence,
^Warren C. Robinson, 'Recent Mortality Trends in Pakistan', 
in Studies in the Demography of Pakistan, ed. W. C. Robinson, 
Karachi: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1967.
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the 1970 cyclone and tidal wave, the 1947 partition of India, 
and the Bengal famine of 1943, to name a few. Thus, the source 
and pace of mortality decline in Pakistan was quite different 
from that of the European experience upon which the demographic 
transition theory is based.
The Rate of Growth
A rate of growth of around three per cent may not sound ex­
cessive, but by historical standards it is phenomenally high; in 
fact, it is unprecedented. A three per cent rate of growth, if 
continued, will result in a doubling of the population every 23 
years; and if further sustained, would result in nearly a 32 
fold increase in a century. Historically, the rate of growth of 
the human population from its earliest to its early modern times, 
though marked with great fluctuations from disease and famine, 
must have been nearly zero. That is, its growth rate could not . 
have averaged more than 0.002 per cent or 20 per million per 
year. Compare this with the annual rate of growth for Pakistan 
and Bangladesh which is more than three per cent or 30,000 per 
million. That is 1,500 times greater! During the European demo­
graphic transition the annual rates of growth ranged between 0.5 
to 1.5 per cent (5,000 to 15,000 per million) while averaging 
around 0.7 per cent (7,000 per million). Europe had few countries 
with doubling times less than 50 years, and most doubled around 
every 90 years. A three per cent rate of growth requires a huge 
effort just to maintain investments in social overhead at current 
inadequate per capita levels. And investments to actually improve
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the standard of living —  the driving force of the decline in fer­
tility in the West —  are all the more difficult.
In 1901 the population of what was later West and East Pakistan 
was estimated to have been around 46 million; 50 years later in 
1951 the population had increased to around 76 million, an addi­
tion of 30 million persons. During the following ten years, 1951 
to 1961, the population grew by some 18 million to 102 in 1961.
In 1951, after Pakistan*s first partition, the population size 
for the West was reported to be 33.7 million with an average annual 
rate of growth of 1.7 per cent between 1941 and 1951, a rate which 
would double its population every 40 years. In 1972, at the time 
of Pakistan's second partition, the Census reported a population 
size for the West of 64.9 million with an average annual growth 
rate of 3.7 per cent between 1961 and 1972, a rate which would 
double its population every 19 years. If one accepts these figures 
as true, then Pakistan has very nearly the highest rate of growth 
in the world
If the following conservative estimates of the average rates 
of growth (3.0 per cent for Bangladesh and 2.5 per cent for Pakis­
tan) were to continue unchanged and are applied to mid-year 1970
*Lee L. Bean has argued, on the other hand, that the population 
estimate of the 1972 Census of Pakistan is inflated because the 
Census occured at the same time as the Sind language riots and con­
flicts over state representation to the National Assembly which 
resulted in overreporting to gain greater regional representation, 
much like India in 1931, and Nigeria in 1962 and 1972. But Bean 
still estimates the true size at around 60 million with an average 
annual rate of growth of three per cent. See Lee L. Bean, 'Demo­
graphic Review, The Population of Pakistan: An Evaluation of Re­
cent Statistical Data', Middle East Journal, Vol. 28, No* 2, Spring 
1974, pp. 177-184.
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estimates of 69.2 million (100) and 57.0 million (100) (with the 
numbers in the parentheses as base index numbers), then by the 
year 2000 the population would reach 170.2 million (246) and 
120.7 million (212). By the year 2030 the population would reach 
418.6 million (605) and 255.5 million (448) —  more than a six and 
four fold increase respectively. But are these projections real­
istic? No, this sort of projection makes the unlikely assumption 
that fertility, mortality, and migration will remain unchanged; 
or, at least, that their net sum, the rate of growth, will remain 
unchanged•
Population Growth
Using alternative projections, Tomas Frejka* suggests that by 
the year 2000 these populations could increase to between 151 and 
186 million for Bangladesh and 110 and 130 million for Pakistan. 
What are the basis for these projections? Essentially the range 
of these projections result from differing assumptions about fer­
tility declines. International migration is assumed to be nil 
while mortality is assumed to decline, but this decline is the 
same in each projection. Thus, the differing range for the year
*Frejka assumes the following demographic statistics for 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively. In 1972, a crude birth rate 
of 44 and 45; a crude death rate of 17 and 16; and thus a crude 
rate of natural increase of 27 and 29. For the period 1965 to 1970 
the total fertility rate (TFR) is assumed to be 6.8 and 6.2, the 
gross reproduction rate was estimated at 3.3 and 3.0, and a net 
reproduction rate of 2.5 and 2.3 was used. Under these mortality 
conditions a total fertility rate of 2.6 would represent replace­
ment in both countries. See Tomas Frejka, 'Bangladesh", Country 
Prospects, New York, The Population Council, 1974, 31p; and Tomas 
Frejka, 'Pakistan', Country Prospects, New York, The Population 
Council, 1974, 31p.
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2000 is entirely due to different assumptions about fertility 
decline. Under these assumptions a slow decline in fertility 
would result in the high estimates of 186 and 130 million, re­
spectively; but with a drastic decline in fertility, the popula­
tion would still reach 151 and 110 million, respectively. Frejka's 
approach assumes that at some point in time the population of 
Bangladesh and Pakistan will cease to grow and will become sta­
tionary. These alternative projections allow us to examine the 
feasibility of a stationary population at different points in time, 
to get some idea of the eventual size of the population, and to 
see the demographic conditions occurring with different paths of 
growth. However, they do not show the more pessimistic path to 
a stationary population created by a substantially increased mor­
tality.
Age Structure
Because of the high fertility, the age structure in Asia is 
much "younger'' than it was in Europe; and, thus, it is much more 
difficult to reduce the rate of population growth. The momentum 
of this young age structure will ensure a substantial growth in 
population even if fertility were suddenly to drop to replacement 
levels. Let us suppose that fertility were to immediately drop 
to the level of replacement; that is, a level just above two chil­
dren per family on average, a level which would ensure that enough 
children would survive to their own childbearing years to enable 
then to exactly replace their parents. Each person in the popula­
tion would be replaced by only one other person, no more and no
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less. At first glance one might expect that the rate of population 
growth would then immediately drop to nil. However, the high pro­
portion of young people in the age structure will make the con­
tinued growth of the population inevitable for some 60 to 70 
years•
One of the most startling implications which leaps from Frejka's 
projections is the effect of the age structure on the evermal size 
of the population. Even on the most unrealistically optimistic, 
indeed now impossible, assumption where there
is an immediate decline in fertility to the level of replacement 
in 1970 and from there afterward, Bangladesh's population would 
grow by about 46 per cent by the year 2000 and would finally level 
off in the year 2050 with a population some 87 per cent larger 
than in 1970. Under the same assumptions, Pakistan's population 
would level off at a size some 70 per cent greater than in 1970.
Fertility
The present levels of fertility in Bangladesh and Pakistan, 
with a crude bixth rate of between 45 and 50 per thousand, are 
much higher than that of pretransition Europe. The crude birth 
rate of early 19th century Britain was less than 35 per thousand.
The main reason for this difference is the early and near univers­
ality of marriage in Asia. Such a high fertility level would 
have to fall a great deal farther than it did in the West in order 
to achieve a low rate of growth. To date, there has been no 
evidence of a decline in fertility.
A major effort to make an estimate of fertility was the Pakistan
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Population Growth Experiment of 1962-1965. This was the first 
national dual record survey which required four years of field 
work and another five years for matching, analysis, rechecking, 
and publication. The fertility estimates for what is now Bangla­
desh were thought to be somewhere between the registration figures 
( Crude birth rate of 44 and a total fertility rate of 6.29) 
and the Chandrasekaran-Deming adjusted figures ( C.B.R. of 
53 and total fertility of 7.4). Similiarly, crude birth rates 
for Pakistan were reported to be between 42 and 52. Serious 
methodological criticisms including false non-matches resulting 
in inflated estimates have been raised about this study. J.G.C. 
Blacker has also criticized the time and apparent cost of such
dual procedures relative to the effort needed to complete single
1 2 surveys. In analyzing the data M. Badrud Duza found no signif­
icant fertility differentials among urban and rural populations. 
Since fertility differentials usually accompany a decline in fer­
tility, he argues on theoretical grounds that a decline in fertility 
was unlikely, especially since the mass of the population has been 
so little affected by the kinds of socio-economic development
^See F. Yusuf, Population Growth Estimation: Studies in
Methodological Matching of Vital Events, Research Report No. 67, 
Karachi: Pakistan Institute of Development Studies, 1968; W.
Brass, 'A Critique of Methods for Estimating Population Growth 
in Countries with Limited Data', Bulletin of the International 
Statistics Institute, Vol. 44, No. 1; and most recently see J.
G.C. Blacker, 'Dual Record Demographic Surveys, A re-assessment', 
Population Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, November 1977, pp. 585-597.
^M. Badrud Duza, 'Differential Fertility in Pakistan*, Studies 
in the Demography of Pakistan, Warren C. Robinson, ed., Karachi: 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1967, pp. 93-137.
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normally associated with smaller family size. Duza also argues 
that the age specific fertility rates arelikely to have remained 
fairly constant even though the crude birth rate may have fluc­
tuated because of changes in the age structure of the population 
as well as random and nonrandom changes from year to year.
Between 1968 and 1969 the National Impact Survey was under­
taken to study the demographic effects of the family planning pro­
gramme. The validity of the fertility and infant mortality level 
and trend data are dubious at best.^
The Bangladesh Retrospective Survey of Fertility and Mortality 
followed immediately upon the 1974 Census and gave estimates of
7.08 for total fertility and a crude birth rate of 48 per thou- 
2
sand. Blacker has noted that the indirect techniques used to
derive these estimates probably resulted in an underestimation of
3
the events rather than an overestimation. In any case, there is 
no evidence of a fertility decline.
No evidence of a fertility decline was found in the 1975 Pak­
istan fertility survey conducted as a part of the World Fertility
_...............4 .................................................
Survey programme.
*See I. Sirageldin, D. Norris and M. Ahmad, ’Fertility in 
Bangladesh: Fact and Fancies*, Population Studies, Vol. 29, No.
2, July 1975, pp. 209-216.
^Bangladesh, Census Commission, Bangladesh Population Census, 
1974, Provisional Results, Bulletin, Dacca, 1975.
3
Blacker, loc. cit., p. 589.
A
Population Council of Pakistan, Pakistan Fertility Survey: 
First Report Lahore, Directorate of Production and Publication, 
1976, xix, llOp.
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Thus, the fertility levels in Bangladesh and Pakistan are 
high compared to those of other less developed countries and are 
extremely high in comparison with those of pretransition Europe. 
Fertility would have to drop much farther to reach replacement 
levels, and to the best of our knowledge, a downward trend has 
not yet begun.
Education
There is some evidence that universal primary education may 
reduce the level of fertility in Asian countries. Primary educa­
tion, especially for women, may result in a desire for smaller 
families by expanding nontraditional opportunities and by increas­
ing the opportunity costs of early marriage and familial roles.
It also raises intellectual barriers between them and earlier and 
more traditional generations. Education also raises the costs of 
children through school-related expenditures while diminishing 
their productive value in agriculture and at home. It is also 
argued that education may make people more receptive to family 
planning information.
However, because the school-age population is increasing so 
rapidly, Pakistan and Bangladesh are having difficulty maintain­
ing even past enrollment ratios which are abysmally low. Less than 
one out of ten persons in Bangladesh is functionally literate, or 
has at least five years of formal education.^ Gavin Jones has
Hf. Henry Mosley and Monowar Hossain, ’Population: Background
and Prospects', Disaster in Bangladesh: Health Crisis in a Develop­
ing Nation, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 8-17.
146
analyzed educational targets against projected population growth
for Pakistan and concluded "(the nation). •.would find it impossible
to provide universal, high quality education within a decade or
two even if fertility were to decline quite rapidly."^
Nevertheless, much more could be done to improve education
even within the existing financial constraints. The distribution 
of primary education could be greatly expanded if less were spent 
on higher education. The curriculum could be vastly altered and 
made relevant to rural peoples. Some type of nonformal education 
combined with an agricultural extension service could be more ef­
fective than a formal system.
Gavin W. Jones, * Effect of Population Change on the Attain­
ment of Education Goals in the Developing Countries', Rapid Popu­
lation Growth. National Academy of Sciences, Baltimore and Londons 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.
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Nonagricultural Employment
There is some reason to believe that Europe's fertility decline
i
i was accompanied and reinforced by urbanization and a movement away
from agricultural employment. But because of Asia's rapid popula­
tion growth, the demand for non-agricultural jobs far exceeds the 
supply; and since urbanization without urban jobs will not improve
I
[
j the standard of living, fertility may remain high. According
to an unpublished paper by Hofraeister,^ the total employment for 
registered factories (all factories with more than ten employees) 
was less than the average yearly increase in the labour force, de­
spite the fact that manufacturing represents more than 15 per cent 
of Pakistan's gross domestic product. The growth of the labour 
force in relation to expected employment is perhaps the most dis-
i
I 2
turbing and most inevitable aspect of population dynamics.
I
| The scarcity of jobs and, thus, the low standard of living may
f
I in part account for the unusual fact that fertility differentials
between urban and rural areas are so slight.
Employment of Women
If the increase in nonagricultural employment of women was
^R. Hofmeister, 'Economic Situation and Prospects in Pakistan, 
1974', Annex D, Document of the World Bank, forthcoming, 1974.
Cited in D. C. Rao, 'Urban Target Groups', Redistribution with 
Growth, Hollis Chenery et al., Londons Oxford University Press, 
1974, p. 139.
2
See, for example, the work by Ghazi Farooq including, 'Dimens­
ions and Structures of Labour Force in Relation to Economic Develop­
ment: A Comparative Study of Pakistan and Bangladesh', Islamabad,
Pakistan Institute of Development Studies, 1975.
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a factor in Europe's reduced fertility, it is not likely to be a 
factor which will reduce fertility in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Even if the status of women were somehow greatly improved, the 
number of women entering into employment would be severely limit­
ed because of the rapid growth of the labour force population.
Chaudhry has recently found an overall negative relationship
between fertility and the proportion of women in the labour force
in Bangladesh,^ and he even reported a negative relationship with
agricultural activity and a positive relationship with non-agricul-
tural activity. Nasra M. Shah, however, argues that this might
result from an artifact in the data as participation rates might
have been over-reported and fertility under-reported in the rural 
2areas.
Shah's multivariate analysis of the 1968-69 National Impact 
Survey found that a weak bivariate relationship was not substanti­
ated, and that the "net" effect of the wife's employment on desiring 
an additional child was negligible. The age of wife and the num­
ber of living sons was deemed much more crucial than any socio­
economic factors. "Given our data limitations, we can say with 
some confidence that policies for increasing female employment can 
not be expected to have miraculous negative effects on fertility,
^Chaudhry, Rafiqul-Huda. 'Labour Force Status and Fertility',
The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. II, No. 4, October, 1974, 
pp; 819-838.
^Shah, Nasra M.. 'Female Labour Force Participation and 
Fertility Desires in Pakistan: An Empirical Investigation',
Pakistan Development Review, (Islamabad) Vol. 14, No, 2, Sum­
mer 1975, pp. 185-206.
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except for specific jobs in some subgroups (such as professionals)*" 
Migration
Migration played an important role in Europe by lessening the 
effects of rapid population growth as tens of millions of persons 
moved to the Americas and elsewhere. But it is completely unreal­
istic to expect outmigration to mitigate the current population 
growth. The migrants would be unacceptable to any other country 
and Pakistan’s history of mass migration has already been more 
than tragic. Following the first partition, the 1951 Census found 
one out of every 14 Pakistanis was a refugee. During the Bangla­
desh War of Independence there were perhaps as many as ten million 
refugees, though this official estimate may be an overstatement.
2But the appalling conditions m  the refugee camps is not overstated. 
Any policy or programme which would encourage migration on a scale 
that would be demographically effective would not be politically 
realistic, administratively feasible, nor morally acceptable. Such 
a migration could only be another tragic response to a catastrophe.
Shah, Nasra M.. 'Female Labour Force Participation and 
Fertility Desires in Pakistan: An Empirical Investigation’,
Pakistan Development Review, (Islamabad) Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 
1975, p. 203.
2
J. E. Rohde, L. C. Chen, and P. Gardner, 'Refugees m  India: 
Health Priorities', Disaster in Bangladesh: Health Crises in a
Developing Nation, L. C. Chen, ed., New York: Oxford University
Press, 1973.
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Marriage
Because of the early and near universal marriage in Asia 
there is a greater potential for reduced fertility via a delay 
in the age of marriage or a reduction in the proportion marrying 
than existed in Europe. European marriage patterns prior to the 
decline in fertility consisted of much later and less universal 
marriages.^ The decline in overall fertility would have been 
even greater in Europe had these marriage patterns remained con­
stant, but some countries experienced trends toward earlier and 
more universal marriages. At least this is not possible in Bang­
ladesh and Pakistan.
In Bangladesh the female age of marriage among rural women is 
as early as 13 and around 16 for urban women. The average age of
marriage for men is comparably high at around 23 to 24, making
2
them on average nearly ten years older. Mosley and Hossain re­
port that "nearly all women marry and...marry at an early age. 
Fifty per cent of all females are married by the age 13 and over
99 per cent are married by the age of 19. On average, males
........................................3
are ten years older than their wives."
^Industrializing Western Europe was very unusual in its pat­
tern of late marriage and nonmarriage. See John Hajnal, 'European 
Marriage Patterns in Perspective', Population in History, D. V. 
Glass and D. E. C. Eversley, eds., Chicago: Aldine, 1965.
^See Mohammad Afzal, 'The Fertility of East Pakistan Married 
Women', in W. C. Robinson, loc. cit., 1967j M. Dadrud Duza, loc. 
cit., 1967; M. Obaidullah, 'On Marriage, Fertility and Mortality', 
Demographic Survey in East Pakistan, Dacca: University of Dacca;
and M. Badrud Duza and C. Stephen Baldwin, Nuptiality and Popula­
tion Policy, The Population Council, 1977, pp. 49-56.
3
W. Henry Mosley and Monowar Hossain, loc. cit.
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With the limited capacity for educational expansion, it seems 
doubtful that formal education for women could be employed to re­
duce or delay marriage. The best that might be done within this 
social structure would be to greatly expand nonformal educational 
programmes for women.
It is also unrealistic to expect industrial employment or even 
urbanization to have much impact on marriage patterns. The Bangla­
desh Academy for Rural Development has successfully experimented 
with new cottage industries for women’s cooperatives; and while it 
may demonstrate some feasibility, that is, Muslim women are will­
ing to work outside the home, there are great difficulties in ex­
tending such programmes across the countryside. The Women’s Re­
habilitation Board^ and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
are also involved in such experiments.
The Bangladesh First Five Year Plan proposes to increase the 
age of marriage through legislation: "in an attempt to check high 
growth rate of population necessary steps to promulgate a law 
raising the legal age of marriage will be taken during the plan 
period in collaboration with the relevant Ministries." This is 
not much. There are no details of implementation; and no mention 
is made of how low the age of marriage is, how much it varies, or 
its universality. But how effective might a policy be if it were 
really implemented? Many countries have attempted to ensure a 
minimum legal age at marriage for nondemographic social reasons,
^See S. Jahangeer Haider, ed., Women’s Work, Dacca: National
Board of Bangladesh Women’s Rehabilitation Program, 1974; and 
Khushi Kabir, Ayesha Abed, and Marty Chen, 'Rural Women in Bang­
ladesh: Exploding Some Myths’, Report No. 42, Dacca, Ford Foun­
dation, May 1976.
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but any enforcemnt in Bangladesh, for any reason, would be very 
difficult. A government incentive scheme would be dependent upon 
the ability to prove one's legal age, nearly impossible in a coun­
try without vital registration or similiar administrative measures.
Birth Control Technology
New methods of birth control have become much more effective 
than the traditional methods used in the European decline of fer­
tility. Providing that such methods are known, available, and 
acceptable, any given level of motivation for reducing fertility 
will probably result in more effective fertility control.
Abortion, another factor reducing fertility in Europe, is now 
a potentially safe technique. In some countries government policies 
on abortion have produced some dramatically rapid changes in fertil­
ity. In Japan, fertility declined rapidly after the legalization
2 . . .  of abortion, while in Romania fertility rapidly increased lmraedi-
^This brings to mind a relevant statement by Karol Krotki in 
which he explained the opposition by some to a vital registration 
system, "...the public is only too happy to go on with its pres­
ent erratic systems. In fact it sees an actual advantage in not 
having births registered. In the absence of a birth certificate, 
the age limit at stages of one's life when it really matters, such 
as: admission to school, early marriage, admission and promotion
in public life, compulsory retirement, becomes less rigidly oper­
ative." Karol J. Krotki, The Problem of Estimating Vital Rates in 
Pakistan, United Nations World Population Conference, September, 
1965, WPC/WP/234, mimeographed, p. 1.
TCingsley Davis, 'The Theory of Change and Response in Modern 
Demographic History', Population Index, Vol. 20, No. 4, October 
1963, pp. 345-366.
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ately following-restrictive policies. There are no laws forbid- 
ing abortion in Pakistan and the Bangladesh First Five Year Plan 
suggests a liberalization of the abortion laws. Ambulatory ser­
vices for abortion and "menstrual regulation" were provided by 
at least two clinics in 1974. In 1975 the government of Pakistan
officially sponsored training in the use of aspiration abortion 
2
procedures. But abortion is not openly discussed m  either of 
the two countries; and though it is practiced in the rural areas 
to prevent unwanted illegitimate births, there are strong reli­
gious and social objections to its use. Although there is no 
specific mention of abortion in the Quran, and some modern Is­
lamic thinkers have agreed on a rather liberal view of abortion 
in the first 120 days after conception, much of the population 
and even those women who resort to abortions themselves may view 
it as contrary to their religion. It is commonly believed that 
.if abortion was to become an important public policy, it would be 
strongly opposed.
In .general, modem methods of contraception, if acceptable
^Fertility rose for only a short time and then fell, sug­
gesting that the population at first had become dependent upon 
abortion as a normal method of birth control; but then they ac­
comodated to the new regulations by simply changing to other 
methods of birth control. The increase in fertility resulted 
from a lag in the change from one method of birth control to another.
See Michael S. Teitelbaum, 'Fertility 
Effects of the Abolition of Legal Abortion in Romania', Popula­
tion Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, November, 1972, pp. 405-417.
Xhristopher Tietze and Marjorie Cooper Murstein, Induced 
Abortions: 1975 Factbook, Reports on Population/Family Planning,
No. 14, 1975.
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and accompanied with appropriate motivation, provide a greater 
potential for a rapid fertility decline than existed in Europe* 
European fertility might have fallen much more quickly and to a 
lower level had oral contraceptives, IUDs and other modern methods 
been used instead of the more traditional methods which included 
coitus interruptus. The traditional methods can be effective pro­
viding there is enough motivation to use them properly. The main 
difference is that there was substantial motivation in Europe 
while there is little in Asia today. But for any given level of 
motivation, modern contraceptives will result in more effective 
birth control. Some modern methods may also require less fre­
quent motivation, that is, a person may only have to be motivated 
once to have an IUD. Thus, if there is sufficient motivation to 
regulate fertility, the methods are available today for a more 
rapid transition than occutjed in Europe.
Certainly there were no population policies and family plan­
ning programmes to supply these contraceptives during the European 
fertility transition, and the whole range of policies discussed 
in other sections of this thesis may well accelerate a decline in 
fertility.
Linguistic Barriers, the Mass Media, and Fertility Decline
The Princeton European Fertility Studies found some evidence 
that contraceptive practices in Europe spread easily within linguis­
tic or cultural groups but not easily between them. This may facil­
itate the diffusion of these practices in Bangladesh but not in Pak­
istan where there is much less unification among the Punjabis,
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Pathans, Sindis, and Baluchis.^ But unlike transitional Europe, 
Pakistan is developing a modern communication system which has a 
much greater potential for permeating these linguistic barriers.
In Bangladesh, travel and communications are very difficult in 
much of the rural area and during some seasons, are not possible 
at all.
Through technical improvements in the mass media there may come
a general commercial saturation by Western culture; and among
its many influences, it may bring an "increased legitimacy of
2
the small family norm". This example, which pretransition Eu­
rope never really had, may show that a small family is normal and 
legitimate and that the planning of births is both within the
calculus of conscious choice and is really feasible,
3 A
There is also increasing evidence from Kirk, Beaver, and 
Mauldin^ that in other Third World countries where fertility is
^The 1951 Pakistan Census (Vol. I, p. 71) found the follow­
ing linguistic proportions: Urdu, 7.2 per cent; Punjabi, 28.A
per cent; Pushto, 7.1 per cent; Sindhi, 5.0 per cent, and Bengali,
5A .6 per cent.
^Michael Teitelbaum, * Relevance of Demographic Transition 
Theory for Developing Countries', Science, Vol. 188, 2 May 1975, 
pp. 420-425.
3
Dudley Kirk, 'A New Demographic Transition?' Rapid Popu­
lation Growth, National Academy of Sciences, Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 123-147.
4
Steven E. Beaver, Demographic Transition Theory Reinter­
preted: An Application to Recent Natality Trends in Latin Amer­
ica. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975, 208 p.
5W. Parker Mauldin, 'Assessment of National Family Planning 
Programs in Developing Countries', Studies in Family Planning,
Vol. 6, No. 2, 1975, pp. 30-36.
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declining, it is doing .so at "a much more rapid pace than it did 
historically in Europe and among Europeans overseas".^
Development and Fertility
During the decade of the 1960s Pakistan's rate of economic 
growth was much more rapid than anything experienced during the 
European transition. That rapid growth did not continue during the 
1970s, but it could not have been expected to in view of the civil 
war and all the other political and natural calamities; and besides, 
such growth rates often fluctuate. But nevertheless, there re­
mains a great potential for rapid economic expansion in the agri­
cultural sector for Bangladesh and in both agricultural and non­
agricultural sectors in Pakistan. The agricultural output per 
acre in Bangladesh is exceedingly low by international standards, 
and this is to a large extent a reflection of the low level of 
fertilizer and other biological inputs used per acre. So even 
without massive investments in flood control, Bangladesh has a 
tremendous potential for increased agricultural output.
Shortages of capital, technology, and trained personnel can 
be surmounted by transfers from the developed world; and, if ap­
propriately applied to the problems of development, they could, 
in theory, be a great advantage which transitional Europe did 
not have. Unfortunately, such transfers also bring a tremendous 
dependency and a distortion of development objectives.
The rate of population growth, the absolute number of people
“^Dudley Kirk, fA New Demographic Transition?1 Rapid Population 
Growth. Consequences and Policy Implications. National Academy of 
Sciences, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press), 1971, pp. 123-147.
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added every year, and even the density of population on. the land 
is so high, that the chances for development are less than those 
of pretransition Europe. A large proportion of the development 
budget must go toward maintaining, rather than improving, per 
capita investments' in social overhead for a growing number of 
people. . w  Since fertility
is high, the child dependency ratio is high; and, thus, there 
are relatively higher costs to maintain the same per-capita in­
vestments in education, housing, health, and so forth. This in
turn reduces the potential level of investment, and it may limit 
other
investment from/more productive sectors. With the labour force 
growing so rapidly, the capital investment per worker is reduced; 
and, thus, the productivity per worker may not increase. At 
the same time, unemployment continues to increase.
To the best of our knowledge, the rapid economic growth in 
the 1960s did not result in a reduction of fertility. There could 
be many explanations of this since we are unsure of the causal 
mechanisms which relate these phenomena. It might easily be argued 
that under the present circumstances, economic growth reduces fer­
tility only over the long run through indirect effects, and that 
in the short run, it might have the direct effect of increasing 
fertility. Pakistan's economic growth was not sustained for a 
long period and had it continued for a longer duration, there 
might have been a measurable demographic change. It might be 
that a rapid rate of growth at this low level of development would 
not have a negative effect upon fertility in any case. But per­
haps the key issue lies in how this rate of growth was distributed
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across the population.
Is development an ip so facto population policy? Over the 
long run development is an important way of reducing fertility.
But the desire for economic growth is widespread; and if govern­
ments are not already doing everything they can to accelerate 
economic growth, it seems doubtful that they will do more to fos­
ter growth just because over the long run it might reduce fertility.^ 
There is certainly a consensus that the more economic growth these 
countries have the better; it will improve the standard of living; 
it will enable better preparation for the population growth that
is inevitable; and it may reduce fertility over the long run. But
2such platitudes are not of much use to development planners. The 
fundamental issue is the type of developments what set of policies? 
how will these be implemented? and what sort of impact and distri­
bution will there be? Demographic considerations should be taken 
into account in all of these aspects, and particularly in regards 
to which aspects of development strategy will most effectively re­
duce fertility.
^"That population policy considerations somehow could speed 
up the overall level of such development efforts of governments 
seems to me to be an extremely farfetched idea". Paul Demeny,
•On the Economic Theory of Fertility*, A paper presented at the 
Conference on the Economic Aspects of Population Growth, Valescure, 
France, 3 September 1973, Mimeo, p. 4.
2
"We are likely to be left with the platitudinous proposition 
that economic and social development will be helpful in solving 
the population problem - the more development, the better - but 
the structure of development measures, the real policy issue, re­
mains determined without reference to demographic considerations". 
Paul Demeny, Ibid, p. 5.
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Population policies and development are not mutually exclus­
ive and there are many reasons to think that they are reinforcing. 
Any "either/or" type of argument is not cogent because there is 
little reason to choose between them if they are mutually suppor­
tive.^ Population policies should not and have not been a sub­
stitute for development efforts. This does not mean that there is 
no room to argue about their relative importance or the way in which 
international agencies have given emphasis to population. But 
nevertheless, in this writer’s view, the size of the family plan­
ning budget compared to development budgets has not been excessive, 
especially in relation to the magnitude of the population growth 
in these countries. If the entire family planning budget for Pak­
istan in 1966 or 1967 had been diverted instead to education it 
would have brought 8 and 7 days respectively, of extra education;
2
or raised by 3.6 and 3.0 per cent the number of children in school.
The family planning programme then accounted for about 12 per cent
3of the budget for the Ministry of Health. Had the funds been di­
verted to the military they would have raised deferc e expenditure 
1
See Michael S. Teitelbaum, 'Population and Developments Is 
a Consensus Possible?' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 4, July 
1974, pp. 742-760.
2Gavin W. Jones, 'Effect of Population Change on the Attain­
ment of Educational Goals in the Developing Countries', Rapid 
Population Growth, Consequences and Policy Implications, National 
Academy of Sciences, Baltimore and Londons The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1971, p. 357.
3
Dorothy Nortman, 'Population and Family Planning Programss 
A Factbook', Reports on Population/Family Planning, New Yorks 
The Population Council, December, 1969.
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by only 1.8^percent. If anything is competing with the develop­
ment budget it is the military and not the family planning pro- 
2gramme.
While population policies have not been a substitute for devel­
opment, neither should development be a substitute for population 
policies. Population policies should be a component of develop­
ment policies, and they should be integrated into development 
3
planning. Unfortunately, this is not as easy as it may seem. It 
is relatively simple, though discouraging, to incorporate demographic 
projections into various sectoral plans and to see what efforts 
are needed to accomodate to the expected population. But integrat­
ing policies of family planning and "beyond family planning measures" 
is more difficult. How is family planning going to be efficiently 
integrated into such programmes as health, maternal and child care,
^Gavin W. Jones, 'Effect of Population Change on the Attain­
ment of Educational Goals in the Developing Countries', Rapid 
Population Growth, Consequences and Policy Implications, National 
Academy of Sciences, Baltimore and Londons The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1971, p. 357.
2
"To an economist...the inescapable conclusion would seem 
to be that Pakistan, which was already spending too much of her 
own resources on military purposes, was encouraged by the U.S. mil­
itary aid program to spend even more on military purposes". David 
Bell, then Deputy Director, Pakistan-Iran Advisory Group, Graduate 
School of Public Administration, Harvard University, in Hearings 
on the Mutual Security Programs, House of Representatives, 86th 
Congress, First session, 22 January 1959.
3
Riad B. Tabbarah, 'Population Policy Issues in International 
Instruments: With Special Reference to the World Population Plan
of Action', Draft of paper for publication in Journal of Interna­
tional Law and Economics, December 1974.
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community and rural development, agriculture, and so on? Is
that really efficient? Are the benefits of specialization lost
by these steps? Will it not raise more problems?*1 Such policies
may be integrated at the top levels of government but integrating
2them at the village level is difficult.
Perhaps what is needed is not so much an integration of the 
family planning programme into these other areas but that these 
other areas, or certain areas, be identified for special emphasis 
in the development strategy. Kocher and Rich and others have em­
phasized the extension of primary education; a greater equality 
for women; a more equitable distribution of income; greater ef­
forts to increase employment, especially for women; old age welfare 
payments and so on. These sorts of policies with an important dis­
tributional emphasis- will by definition most directly change the
3
lives and standard of living of the population. Such a distri-
These are questions raised by Bernard Berelson in The Great 
Debate on Population Policy, An Instructive Entertainment, New 
Yorks The Population Council, 1975, p. 4.
^aul Demeny, * Observations on Population Policy and Popula­
tion Program in Bangladesh, 1960-74', Population and Development 
Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 1975, pp. 307-321.
3
D. V. Glass has asserted that "direct programmes for spread­
ing the use of birth control are, however, only a small part of the 
action in which developing societies will require to engage. The 
largest part will have to consist of planned economic and social 
development— and development at a considerably higher rate than 
appears to have been evident so far. This will be needed because, 
without an improvement in levels of living, birth control programmes 
may well be empty frameworks...Desirable social change may involve 
additional expenditure beyond that justifiable for purely economic 
considerations...Many of the developing societies themselves could 
and should do much more to mobilize and use their own resources, 
especially their human resources. Economic and social development 
must be shown to have meaning for, and impact upon, the population 
in general." D. V. Glass, 'Population Growth and Population Policy', 
Public Health and Population Change, M. C. Sheps and J. C. Ridley 
eds., Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965, pp. 23-24.
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butional emphasis, if successfully implemented, would probably 
have a tremendous demographic impact because of the sheer arith­
metical power of weighted averages. There is an emerging inter­
national consensus that this is the developmental structure which 
is worthwhile in and of itself,^" and, furthermore, is likely to 
have important influences on the motivation for reproductive con­
trol . ^
But a word of caution must be added. Development plans and
programmes and virtually all other governmental efforts are made
within political and economic constraints and represent political
compromises within the existing power structure. Because these
programmes are worthwhile in and of themselves, they should have
been adopted already and they have not been. It certainly seems
unlikely that they will now be adopted because of their presumed
3negative effect upon fertility.
^Even the World Bank is now emphasizing the distributional 
aspects of its programmes, see Hollis Chenery, et al., Redis­
tribution With Growth, Londons Oxford University Press, 1974.
2
See World Bank, Population Policies and Economic Develop­
ment, Staff Report Baltimore* The Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
3
"It is, in fact, doubtful whether arguments based on fer­
tility effects of development policies are ever strong enough 
appreciably to modify the mix of development measures that plan­
ners would otherwise propose." Paul Demeny, ’Population Policy* 
The Role of National Governments', Paper presented at the First 
Regional Population Conference, Beirut, 18 February 1974, p. 9.
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The Distributive Hypothesis And Fertility
It is evident that Pakistan’s rapid economic growth of the 
1960s was extremely concentrated in a small modern sector which 
absorbed a huge proportion of the total investment. This growth 
was not shared with the vast majority of the population who were 
denied access to physical and human capital. The inequitable 
distribution of income was further reinforced by trade and 
fiscal policies which intentionally financed industrial growth 
with transfers from agriculture. Government policies further ac-
r
celerated the trend toward a dual, bimodal agricultural system. 
Furthermore, the inequality was exacerbated by the distribution 
of public expenditure.
This has been the experience of many countries, especially 
in the early stages of development. But it is not necessarily in­
evitable as the experience from many countries during the last 
fifteen years shows; there is a great diversity in income dis­
tribution and, in a few cases, rapid growth has been accompanied 
with a real improvement in the actual and relative welfare of 
the poorest. Traditional welfare economics, which had stressed 
that policies for optimum growth and policies for equitable dis­
tribution are mutually exclusive, is now being called into greater 
question. Even the World Bank is now emphasizing development 
strategies, within the narrow limits of fiscal measures, which 
will have growth implications for the poorest of the poor. Such 
policies would encourage greater incomes for the poor by a redi­
recting of public investment to expand their productive capacity
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and income•
The development and demographic transition hypothesis fo­
cuses mainly on «J»regate economic and social measures rather than 
on their underlying distributions* This is essentially where it
differs from the distributive hypothesis as proposed by Kocher,^"
2 3 4Rich, Repetto, and others including Stamper* James E* Kocher
has argued that a redistribution of income in the rural areas of 
the Third World would not only accelerate a broad development 
process and reduce dual or bimodal agriculture, but that such a 
process may be crucial to a sustained decline in fertility. Kocher 
does not specifically apply this theory to Bangladesh or Pakistan, 
and it is one of the aims of this thesis to explore more fully 
its relevance and application in these particular countries.
When discussing the effects of income on fertility, it is 
first necessary to make an important distinction between the short- 
run and the long-run effects. In the long-run, a previous in­
crease in income influences structural changes by buying more ed­
ucation, or better health, improved housing, and locational changes,
^James E. Kocher, Rural Development, Income Distribution, and 
Fertility Decline, New Yorks The Population Council, 1973.
^William Rich, Smaller Families Through Social and Economic 
Progress, Monograph No. 7, Washington, D.C.s Overseas Develop­
ment Council, 1973.
3
Robert Repetto, The Interaction of Fertility and the Size 
Distribution of Income, Research Paper No. 8, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Center for Population Studies, Harvard University, 1974.
4
B. Maxwell Stamper, 'Some Demographic Consequences of the 
Cuban Revolution', Concerned Demography, Vol. 2, No. 4, March 1971, 
see also Amit K. Bhattacharyya, 'Income Inequality and Fertility;
A Comparative View', Population Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 
1975, pp. 5-19.
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as well as changes in outlook, and, some would argue, changes in 
tastes for buying consumer durables including children. In the 
short-run, however, an increase in income will have less impact 
on such structural changes which might have fertility-reducing 
effects later on. Thus, an increase in income may not reduce fer­
tility but increase it temporarily, because the desire for children 
has not changed though the cost of children is cheaper. It is this 
time distinction which is usually used to explain the apparent 
inconsistency between the negative relationship of income and 
fertility in cross-sectional studies and the positive relation­
ship found in time series
Another distinction should be made between absolute and re­
lative income and fertility. First, we might ask, to what extent 
is fertility influenced by redistribution of incomes to improve 
the absolute incomes of the poorest? Secondly, to what extent 
is fertility influenced by the redistribution of incomes to alter 
a family's income relative to other families' incomes? Clearly 
the latter is of less importance.
It is, of course, difficult to specify the exact causal mech­
anism of these relationships. Part of this argument must lie in 
the more general concept that fertility declines within the broad 
context of social and economic development. And since it is gen­
erally agreed that development will ultimately reduce fertility, 
it seems evident that fertility will decline more quickly the
*See Julian L. Simon, 'The Effect of Income on Fertility', 
Population Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, November 1969, pp. 327-341; 
Julian Simon, The Effects of Income on Fertility, Chapel Hills 
University of North Carolina Press, 1974.
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sooner development reaches a greater proportion of the popula­
tion. The sheer power of weighted arithmetical averages supports 
the distributional argument.
According to this approach government policies should promote 
a greater level of investment in human capital, and should do so 
with a much wider distributional emphasis. Although much could 
be done to improve the distributional aspects of government pro­
grammes, it would be expensive for these poor countries to radical­
ly increase the level of investment in human capital. But it 
is argued here that it is feasible to increase the incomes of 
the poor by redirecting public investment to expand their produc­
tive capacity. Any efforts to increase the productive capacity 
of the poor in Bangladesh or Pakistan must lie within the agricul­
tural sector.^"
To briefly summarize, Kocher argues that government develop­
ment policies which aim to accelerate the broad diffusion of new 
agricultural technologies (See Figure 1 ) to the smallest farmers 
would increase and widely diffuse productivity and incomes. This 
in itself would enchance development. Greater incomes for the poor
In discussing rural development projects something must be 
said about the fundamental causes of rural poverty and inequality 
and different models of development. Neoclassicists might argue 
that the poor were excluded from technological changes while the 
large landowners were quick to adopt technology and thus became 
richer. While others might argue that the poor are so for his­
torical reasons and that they have been systematically exploited, 
alienated, and marginalized by the landowning class. The type of 
interventions recommended for reducing rural poverty depend large­
ly upon ones view of these fundamental causes. If one takes the 
latter view then projects which challenge the social structure 
are of great iraportancef^nstituting land reform, and the organi­
zation of landless and near landless peasant to challenge the 
existing structure^
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Figure 1 Illustration of a Possible Rural Growth Equity Model 
and its Jtelation to Fertility
Facilitate widespread adoption of 
new technologies by small fanners
Increased agricultural production widely d iffused^
Improved rural incomes widely diffused1
Improving levels 
,of education, 
sanitation, 
nutrition
Increasing 
length of 
productive 
life and 
fitness 
for work
Increased consumption 
of bicycles, radios, 
better housing, sewing 
nmnhinaa, and Other 
modest consumer items -
Increased
investment__
in physical 
capital
Increased 
survival of 
children
Increasing 
investment in 
human capital
Rising aspirations for 
children; rising costs 
and declining productive 
value of children
Desire for smaller families
'Increasing family planning
■Declining fertility*
Declining dependency*—^
National 
Family ' 
Planning 
Program
Domestic
institutions
Development policies 
and programs
Stream of agricultural 
technologies suited to 
local resource endowment
Rising levels of rural production and consumption; 
declining mortality and fertility
Low levels of rural agricultural and nonagricultural production and 
consumption; high levels of fertility; mortality moderate and declining
SOURCE: Jamea E« Kocher, Rural Development, Income Distribution, and
Fertility Decline, New Yorkr The Population Council, 1 9 7 3 *  P» 58*
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would bring greater investment in physical capital as well as 
a greater distribution and increased investment in human capital, 
i.e., education, sanitation, nutrition and so forth. This new 
and diffused investment in human capital would indirectly in­
fluence the desire to control reproduction. These services would 
bring an increase in child survival, and fewer births would be 
necessary for a desired number of children to survive. With a 
greater investment in human capital, parents* aspirations for 
their children would increase. The child*s cost to the parents 
would increase while the productive value of the children would 
decline. Education, especially of women and children, will pro­
bably in the long-run result in a desire for smaller families.
The cost of raising children increases when they attend even 
free schools because of clothing, transportation and supply costs 
and because they are of less productive value when they are away 
from the home and the fields. It is also argued that education 
raises intellectual barriers between their own generation and that 
of more traditional earlier generations. Furthermore, education 
for women expands nontraditional opportunities and raises the op­
portunity costs of early marriage and familial roles.
It is also argued that diffused modernization brings with 
it materialistic aspirations for not only radios, housing, sewing 
machines and bicycles but also for water pumps, fertilizer, im­
proved implements, and other physical investments which will fur­
ther increase productivity. These materialistic aspirations begin 
to compete with the cost of additional children.
All these factors working together over time and reinforcing
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each other within the context of broad development will substan­
tially contribute to the control of human reproduction. Under 
these circumstances, a programme which supplies contraceptives 
and relevant information is likely to accelerate the decline in 
fertility.
On the other hand, if the productive capacity of the poor is 
not substantially improved then the agricultural sector in these 
countries will continue along its bimodal path. An accelerating 
trend toward a dual agricultural sector —  one modern, small, 
highly productive subsector and one large, traditional subsector 
having only marginal productivity. The trend toward dualism 
is accelerated not only by the existing economic and political 
power structure but by new technology and the way that new tech­
nology is introduced and supported by government policies.
Kocher’s second scheme (Figure 2 ) . shows a remarkable 
resemblance to the agricultural system of present day Pakistan.
The left of the illustration represents the small, modern, agri­
cultural sector benefiting from government supports of mechanical 
and biological technologies; rapidly rising incomes; conspicuous 
consumption of imported luxury goods; investment in physical cap­
ital (often labour replacing); and expenditure for education, san­
itation, and nutrition and modern health services for a small pro­
portion of the population. All this may result in some fertility 
declines among those in this subsector but since its population is 
so small, national fertility rates may remain unchanged.
The right side of the illustration represents the large, tra­
ditional, poor, agricultural subsector, with little or no change
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Figure 2 Illustration of a Possible Rural Bimodal Growth 
Model and itn Relation to Fertility
Prevent widespread adoption of new technologies 
by small farmers; adoption limited to large fanners
Domestic
institutions
Development policies 
and programs
Stream of agricultural 
technologies suited to 
local resource endowment
Low levels of rural agricultural and nonagricultural production and 
consumption; high levels of fe rtility ; m ortality moderate and declining
who are politically and economically advantaged
, Rapidly increasing agricultural 
productivity among large farmers
I
r
 Rapidly rising incomes —
Improving
 education.
sanitation,
nutrition
\
Approaching 
“modem” 
health levels
Increased consumption 
of many items —much 
of it “conspicuous” 
such as elaborate 
homes, imported cars, 
servants, etc.
Increasing 
investment 
in human 
capital
Very
low
child
mortality
\
Rapid
investment, 
in physical, 
capital
. L ittle or no agricultural productivity 
gains among small farmers
I
Little or no change in incomes—
I
Little or no 
consumption 
gains
Little or no
improvement-----
in education,-----
sanitation,
nutrition
Little improvement 
^  in length of life 
and physical 
fitness for work
No investment 
in physical 
capital
No investment in
4 1
Aspirations for children rising 
rapidly; rapidly rising costs of 
children and tow productive 
value
1
Some desire for smaller families
I
Increased family planning
I
Declining fe rtility -----------
1
Declining dependency*
National
Family
Planning
—► human capital
Modest 
improvement 
in child survival
Perhaps some rise in aspirations for 
children; little  change in costs or 
productive value of children
No desire for smaller families
I
Little or no family planning gain*
No decline in fe rtility --------
 No decline in dependency*
Rapidly rinng levels of production and 
consumption for this small but advantaged 
rural subsector; continued substantial 
m ortality decline; some fertility  decline
Little or no change in production or 
consumption for this large and disadvantaged 
rural subsector; perhaps modest mortality 
decline; little  or no fe rtility  decline
Further perpetuation of a dual rural sector with a small, prosperous, and highly modern 
subsector undergoing rapid improvements in living conditions, while a large, traditional, 
impoverished subsector experiences no significant improvements in living conditions
SOURCE: James E. Kocher, Rural Development, Income Distribution, and 
Fertility Decline,. New York: The Population Council, 1973, P* 39*
171
in incomes; no improvement in education, nutrition, sanitation; 
little investment in human or physical capital; little improve­
ment in health; few changes in the costs or the productive value 
of children; continued desire for large families; no motivation 
for accepting contraception; and continued high fertility and de­
pendency ratios. Since there is little demand for contraceptives, 
family planning programmes would be ineffective even if they were 
administratively effective.
There is not a great deal of evidence on this relationship 
but what there is suggests some relationship between a more equit­
able income distribution and lower fertility. Kocher looked at 
the experience of twelve Third World countries and the U.S. (see 
Table 13 ). He arranged these countries into three groups accord­
ing to their fertility experiences (Columns 9 and 10), the first 
group having the greatest declines in fertility and the last group 
having the least. Within a group, the countries were then ranked 
in order of their index of relative income inequality (Column 4) 
from more to less equal. In the first group were South Korea, 
Japan, Taiwan, and West Malaysia which have had rapid and sub­
stantial declines in fertility and which according to these d&fca 
had relatively less income inequality. Kocher hypothesized that 
if a fertility decline was related to a more equitable distribu­
tion of income then the first group of countries with the greatest 
declines would also have had the most equitable distribution and 
the group with little change would have greater inequality. In 
the second group he listed the U.S.A., Sri Lanka, China, and Costa 
Rica which have had more moderate declines in fertility but for
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which few data on income inequality/were presented. In the third 
group is listed India, Philippines, Thailand, Mexico, and Brazil 
which have had smaller declines in fertility and whose relative 
income inequality was found to be greater. In comparing columns 
4, 9, and 10 there is a fairly close and consistent relationship 
between fertility trends and the data on relative income inequality.
If one takes this index of inequality, which is the sum of 
decile deviations from ten per cent, and averages the index for 
Group One and Group Three, one gets a mean of A6 and 83, respec­
tively, which ammounts to a substantial difference with the latter 
some 80 per cent larger.
As a check on the findings this writer used a different es­
timate of income inequality, Gini coefficients taken from Robert
Repetto's work^ and substituted them for Groups 1 and 3 for the
2same countries for which data were presented. Gini coefficient 
means of 43 and 50'respectively were found. : Though not numeri­
cally comparable to the earlier index, these estimates show the latter
group to be only 16 per cent larger than the former, as compared
data.
to the 80 per cent difference with the Original j Since Kocher 
first grouped the countries by their fertility experience, a 
finding of substantially smaller differences between the groups
^Repetto, 197A, loc. cit., Annex A.
2
The Gini estimates may, however, introduce an unfair time 
comparison. Though Kocher's indices of income inequality
show levels and not trends, at least they generally fall within 
the corresponding changes in fertility unlike some of the Gini 
coefficients which were substituted into the table.
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would weaken the significance of the relationship.^
Another interesting aspect of Table is that there is no 
apparent relationship between the growth of agricultural output 
and fertility decline, nor does there seem to be any relation be­
tween the growth of agricultural output and income inequality,
. . L
Furthermore, population growth and food produc­
tion are not related. Thus, if one accepts the data as valid, 
then income distribution is the most distinguishing variable in­
fluencing fertility.
In studying the relationship between the general fertility rate 
and the share of income to the poorest 40 per cent of households 
in 64 countries (using data from 1960-65), Repetto found an elas­
ticity of -.36, while the elasticity between average growth of 
per capita income and the general fertility rate was -.20. How­
ever, if lower fertility results in a more equitable distribution 
of income, then these estimates which were based upon an ordinary 
least-squares technique could be biased.
In a subsequent study of 68 countries Repetto attempted to 
get around this by using a two-stage, least-squares analysis and 
his results were similiar; indeed, the size of the regression coef­
ficient was larger. A reduction of 0.10 in the Gini coefficient
^When a Gini estimate for India was substituted, the former 
was only twelve per cent larger than the latter.
2
Robert Repetto, Appendix A, Population Policies and Economic 
Development, Timothy King, et al., eds., Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1976.
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was associated with a gross reproduction rate lower by 0.21. With 
sample means of 0.4415 (Gini) and 2.41 (GRR) an elasticity of 0.39 
was implied, thus a ten per cent reduction of income inequality 
(in Gini coefficients) was associated with a reduction in fertility 
of 3.9 per cent (in the gross reproduction rate).. Using another 
measure of fertility, an approximate of the general fertility rate, 
the elasticity was found to be even greater at 0.47.
Repetto's model also took into account infant mortality, fe­
male literacy, growth of per capita income, and newspaper circula­
tion and over 60 per cent of the total fertility
variation (with one exception) was accounted for by the model. The 
elasticity at the sample mean of fertility with the average growth 
of income per capita was -.10 and with female literacy, -.25; 
and with infant mortality, 0.02. Thus, Repetto tentatively con­
cluded that income distribution is by far the most distinguishing 
variable influencing fertility, not only because of the high elas­
ticities but because the coefficients increased when estimated as 
part of a larger model encompassing other variables and because 
his use of the two-stage, least-squares technique reduced the pos­
sible effects of high fertility upon income distribution.
The sample of 68 countries was very wide, including countries 
with all types of development; and since the variables, especially 
from the Third World, were often unreliable, a more accurate esti­
mate of the coefficients is given when the true underlying vari­
ables come from a wide range. However, when the sample was
^■Repetto, 1974, loc. cit.
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restricted to forty-one less developed countries, the regression 
coefficient of income distribution was statistically insignificant. 
More significantl5j|however# was the case when the entire world sam­
ple^ was run but with the exclusion of only five East European 
countries— Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia- 
all of which were extreme in their equitable income distribution 
and their low fertility. Without these five countries, the rela­
tionship was no longer significant.
It would be an understatement to say that there were serious 
deficiencies in the income distribution data. Furthermore, such 
data are likely to have changed over time, particularly in the thir­
teen rapidly changing countries selected by Kocher. Though we are 
given some time series data on the per capita income and crude birth 
rate we are only able to make cross-sectional comparisons with his 
income inequality data. The estimates come from the years between 
1958 and 1966.
Perhaps a more important aspect of this relationship is not
so much the level of inequality but the trends in inequality over
time. And, unfortunately, though Kocher presented time-scale data
for crude birth rates and per capita income, he was not able to ob-
2
tain time-scale data on income distribution. Robert Repetto has
^China and Cuba, two important countries with relatively eq­
uitable income distribution and declining fertility, were not in­
cluded in any of the samples presumably because the necessary data 
were not available. North Korea and North Vietnam were not includ­
ed either.
^Repetto, loc. cit., pp. 14-15.
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put together some income distribution time-series data for ten 
countries (see Table 14 ). in the first group are countries in 
which income distribution apparently improved— Costa Rica, Sri 
Lanka, and Taiwan; in the second group were countries in which 
it apparently deteriorated— Brazil, India, and Puerto Rico, In 
comparing changes in the crude birth rates in these countries over 
the same period, Repetto concluded that when income distribution 
became more equal, birth rates dropped more rapidly than when it 
did not.
Repetto did not mention that fertility declines were about 
the same or perhaps slightly greater in countries where income dis­
tribution deteriorated than where income distribution remained 
substantially unchanged. But nevertheless, he argues 
that income distribution was the best distinguishing variable—  
much better than the rate of growth of per capita income which was 
low in Sri Lanka and India but high in Taiwan, Mexico, Brazil, and 
Puerto Rico.
In a contrasting view the inegalitarian effects of biomodal 
agriculture are recognized as inherent, though to some extent they 
may be compensated by other fiscal policies and programmes, in­
cluding price policies against capital-intensive labour replacing 
mechanization. As productivity increases, largely through new bio­
logical technology, improved irrigation, and multiple cropping, 
the demand for labour may rise. Though evidence on the demand for 
labour under different modes of agricultural production is mixed 
and depends upon many factors.
The transition in the mode of production from the peasant to
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Table 14
Changes in Income Distribution and Changes in the Crude Birth Rate
Country Year Source Gini Coeff. Year CBR
(A) Countries in which Income Distribution Apparently ;[mprovedl
Costa Rica 1961 IBRD .5064 1960-65 44-46
(households) 1971 «« .4287 1971 31.6
Sri Lanka 1953 II .4503 1953 38.7
(households) 1969-70 • • .3730 1971 29.9
Taiwan 1953 If .5542 1953 45.2
(households) 1961 If .4500 1961 38.3
1964 If .3180 1964 34.5
(B) Countries in which Income Distribution was Substantially Unchanged
Mexico 1963 IBRD .5509 1960-65 44-45
(households) 1969 II .5580 1969 41.6
Peru 1961 If .5886 1960-65 44-45
(Econ. Act. 1970/1 It .5714 1965-70 41.8
Population)
Philippines 1956 II .4742
(households) 1965 II .4891
Yugoslavia 1963 • I .3304 1963 21.4
(households) 1968 II .3309 1968 19.0
(C) Countries in which Income Distribution Apparently Deteriorated
Brazil 1960 It .5578 1960-65 41-43
(Income 1970 It .6135 1965-70 37.8
Recipients)
India 1953-5 II .3955 1953 41
(Income 1961-4 •1 .4610 1963 38
Recipients)
Puerto Rico 1953 Weisskopf .417 1953 35
(households) 1963 II .441 1963 31
SOURCE: Robert Repetto, 'The Interaction of Fertility and the Size
Distribution of Income) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for Pop­
ulation Studies, Harvard University, Research Paper No. 8, October 
1974, pp. 14-15.
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the capitalist, or from the familial to the nonfarailial may, how-
2ever, reduce the incentives for high fertility. It may increase 
the costs and reduce the benefits of additional children; lessen 
traditional kinship ties which emphasize children, and increase 
migration and urbanization which may also reduce fertility; where­
as the integrated rural development programmes, according to some, 
may subsidize the costs of children while increasing their benefit 
on the family farm. Thus, the bimodal agricultural process may 
have the important and unintended impact of reducing fertility even 
though it conflicts with the more important development objectives 
of equity and employment. This hypothesis in part rests on the 
perceived and actual costs and benefits of children in peasant ag­
riculture about which there is still considerable debate.
In peasant agriculture, children are both economic consumers
and producers, and their net economic contribution to their parents
changes over time and is often different according to sex. Eva 
3
Mueller has carefully reviewed the available evidence, mostly 
from Asia, and found, contrary to much opinion, that children rep­
resent a serious economic burden in peasant agriculture. She
transition of the mode of production^.
. _ 4?rom the peasant to the communal may result
in reduced fertility* also. ^  This may have happen­
ed in China, a country which also achieved some of its objectives 
of equity and employment.
2
Caldwell, John C.,'Toward A Restatement of the Demographic 
Transition Theory', Population and Development Review, Vol. 2,
Nos. 3-4, 1976, pp. 321-366.
3
Mueller, Eva, 'The Economic Value of Children m  Peasant 
Agriculture', Population and Development: The Search for Selective
Interventions, Ronald G. Ridker, ed., (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press) 1976, pp. 98-153.
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found that from birth to the time of their own marriage, children 
consume far more than they produce; and because there is an excess 
of supply of adult labour in the countryside, child labour-partic- 
ipation rates are low. The policy findings from her study recommend 
1) More research to improve the data base, and to construct con­
sumption profiles, production profiles, and analyze the intra­
family transfer systems. 2) Government or cooperatively run social 
security systems for the aged, perhaps restricted to couples with 
fewer than two sons. 3) The development of secure savings insti­
tutions with access for rural poor. 4) Life insurance schemes 
and 5) Policies that might encourage women to spend more time, and 
children less time, in|the market— though child labour laws would 
be difficult to enforce and have negative welfare implications 
for the poor.
Most of Mueller's data is based on national employment and 
labour force statistics and not on village and household level 
studies; therefore, they may have underestimated the actual amount 
of work that children perform. Micro analysis on the household 
level and the village level is greatly needed to examine the costs 
and benefits of children in peasant agriculture and to see how 
fertility might change in response to labour demand for both the 
mother and the child.
Some recent studies have contradicted Mueller's conclusions 
about child labour participation rates (White, 1976 for Indonesia; 
Caldwell, 1977 in Nigeria; Cleave, 1974, in Uganda and Gambia, and
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Cain, 1977, 1978 in Bangladesh).^" These studies generally sup-
2
port the strong arguments made by Mamdani, (1972) about the par­
ents* perception of their children as valuable economic assets 
in peasant agriculture.
One must conclude that the evidence supporting the equity/ 
fertility thesis is mixed and is mostly based on national data
3
(Kocher, and Repetto) which, because of its aggregation is in­
adequate to substantiate the hypothesis. The case studies of 
China and the Indian state of Kerala (J. Ratcliffe, 1977; 1978) 
tend to support the thesis but the evidence is still fragmentary 
and even if validated it is not apparent that such policies could 
be duplicated elsewhere.
Will a strategy of poverty alleviation, meeting the basic
^"White, Benjamin, 'Population Involution and Employment in 
Rural Java', Development and Change, Vol. 7, 1976, pp. 267-290; 
Caldwell, John C., *The Economic Rationality of High Fertility:
An Investigation Illustrated with Nigerian Survey Data', Popula­
tion Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 1977; Cleave, John H., African 
Farmers: Labor Use in the Development of Smallholder Agriculture,
New York: Praeger, 1974, 253p; Cain, Mead T., 'The Economic Ac­
tivities of Children in a Village in Bangladesh', Population and 
Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, September 1977, pp. 201-227.
Mamdani,Mahmood, The Myth of Population Control: Family,
Caste, and Class in an Indian Village, (New York: Monthly Re­
view Press) 1972.
3
Kocher, 1973, loc. cit.; Repetto, 1974, op. cit., and 
1976 op. cit.
4
Ratcliffe, John, 'Poverty, Politics, aid Fertility: The
Anomaly of Kerala*, Hastings Center Report, February 1977, 
pp. 34-42, and Ratcliffe, John, 'Social Justice and the Demo­
graphic Transition: Lessons from India's Kerala State',
International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978, 
pp. 123-144.
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needs of the poorest of the poor, reduce fertility? It is entirely 
possible that development strategies which benefit the poor may in 
the short run actually increase fertility. The costs of children 
may be subsidized by welfare programmes. The demand for child 
labour may increase with rural labour-intensive strategies. And 
improved health and nutrition may increase fecundity. But ul­
timately, socioeconomic development will result in a decline in 
fertility, and the sooner an improved standard of living is shared 
by the poor, perhaps the sooner fertility will decline.
In this writer's view, all of the major conceptual frameworks 
for analyzing fertility-related policies for Pakistan and Bangla­
desh are inadequate or seriously flawed. Theories about fertility 
reduction are not pragmatic - they do not answer the kinds of ques­
tions that development planners need to know. They often do not 
identify or give weights to the crucial causal factors, nor do 
they specify thresholds or critical minimum levels. They are often 
atemporal, that is, they do not usually have a specified time sche­
dule or time horizon. They all have a high unexplained variance, 
they often ignore cultural settings, and none are anthropological.^
In addition to not being able to specify the key variables or their 
thresholds, theories attempting to explain fertility are not use­
ful • for planners because they often ignore the manip- 
ulability of the key variables.
^Thomas K. Burch, 'Theories of Fertility Decline as Guides to 
Policy', Draft of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
Population Association of America, New York City, 19 April 1974. Mimeo.
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CHAPTER SIX
POPULATION, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING:
A FRAMEWORK FOR PAKISTAN
This is an exploratory examination of a framework for develop­
ment planning. It is being investigated because it is a promising 
way of integrating the crucial issues faced by development planners 
in Pakistan and Bangladesh; population> income distribution, and 
the evaluation of alternative development strategies. Since ap­
propriate data were available, Pakistan was chosen.
In the early 1970s the international approach to the study of 
economic development among economists began a substantial change 
away from the near exclusive emphasis on gross national product to 
a broader scope of development which included the distribution of 
income, the absolute level of poverty, the problem of increasing 
employment, and so forth. This changing concern was also expressed 
by a number of economists in Pakistan and x^ as even reflected
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ostensibly in the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan.
An outcome of this new concern was the development of three 
broad types of social welfare indices to measure development and 
to examine development strategies: (1) a GNP index, (2) a poverty
weights index, and (3) an equal weights index.^ The GNP index 
employs the existing size distribution of income as a welfare 
weight. Therefore, if,
W = The weighted index for aggregate economic or social
welfare growth, (expressed in per cents)
g. = the rate of growth of income for the i ^  group
(expressed in per cents). Each group has an equal 
number of households (average family size and ^um­
ber of people will be different in each group) and 
is ordered from lowest income to highest.
w. = the social welfare weight for each i group, and
Tw. = 11
1
i = 1, 2, 3..»n 
then,
W = wn g + w g + ... + w g 
1 1 2 2 n n
Taking income distribution data derived from the Khandker 
study of West Pakistan for 1963-64 (see Appendix E ) and substituting
^"See H. Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth, (New York: 
Oxford University Press), 1974.
2
Simon Kuznets argues that the measure of income distribution 
by ’household income per person' is a more appropriate measure than 
I 'individual head of household', or by family or household alone. 
See Simon Kuznets, 'Demographic Aspects of the Size Distribution 
of Income*, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 25,
No. 1 (October 1976) 1-94.
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it into the GNP Index formula we get the following:
W = 10g^ + + *2^83 + »50g^
where w^ = .10, W2 = *26, and so forth.
If, for example, the average family income per person were 
to increase by 10 per cent for each income group, then W and the 
GNP would both increase by 10 per cent. On the other hand, suppose 
that g^ and g^* the lower income groups, did not grow at all while 
g^ and g^ grew by 10 and 20 per cent respectively. Then both W 
and the GNP would reflect a vigorous 12.A per cent growth. The ab­
solute level of income for the poorest 50 per cent of households 
would not have improved at all; and, furthermore, their relative 
income would have deteriorated substantially as the distribution 
of income became more unequal. Hence, in this case, the GNP is 
actually measuring the economic growth of the upper income house­
holds; and the GNP index, which uses the existing size distribution 
of income as the actual welfare weights, is a wealthy weighted 
social welfare index.
Attempts have been made to develop various poverty weighted 
indices that would measure the impact of development strategies 
aimed at diminishing poverty among the very poor. Welfare weights 
favouring the poor would of course be larger for w^ and w^ and 
smaller for w^ and w^. For example, this writer has employed the 
same Pakistan data in the inverse to the existing size distribution 
of income. That is,
W  =  .50g^ +  .24g2 + * ^ & 3  +  .10g^.
If this social function were to be used, government programmes could
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be judged on the basis of their impact largely upon the incomes
of the poorest section of the population.
An equal weights index could also be constructed which would
weiglt each income group equally. Thus, W = + W2S2 +,,* + WnSn -
where w„ = w„ =...w = ^/n. Such an approach would fall somewhere
1 2  n
between the GNP and the poverty weighted indices.
The differences in these three -indices of development (GNP, 
poverty, and equal weights) will narrow as the size distribution 
of income becomes more equal or . enlarge as income is distri­
buted less equally. Table 15 presents these different indices 
for thirteen countries.
Table 15 Income Distribution and Growth
II. Annual Increase in Welfare 
1. Income Growth  (A) (B) (C) III. Initial
Country Period
Upper
20%
Middle
40%
Lowest
40%
GNP
Weights
Equal
Weights
Poverty
Weights
Gini
Coefficient
Korea 1964-70 10.6 7.8 9.3 9.3 9.0 9.0 .34
Panama 1960-69 8.8 9.2 3.2 8.2 6.7 5.6 .48
Brazil 1960-70 8.4 4.8 5.2 6.9 5.7 5.4 .56
Mexico 1963-69 8.0 7.0 6.6 7.6 7.0 6.9 .56
Taiwan 1953-61 4.5 9.1 12.1 6.8 9.4 10.4 .55
Venezuela 1962-70 7.9 4.1 3.7 6.4 4.7 4.2 .52
Colombia 1964-70 5.6 7.3 7.0 6.2 6.8 7.0 .57
El Salvador 1961-69 4.1 10.5 5.3 6.2 7.1 6.7 .53
Philippines 1961-71 4.9 6.4 5.0 5.4 5.5 5.4 .50
Peru 1961-71 4.7 7.5 3.2 5.4 5.2 4.6 .59
Sri Lanka 1963-70 3.1 6.2 8.3 5.0 6.4 7.2 .45
Yugoslavia 1963-68 4.9 5.0 4.3 4.8 4.7 4.6 .33
India 1954-64 5.1 3.9 3.9 4.5 4.1 4.0 .40
SOURCE: Montek 3* Ahluwalia and Hollis Chenery, 1 The Economic Framework* ,
Hollis Chenery at al#, Redistribution with Growth. A Joint Study 
by the World Bank Is Development Research Center and the Institute 
of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, (London: 
Oxford University Press) 1974, p. 42.
Note: The rates of growth of income in each income group were calculated 
as follows: income shares-were applied to GNP (constant prices) to 
obtain the income of each group in each year. The growth rate is 
the annual compound growth rate estimated from the two endpoint 
income estimates for each income group. Sources of income share 
data for each country are identified in Chapter 1 of Redistribu­
tion with Growth. GNP series are from the World Bank data files. 
Equal weights imply a weight of 0.2, 0.4, 0.4 for the three 
incomo sr-nnps while poverty weights are calculated by giving 
weights of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.6 respectively.
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Let us examine in a theoretical way an approach for relating 
population, income distribution, and development planning. Table 16 
represents the following hypothetical situation: Column 1 divides
all households into quartiles ranked by income, from lowest to 
highest, with each quartile having the same number of households. 
Column 2 represents the percentage distribution of income (w^) for 
West Pakistan in 1963-64. Column 3 represents a hypothetical 
proportion of the population in each quartile (^4). Column 4 
represents a hypothetical coefficient for income elasticity of 
f family size (^) • The last two columns represent two different 
hypothetical distributions of income growth (g^). The first re­
flects an income growth which is favourable to the high income 
groups (HI), while the second reflects an income growth distri­
bution which is favourable to the low income groups (LI). The HI 
column might represent the outcome of successful development poli­
cies in the modern, urban, industrial sectors while the LI might 
represent the outcome of successful development policies in the 
traditional, rural, small-scale agricultural sector.
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TABLE 16 Demographic Implications of Hypothetical Paths of Income Growth
Percentage
of
Households
(1)
Percentage 
Distribution 
of Income(w.) 
(2) 1
Hypothetical
Percentage
of
Population (<X.) 
(3) 1
Hypothetical 
Income 
Elasticity of 
Family SizeTJ.
(4) t1
Hypothetical
Distribution of
Income Growth(g.)
Favouring: 1 
tiign LoW
Income Income
Groups(HI) Groups(LI)
(5) (6)
0-25 10 40 -0.4 0.0 20
26-50 16 30 -0.2 5 10
51-75 24 20 0.0 10 5
76-100 50 10 0.2 20 0.0
SOURCE: Adapted from Michael P. Todaro, ’Development Policy and Population
Growth: A Framework for Planners’, Population and Development
Review, March and June 1977, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 & 2, p. 35. Column
2 is derived from Khandker, 'Distribution of Income and Wealth
in Pakistan', Pakistan Economic and Social Review, Spring 1973.
Using the G.N.P. income weights, that is, the welfare index
which is weighted toward the existing distribution of income, one
gets the following indices depending on the impact of different 
development alternatives. The impact of a development strategy which
increases the income of the higher income groups(HI) would have
the following effect on the GNP income weighted welfare index:
W = .10 (0) + .16 (.05) + .24 (.10) + .50 (.20)
WHI = 13-2
The impact of a development strategy which would increase the in­
come growth of the lower income groups would have the following
effect on the GNP income weighted welfare index:
189
W = .10 (.20) + .16 (.10) + .24 (.05) + .50 (0.0)
1-jX
uli = A-8
The substantial difference between the two indices can, of 
course, disappear or be reversed if the equal weights welfare in­
dex or the poverty weighted index is employed. For example, in 
employing the equal weights index where w^ = w^ « w^ = 1/n, one 
finds no difference in the measures:
W = .25 (0) + .25 (.05) + .25 (.10) + .25 (.20) 
WHX = 8-75
WLI = *25 ^'20  ^ + *25 ^*10) + *25 (,05) + *25 (0,0) 
WLI = 8’75
In employing the poverty weighted index one finds the reverse,
WUT = .50 (0) + .24 (.05) + .16 (.10) = .10 (20)
Hx
"hi = 4’8
WIT = .50 ( 20) + .24 (.10) + .16 (0.5) + .10 (0.0)
LtX
^LI = 13,2
The difference between the high income group strategy and the 
low income group strategy, even when using the GNP income weights 
(Wri = 13.2; = 4.8; = 8.4) might be reduced if one
could calculate the long-run impact of the more equitable distri­
bution strategy upon fertility and family size.
Michael Todaro^ has recently developed an extension of the
^Michael P. Todaro, ’Development Policy and Population Growth: 
A Framework for Planners', Population and Development Review, March 
and June, 1977, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 Sc 2, pp. 23-43.
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social welfare index which attempts to incorporate the effects 
upon fertility of differential income growth. This assumes that 
as per-oapita income grows, the marginal fertility will be different
for different income classes. That is, higher income groups are
assumed to have a lower fertility on average than do lower income 
groups. Secondly, mortality and fertility are both assumed to be 
inversely related (at least over the medium and long range) with 
levels and changes in household income. Since a nonlinear rela­
tionship is assumed between changes in income and fertility, in­
come changes in various income classes will differ in the magnitude 
and direction of their fertility impact.
Todaro's new social welfare function combines any of the three 
broad types of welfare indices , (GNP, poverty, and equal weights) 
with differential income induced fertility changes. He has rewrit­
ten the basic social welfare equation as follows:
W = w.g. - OC.ll. g. +. ..w g - Yf g
1 1  1 (1 1 n n njn n
or reformulated,
w = (Wj + Cw2 - 0 ‘27 2>S2 + - " + (wn - « n ^ )sn-
Where,
^ i  = the per cent of the total population in the i ^  
income group.
yj . = an arc (between sequential groups) and a specified
' time period per person elasticity^gf demand for
children for households in each i group.
71 - Percentage change in Average Household Size
"" Percentage change in Average Household Income
per person between successively higher income groups
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could be positive or negative. Todaro assumes that gener­
ally it would be negative for most income groups in developing 
countries. He concedes that it might be positive for the lower 
income groups, but this would normally be the case only in the 
short-run. Several different theoretical and operational defini­
tions are actually presented in the framework. In theory,
^  is the income elasticity of the birth rate and its calculation 
would be based on sophisticated time series data on actual family 
income and family size, adjusted for age of parents, and their de­
sired and actual family size. This would incorporate the concept 
of expected permanent family income and its relationship to de­
sired family size. Admittedly, even if such sophisticated data 
were available, it would be inadequate because of changes in in­
tergen erational behaviour, and expectations. But ih attempting to 
make use of generally available statistics, the above operational 
definition is employed for period data.
There is some ambiguity in the article outlining this frame­
work and in places it mistakenly labels the latter of the above 
coefficients the "Income Elasticity of the Birth Rate" when in 
fact it is the income elasticity of family size which is being 
defined. A number of issues are raised by the use of income elas­
ticity of family size instead of the income elasticity of the birth 
rate. Indeed, income and mortality are perhaps more closely re­
lated than are income and fertility. An improvement in overall 
income is likely to result from development, which is likely to 
be strongly associated with an improvement in the mortality con­
ditions, which will naturally result in a greater number of surviving
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children. The author of the model recognizes this difficulty 
and explains:
Although income growth will also lower mortality rates 
among low-income groups and thus partially or completely offset 
any short-run birth rate reductions, our perspective is on the 
long-term decline in population growth, and, thus, our primary 
focus is on the fertility effects of family income growth. 
Moreover, mortality declines are inevitable short-run outcomes 
of successful development policies and should not be viewed as 
undesirable "side effects" (from ^ social welfare viewpoint) 
of antinatal population policies.
But it seems that this does not really answer the difficulties 
in the operation of the model. Increased income for income groups 
w^ and w^ will probably reduce mortality in the short, medium, 
and long run. And this will contribute a positive influence on 
family size from the short to the long-run. Whether or not it is 
"desirable" is not relevant to the model. Furthermore, we do 
not know with any certainty that an increase in income will have 
a negative short-run effect upon fertility. Since an improved in­
come will reduce the costs of childbearing and childrearing, and 
it is associated with improved nutrition and health, there are 
many reasons to believe that in the short-run it may increase 
fertility and family size. It is true that in the long-run we 
would expect that increased income would, in a number of indirect 
ways reduce fertility and family size, though the mechanisms by 
which it would do so would be complex and synergetic.
A change in income among various income groups is likely to 
have a significant influence on the rate of new family formations, 
both independently and in association with changes in fertility
^Todaro, lo. cit., p. 42.
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and mortality. Naturally, changes in the rate of family forma­
tions will directly alter family sizes and are likely to do so 
differently for each income group. Furthermore, the concepts of 
"household” and "family” are used interchangeably to simplify the 
framework but the differences in meaning, particularly for Pakis­
tan, are more than slight, and present a formidable complication. 
Hovrever, the available data are no more sophisticated than the 
model in this respect.
By using the income elasticity of family size as a proxy for 
the income elasticity of the birth rate, the model is employing 
at least two addtional components, changes in mortality and family 
formation, which may be substantially more powerful than fertility 
in the determination of7|^. This may be true even over the long 
run.
On the other hand, there are hundreds of potential interven­
ing variables which might exert such an influence and it is not 
possible with the present data base to unravel the problems with 
simultaneity, multicollinearity, accurate specification, time lag 
structures, and controls for ceteris paribus assumptions. Julian 
Simon argues,
"All of these correlations of rises in income are closely 
associated statistically which makes it impossible to learn 
their separate effects by statistical analysis, and these 
forces are all interacting constituent parts of economic de­
velopment, all linked and working hand in hand. Hence,^it 
is not even sensible to try to separate their effects."
^■Julian L. Simon, ‘Income, Wealth, and Their Distribution 
As Policy Tools in Fertility Control*, Population and Development; 
The Search for Selective Interventions. Ronald Ridker, ed., (Bal­
timore: Johns Hopkins Press), 1976, p. 55.
194
The power of the concept of elasticity is that it enables one, 
within limits, to make broad generalizations if they are empir­
ically supported and to do so without attempting to unravel all 
the intermediate variables. It might be argued that the pathways 
of causality are less important for these particular policy pur­
poses, thus enabling the use of the elasticity concept to provide 
a general indicator, despite the fact that the numerator and 
denominator have less than a direct causal relationship.
Later in this chapter attempts will be made to estimate*^ 
from both the period (arc) data and from time series data on family 
size and income in Pakistan.
Let us return to our hypothetical example of the application 
of a GNP welfare index for evaluating the implications of two al­
ternative development strategies. We found a considerable gap in 
the GNP welfare index between the development strategy which empha­
sized income growth for the highest income groups(HI) and that
emphasizing growth for the lowest income groups (LI), (W = 13.2,
H i
W _ = 4.8; W - W_ = 8.4). But if we incorporate the concept of 
Li L i1L Li L
^  into the GNP welfare index using the hypothetical values found 
in Table 16 we get the following:
WHI = (wi - “ i V  gi +" >+ (Vn - ‘’‘n V  Sn
WUT = (.10 - .40 (-0.4)) (0) + (.16 - .30 (-0.2)) (.05) +
hi
+ (.24 - .20 (0.0)) (.10) + (.50 - .10 (0.2)) (.20)
W = 0 + (.16 -(-.06)) (.05) + (.24 - 0) (.10) + (.50 - (,02)(.20))
WHI = 13,1
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W = (.10 - .40 (-0.4)) (.20) + (.16 - .30 (-0.2)) (.10) +
+ (.24 - .20 (0.0)) (0.5) + (.50 - .10 (0.2)) (0.0)
WLI = (*26) (,20) + (,22) ('#10') + (,2A) (,05) + 0,0
WU  = 8‘6
When taking into account these hypothetical values the gap
between the two development strategies is reduced (W = 13.1;
HI
W^-j. = 8.6; W^j - W^j = 4.5) by some 46 per cent from 8.4 to 4.5. 
This is true despite the fact that we are employing the conserva­
tive GNP weighted welfare index. The development strategy for low 
income groups would have been substantially higher had we employed 
the equal weights or the poverty weighted welfare index.
Todaro suggests that births among different income groups may
be more or less likely to contribute to society's social welfare.
He proposes the incorporation of differential social premiums based 
on the relative social benefit-cost ratio of lowered fertility for 
various income groups. Essentially, it is argued that though the 
children of poorer families use fewer social resources, the lifetime 
earnings and productivity of the children from wealthier families 
is substantially greater. In other words, the greater the invest­
ment in human capital the greater the return. Therefore, the net 
social costs of accruing births are less, the higher a family's 
present income.
If ^  can be defined as the "relative social benefit (cost) 
of a unit decrease (or increase) in average family size in the in-
come class i ; then, the welfare equation may be rewritten as:
W
= (W1 S1 + * • *+ (wn - K * X K
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An estimate of might be obtained by finding the inverse of the
social benefit-cost ratio Rut of course, it is not possible
to directly calculate a social benefit - cost ratio for different
income levels. But if it were possible to get values for R^, say
R = 0.5; R = 0.8; R = 1.25 and R. = 2.5; then we could determine 
1 2  3 4
P i from = 1/R^ T h u s , ^  = 2.0; ^  = 1.25;^3 = 0.83; and ^  = 
0.40.
Returning to our hypothetical example, could be incorporated 
into the GRP welfare index to again evaluate the two alternative 
development strategies favouring the growth of the high income 
groups (HI) or the low income groups (LI).
WHI = (,1° " (2*0) ( ‘40) (0) + (-16 “ (1.25)(.30)(-0.2))(.05)
+ (.24 - (0.83)(.20)(0))(.10) + (.50 -(0.4)(.10)(0.2))(.20)
W = 0 + .01175 + .024 + .0984
W = 13.4
Wu  = (.10 -(2.0)(.40)(-0.4))(.20) + (.16 -(1.25)(.30)(-0.2))(.10) + 
+ (.24 -(0.83)(.20)(0))(0.5) + (.50 -(0.40)(.10)(0.2))(0)
W = .084 + .0235 + .12 + 0
WLI = 22*8
This demonstrates that by incorporating the concept of the rel­
ative welfare rankings of the high and low income development stra-
"^The following relationships between^, and R. are assumed: "if
0 ^  R.^ 1, then jS. = 1/R. (marginal births m  income group i have a
net social cost);1if R. = 1, then 2?. = 0 (marginal births in group i
do not directly add to1or subtract £rom society's social welfare); if 
R.^ 1, thenp. = -R. (additional births in group i yield net social 
benefits); where R.1^  $./C. is the discounted social benefit-cost ratio 
of a 1 per cent increase or decrease in the average birth rate of in­
come group i." Todaro, Ibid, p. 37.
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tegies can be dramatically reversed to favour strategies helping the
'poor. Of course, this is only a hypothetical example, and the
magnitude of the relative welfare indic^es depends entirely upon
the hypothetical values employed. But it does show the way in
which demographic variables can be employed in relation to the
growth of income distribution to evaluate different development
strategies, and it demonstrates that, at least in theory, demographic
variables can be important.
Todaro argues that if the net social costs of accruing births
are less, the higher a family's present income, then the relative
social benefit premiums of accruing births may be roughly estimated
by using the income distribution as a proxy. Thus, as w^ decreases
^  increases. It is argued that this is probably valid in poor
countries with rapidly growing populations and substantial income
inequality. If this presumption is valid, and other data are not
present for estimating the relative social benefit premiums of
accruing births, then could be roughly estimated by the ratio
w / w. using w as the median value of the w. distribution. In m 1 ° m 1
our hypothetical example w would equal the average mid-value,
W~ + W3 16 + 24 40
w = —m 2 2
= —  = 20.
Thus,
h
w 
=  m / W1 =
20/10 = 2.0
p2
w = m / W2 =
20/16 = 1.25
h
w 
= m / w3 = 20/24 = 0.833
h
w 
= m / W4 =
20/50 = 0.40.
The inverse of the above p^s were employed in the previous hypotheti­
cal example for R^. Unfortunately, R^ cannot be measured directly
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and the above method of estimating ^  from the income distribution 
is extremely mechanical and dubious at best. It is essentially a 
per capita GNP welfare index.
The Data
This section briefly examines the available Pakistani income 
data needed for the planning framework. Though much attention has 
been paid to regional income inequality (East-West), only a few 
studies have been undertaken to examine the income distribution 
among different income groups, and these have been of little value. 
In 1964, Khakija— Haqx studied income-tax data, which was exceed­
ingly dubious, and which included only the very rich. Some five 
percent of the urban population was covered and rural areas x%Tere 
excluded.
2
Another major study was undertaken by Professor Asborn Bergan 
which was wider in scope (both urban and rural) and utilized Cen­
tral Statistical Office (CSO) data collected in 1963-1964 by the 
Surveys of Economic Conditions. But the study only looked at one 
year and that was the first year the CSO undertook such a survey
and many serious non-sampling errors were contained in the 1963/64
3
Quarterly Survey. Furthermore, Khandker has pointed out that
^Khadija Haq, *A Measurement of Inequality in Urban Personal 
Income Distribution in Pakistan', Pakistan Development Review, 
Volume IV, No. 4 (Winter, 1964).
2Asbjorn Bergan, 'Personal Income Distribution and Personal 
Saving in Pakistan, 1963/64', Pakistan Development Review, Volume 
VII, No. 2, (Summer 1967).
3
R. H. Khandker, 'Distribution of Income and Wealth in Pak­
istan', Pakistan Economic and Social Review, (Spring 1973), p. 2.
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Bergan's unpublished data differed from the Central Statistical 
Office's data published subsequently.
Khandker published his own study of the CSO's Quarterly Sur­
veys for 1963/64, 1966/67, and 1968/69, in the then West Pakistan.^ 
Khandker arrived at the extraordinary finding that income inequality 
had lessened over the period 1963/64 to 1968/69. In the rural areas 
he reported a decline in the inequality of income which he attri­
butes to agricultural growth over the period and he makes the sur­
prising argument that the so called Green Revolution might have 
lessened income inequality by helping medium farmers more than those 
owning larger or small farms. In the urban areas he reported 
an increase in inequality between 1963/64 and 1966/67 and then a subse­
quent decline in 1968/69.
Khandker admits that the urban areas were under repre­
sented in the sample and, in addition, that the high income groups
were under-enumerated and therefore the study must significantly
2"understate the degree of inequality of income." Nevertheless, 
he holds to his conclusions despite, as he says, the nearly uni­
versal disagreement with the general public including politicians 
and economic planners who believe precisely the opposite is true 
that income inequality has increased over the period. He argues 
that while his work may not disprove the consensus, it does show 
that the income curve has flattened. This he maintains could hap­
pen concurrently with the accumulation of great fortunes by a very
■^R. H. Khandker, 'Distribution of Income and Wealth in Pak­
istan', Pakistan Economic and Social Review, (Spring 1973), p. 2.
2
Ibid., p. 4.
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few families, and that capital gains, which were excluded from his 
study, may have contributed greatly to income inequality.
Data on income distribution in Pakistan can only be obtained
from bwo sources, either the Central Board of Revenue’s Income-
tax Revenue Statistics or the Central Statistical Officers Quarterly
Surveys of Economic Conditions. The Income-tax Revenue Statistics
have not been published in many years, Qvat even if the unpublished 
were available, they
data/would not be useful for studying income distribution because 
of the pervasive tax evasion, the high legal exemption and the great 
differences between "assessable income" and total income. The other 
data base, the Quarterly Surveys, have serious nonsampling errors 
from respondents* biases. Khandker reports also that the extreme­
ly low and extremely high income groups have by far the greatest 
undernumeratioi through rejection and non-response.^ Thus the Quar­
terly Surveys understate the extent of income inequality.
Unfortunately, one must be especially cautious in accepting
»
Pakistan's official or semi-official data precisely because .they 
are optimistic. We have previously described a pattern of official 
adulteration of demographic statistics and because these figures 
run counter to an overwhelming consensus that inequality is growing, 
we must be especially suspicious. Even if we do not doubt the 
honesty of the survey, we know a substantial list of reasons to 
doubt the quality of the data. Any attempt to adjust these figures 
on our part would only introduce an additional bias. Recognizing 
these serious limitations, we will proceed, hoping to shed perhaps 
some light on the utility of the model and the reasonableness of
^Ibid., p. 5.
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the data themselves.
The following procedures were undertaken to change the form
of the data to make them appropriate for the model. The Khandker
data, shown in A p p e n d i x  E", is a distribution by percentage and
cummulative percentages of household population, earners, and 
arranged
income, /  by household income groups. The average monthly income 
(in Rs.), the percentage of households, the population per house­
hold, and the earners per household, are also given by the size 
distribution of household income. This is available for rural 
areas, urban areas, and rural and urban combined. Furthemore, it 
is available over three time periods for the fiscal years 1963/64, 
1966/67, and 1968/69. The time-series aspect of this body of data is 
important because it enables us to calculate the g^s, the per cent 
distribution of income growth. Using the three surveys we can also 
examine changes in family size and changes in family income and 
together these can be used to make new time series extimates of
V
It was felt that the data would be more manageable if the 
eleven to thirteen income categories were reduced to four for the 
initial analysis. It is necessary that each category have an 
equal number of households. Given the nature of the data,this 
reduction does not result in a loss of precision in the model, 
and most probably this step improves reliability as the numbers 
in each case are greatly increased. The data have been divided 
into quartiles by finding the exact location of the 25, 50, and 
75 percentage points within the cumulative household distribution 
ranked by income (see a p p e n d i x 1? ) .  Four groups of households with
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exactly the same number of households in each group have been 
identified and ranked according to ascending income.
These quartiles are then interpolated against the cumulative per­
centage of income distribution to find the per cert distribution 
of income or w^. Therefore, equals the percentage distribution 
of income received by the poorest quarter of the households, and 
so, with represents the income of the richest household quartile.
Table 17 summarizes the calculations of Appendix F . The first 
column presents the percentage distribution of income for the 
years 1963/4, 1966/67, and 1968/69. These figures indicate that 
roughly half of the income went to the top household quartile while 
about 10 per cent went to the bottom quartile. This income struc­
ture remained roughly constant throughout the three surveys and 
it held up in both urban and rural areas. The average income 
(in Rs.) reportedly rose slightly between 1963/64 and 1966/67 
only to fall again in 1968/69. By world standards the level of 
income is extremely low. The concentration ratios of the reported 
household income distribution (Gini coefficients: .358, .346, and
.333 respectively for the above years) are, by world standards, 
exceedingly low (equal) and becoming more equal. Indeed, if one 
were to accept these estimates, one would have to place Pakistan 
as one of the most equitable countries in the world.
These figures reflect income and not wealth so they exclude 
great fortunes in land or capital, though in theory they should 
measure the income returned from these investments. In reality,
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even Khandker admits that the distribution has been truncated 
at both ends and that it appears too equal. Khandker acknowledge 
that the few very rich families who reportedly own and control 
vast fortunes are not included in the sample. However, he argues 
that the figures are a reasonable reflection of the income distri 
bution of the bulk of the households, though they do not reflect 
the true national distribution. If this is true, we might still 
be able to analyze changes in income and family size for most of 
the population, recognizing that the sample had been truncated. 
But if, as seems likely, the development strategies of the 1960s 
channelled vast funds into one or two per cent of the households 
which were not included in these samples, then it is rather im­
possible to evaluate the impact of the development strategy by 
the reported per cent distributions of income growth (g^s). 
Therefore, the calculation of various welfare indices with these 
g^s is not warranted.
The per cent distribution of income growth (g^) essentially 
expresses the relative changes in distribution among different 
income groups (w^). These figures show some relative improvement 
in the share of income received by the poorest household quartile 
Unfortunately, the bottom of the distribution has also been 
truncated and had the very poor, particularly the landless, been 
fully included in the surveys, the share of the bottom household 
quartile may not have looked as relatively favourable.
The most striking feature of the data is the minimal growth 
which occurred in average monthly income over the three time per­
iods. From 1963 to 1968 the combined urban/rural average income
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increased from Rs. 202 to Rs. 215 (see Appendix E ) only 6.4 per 
cent over the five years, while the rural income actually declined 
from Rs. 193 to Rs. 190 during the same period. Therefore, 
represents changes in relative shares of the income, so while the 
rural g^ may have changed by 20 per cent between 1963 and 1968, the 
actual level of monthly income only rose from Rs. 37.57 to Rs. 40.03 
among the very poor and from Rs. 77.85 to Rs. 80.37 among those 
averaging a monthly income of between 50 and 100 Rs. Certainly 
it is the level of income and not the relative share which most 
affects the lives of the very poor. No one could argue, on the 
basis of this data, that the level of income actually improved for 
the very poor. Taking the data at face value, it still amounts
to an increase of only one per cent per year for the very poor,
and given inflation, the actual income probably deteriorated 
significantly.
The percentage of the p o p u l a t i o n i s  also presented for
the three time periods and for urban, rural, and combined. These
figures are extraordinary. One would expect that the households 
in the poorest quartile would have the largest population by virtue 
of its large family size and likewise we would assume that the rich­
est household quartile would have the smallest family size and 
the smaller population. Instead, these figures suggest exactly the 
reverse. This pattern holds up, though with some variation, through' 
out the three surveys and in urban and rural areas as well as the 
urban/rural combined.
The inverse pattern of 'family size and income, if not an arti­
fact of the data, might be explained by several factors. We know
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that family income is closely related to the structure of the house­
hold. Appendix E lists the proportion and numbers respectively,
of earners per household. We know that many of the very poor, the landless, 
have not been included in this survey. Of those very poor
households that have been included, the land holdings may be too 
small to support an extended family. Children leave early to seek 
wage employment. Cousins, uncles, and others move on. Poor health 
and nutrition may also affect family size through reduced fertility 
and increased mortality. Larger landholdings attract and support
the extended family and may provide a greater economic rationale 
for additional children.
This may help explain the inverse pattern of household size 
and income in the rural areas, but it seems less likely to be true 
in the urban areas. These relationships do point out the mechanical 
and simplistic nature of the planning model in its use of 
arbitrary income groupings rather than actual social classes and 
its simplification of complex relationships.
In looking at changes in average family sizes over the three 
surveys we find that there were some small declines among several 
household groups (see Appendix E). The following average family 
sizes for all income groups combined were reported:
1963/64 1966/67 1968/69
Rural 5.5 5.6 5.4
Urban 5.9 5.6 5.6
Combined 5.6 5.6 5.4
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Recognizing that the samples have been truncated at both ends, 
but with the hope that they might still reflect some valid charac­
teristics of the majority of the population in the large middle 
range, an attempt has been made to analyze the income elasticity 
of family size ^  using period (arc) data from the three sur­
veys. Using the average family size (X.) data between successive
X(n+1) 1income groups an arc, ~ -----  - 1, was calculated. As explained
n
earlier, these data had the unusual feature of generally showing larger 
family sizes in
^higher income groups; therefore, the arc data are usually positive
instead of negative. The average monthly household income (in Rs.)
for each income group was then divided by the average family size
X. in that grcup to obtain the monthly household income per person 
1 Y
y These data were then used to calculate another arc, - 1.
n
The ratio of the two arcs,
X(n+1)
X
i i )
Y
n
is then employed to calculate the income elasticity of household 
size. These estimates were made separately for both the urban and 
rural samples using the data from 1963/64, 1966/67, and 1968/69.
They are generally positive because income and family size are pos­
itively related in these samples. Graphs of these elasticities in 
Appendix H show wide fluctuations; and though they are generally 
positive, they literally cover the graph, and it is difficult to 
find any significant relationships except that the only negative 
coefficients are among the higher income groups. It must be noted 
that the sample sizes are smallest in the highest income groups and
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we night expect some instability in the highest income groups re­
presented by fewer cases. There are, however, wide fluctuations 
in the elasticities of the second to fifth lowest income groups 
and these have the largest sample sizes.
Figure 3 presents the income elasticity of family size for 
different income groups calculated in time series data for the 
three periods, 1963/64 to 1968/69; 1963/64 to 1966/67; and 1966/67 
to 1968/69. These elasticities are characterized by some strong 
fluctuations, but the values are negative and in general they de­
cline with income rather than increase. They are lower than the 
hypothetical values employed in the theoretical section of this 
chapter and they generally go in the opposite direction. We might 
disregard the first income category Rs. 0-50 because the sample 
must have been very small, and sample sizes from income groups 
above Rs. 500 have also been excluded.^ T h e s e u s  are of a more 
reasonable magnitude and are more stable than those found by cal­
culating with period (arc) data. When calculating^^ with period
^Unfortunately, Khandker did not publish the sample sizes so 
we must be especially cautious in interpreting the data in particular 
income groups. We do have the per cent distribution of the population 
sample (see: AppendixE , Figure 4) and we know that nearly three-
fourths of the population is concentrated in the second through sixth 
income groups. The lowest group has a population of less than one 
per cent of the sample and, therefore, its sample size is probably 
too small. Coefficients were not calculated for the highest income 
groups because they represented a very small proportion of the house­
holds and, therefore, their numbers must have been very small. In 
addition, the income categories for these groups were different in 
each survey and thus not strictly comparable. Figure 4 presents the 
distribution of households across the income scale. From this we can 
see that the great majority of the households fall within the 
group averaging less than Rs. 500 per month. It is also apparent 
that the distribution of rural households has remained stable over 
the three surveys though there has been an apparent decline in the 
proportion of poor urban households. The relative stability of the 
rural household distribution is at least an indication that changes 
in the persons per household distribution, used to calculate' 71. are 
not a reflection of underlying changes in family formation. 1
Th
e 
Ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
In
co
me
 
El
as
ti
ci
ty
 
of
 
Fa
mi
ly
 
Si
ze
/(
 
fr
om
 
Ti
me
 
Se
ri
es
 
D
a
ta
, 
Pa
ki
st
an
 
19
63
/6
4 
to 
19
68
/6
9,
 
Ru
ra
l
•H
i
<u x: o) \
to cu = in <r
G w 5 00 oo vo CMid 3 o VO vO O O
x: G o 3 as ON • •
o •r-t33 I—IrH 1—4 o o
4-1 T3•H i—i
o D<U•r4 X3 CN
e 4-> CU 1—4o W in CU
o cd 3 N •
G *—1<4-1 <3 ♦ |H oI—ICO o - C/X 1 >H o i
rH
ON00 00 r*.
vo VO oOn ON o .
i-4 rH • o
X! X o 1
rH
1
00 00 in rHvO VO VO rHON ON O rH1—4 1—4 • .
>* >4 o O
TDi-1
>•.oi—tx: <U Gx: (U E O CO vO r>*4-> CD O in VC oG 3 o -4 *4 ON .O O G CU CU 1—4 ON CM2 = 1-4 A. Ah >4 rH CM
•d
r—^
X o•—A X3 0> G
x: cu E o OO ON+j CO O C/1 VO 00 inG 3 u g G ON « .O O G 0) CU 1-4 o53 I—1Ah A h >4 rH CM
•o1—4
(0 o
G x: 00O cu VO(0 CO ON*4
CU Gcu 3o * r
1-4 in.
tG A h 33 CM CO
TO
rH(0 0
G X3 ooO <u VO
(0 CO ON(4 G 3 f—1 rH 00cu CU o X « .A* A h 33 CM oo
o n 0) k»NVO 00 CUcd X E • 00 0000 G 4-» 0 CO o VOvo cu G o AS . .On > O G o ONI-4< I—l <r
<r cu >nvo 00 f—I CU /“\cd X E • in00 G 4-> O CO in 00vO cu G u ai ■ •ON > O c vy r>-
rH < 53 •H oo r^
TJ
cu 0 otD i-l X3 CU CO in ocd X3 CU E a • oG 4-> C/1 o 3 CO CO |H<u c 3 o O as CO 1> o O G G V4 cu o
< 2 i— a .-J in
CM in - VC
00 O o o rH CN
o O c o O o
o • c . • •« c • o o oo 1 o 1 1 1
o ON 00 r-» CNin in VO o ON CN00 o c o CN vO• • • • . •
0
1
rH
1
rH
1
r—t
i
rH
1
0
1
in vO n* ON ON00 OO rH in OO rH
rH o o o 00 in
• • » • o O
O o o o . •
1 1 1 i o O
<r in
ON <r vO O n vo r-in OO rH UO o o
|H o O C . •. • • . o o
o o o o i I
<r in <r ON 00 <r
r - 00 oo <r |H• • • • • •
|H VO CM 00
CM oo 00 HJ- <r in
in «H r>. rH vo
ON <r n- o <r in• • • • • .
oo o in o vO CO(N 00 oo <r uo
in in rH <r 00 rH• • • • • .
<r in VC vo r^ . 00
CM r^ - CN 00 CM• • • • • .
uo in VO vo I"" n*
in vo o VO rH o00 ON r-» n- rH uo• • . • • .
HT CM rH o ON 00
CN r*. CM CO oo
«H rH CN CM OO
nj OO UO <r o 00in OO o in
. • • • • •
<r oo rH CM <r o
CM r-> CM <r uo
rH rH CM CM 00 <r
o O O O o oin O in o o o
rH CN CN oo <r UO
1
o
1
O
1
o
1
o
i
o 1oo in o in o o
rH |H CN CN oo
209
vo
o
0
1
CN
o
c
•
0
1
oo
<r r - <T
rH vo •
• • 00
uo o 00
vo |H
ON <r
VO
rH
uo HT .• .
<r uo CO
vO 00 rH
00
vo * O
• |H •
00 rH
oo sr VO
• m •
ON ON 00
o o 
CM 00 o OCM CO • •
• • | (N
O 00 rH U0
vo oo oo oo
in 00 rH CM
oo
o rH 00n- |H •• . 00
o OO UN
o O |H
VO 00 rH
O
in Al
l 
Gr
ou
ps
 
19
3.
24
 
18
9.
87
 
5.
5 
5.
4 
35
.1
3 
35
.1
6
In
co
me
 
El
as
ti
ci
ty
 
of
 
Fa
mi
ly
 
Si
ze
Figure 3
210
Income Elasticity of Family Size Calculated from Time Series 
Data by Average Monthly Income Groups (Rs) Pakistan, Urban and Rural 
1963/64 - 1968/695 1963/64 - 1966/67; 1966/67 - 1968/69
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Per Cent Distribution of Households by Average Monthly Income 
Groups (Rs.) Pakistan, 1963, 1966, 1968, Urban and Rural
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data we were confronted with an unusual positive relationship 
between family size and "income. This difficulty was overcome 
by using time series data to look at over time rather than 
by income groups.
In looking at the rural data over the five year period from 
1963 to 1968, we find a 1.7 per cent decline in the average monthly 
household income of all groups combined, from Rs. 193 to Rs. 189.9. 
The percentage change over the period was essentially stagnant for 
all income groups, though the lowest income groups reported some 
slight positive changes while the higher income groups reported 
slight negative changes. The average number of persons per house­
hold declined by 1.9 per cent from 5.5 to 5.4. These declines in 
reported household size were concentrated among the lowest income 
groups. In one sense, the decline in the household income was 
offset by the decline in the reported average family size; there­
fore, the average monthly household income per person remained con­
stant over the period from Rs. 35.13 ^o Rs. 35.16. We can see that 
the level of income per household remained essentially stagnant for 
all income groups, though the lowest income groups reported some 
slight positive changes while the higher income groups reported 
slight negative changes. The average number of persons per house­
hold declined by 1.9 per cent from 5.5 to 5.4. These declines in 
reported household size were concentrated among the lowest income 
groups. In one sense, the decline in the household income was 
offset by the decline in the reported average family size; there­
fore, the average monthly household income per person remained es­
sentially unchanged, and yet because of declines in the reported
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family size, the income per person among certain income groups 
changed dramatically. The households earning between Rs. 50-100 
and Rs. 100-150 reported rather substantial declines in family 
size and only slight gains in family income. Careful examination 
o f r e v e a l s  a further limitation of the planning model. Upon 
first inspection the income elasticities of the household size 
look fairly reasonable. They are based on the per cent change 
in household income per person. Household income per person is 
acknowledged to be a better indicator than average household in­
come. But problems of circular causality remain, in this case 
we do not know why family size declined but we can determine that 
it was not the rise in household income per person which reduced 
family size. The decline in family size is the chief reason why 
household income per person increased.
This framework illustrates some of the important relationships 
between population, income distribution, and the evaluation of 
alternative development strategies. However, it is much too sim­
plistic to be used as an analytical tool for actual planning pur­
poses and even if high quality data were available, serious method- 
ogical difficulties would remain.
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CONCLUSION
The findings in the first part of this thesis indicate a 
surprising dearth of demographic data in development plans of the 
Third World. With a few exceptions, the data found in these plans 
are inadequate and are not presented in forms easily used by 
planners. Use varies significantly by region, with Asia pre­
senting more data than Africa or Latin America and the Caribbean. 
This regional variation is even more marked when population is
taken into consideration. A substantial variation in the parameters 
of demographic data used is also evident. More demographic
data are found in recent plans than in earlier ones,^ but many
^Stamper, B. Maxwell, ’Population Policy in Development Plan­
ning: A Study of Seventy Less Developed Countries,* Reports on
Population/Family Planning, No. 13, 1973.
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countries with rapid population growth continue not to consider 
rudimentary demographic statistics in their national development 
plans. Few of the projections that are presented are sufficiently 
detailed for effective planning, and even fewer have actually 
been integrated with development strategies.
The recognition of population problems in development plans 
is substantial! Two**thirds of the countries studied mention a 
wide spectrum of population problems in their plans. An earlier 
study of 70 development plans of the 1960s* found slightly more 
than one-third of them acknowledging such problems. Recognition 
of population problems has thus increased dramatically. The 
regional differences in problem recognition are acute when pop­
ulation is taken into consideration, Asia again having the most 
comprehensive coverage.
Countries that make extensive use of demographic data tend 
to recognize more population problems than those that do not.
Data on the age structure of a population, for example, appear 
to help alert a planning commission to the problems of a high de­
pendency ratio and an increasing working-age population; when 
population projections are available to be studied in conjunction 
with economic data, the effect of population growth on economic 
development is more readily apparent. And once at least two 
population problems are recognized, others suggest themselves I 
Of the countries that recognize more than one such problem —
^Stamper, B. Maxwell, ’Population Policy in Development Plan­
ning; A Study of Seventy Less Developed Countries,' Reports on 
Population/Family Planning, No. 13, 1973.
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and just half of the countries studied do —  80 per cent recognize 
four or more.
Forty-three per cent of the countries studied propose some 
policy to reduce the rate of population growth. Only 26 per 
cent of the 1960s development plans studied had such policies, 
so it is apparent that Third World countries are becoming in­
creasingly aware not only of the problems arising from population 
growth but of the advisability of some sort of action to deal 
with them. Yet the evidence found in these plans strongly sug­
gests that many countries do not plan for the consequences of 
short-term population growth, let alone long-term growth. Most 
of these policies support only family planning programmes; other 
measures receive relatively little attention. Nine plans ad­
vocate special family planning education efforts and seven ad­
vocate broader education about population issues, but only four 
mention the use of the mass media to spread this information.
Nine plans explicitly state a policy assumption that economic 
development would result in reduced fertility. Two plans advo­
cate an improvement in the status of women in conjunction with 
a decline in fertility. Almost no attention is given in the 
plans to an improvement in the status of women for their own 
sake or for their contribution to development. Again a regional 
pattern emerges, with the Asian plans having far more population 
policies than those of Africa or Latin America and the Caribbean.
Twenty-two countries recognize no population problems and 
include no population policies in their plans; twelve countries 
recognize population problems but have no population policies;
the remaining both recognize population problems and include 
population policies in their plans (see Figure 5 ). There are 
great extremes in this group: Bangladesh recognizes nine pop­
ulation problems and has 14 policies for dealing with them; 
Guatemala also recognizes nine problems but has only two policies 
and one of these is increased employment of women, only partially 
in the context of population policy. Malaysia, on the other hand, 
mentions only one problem but proposes seven policies. A median 
<of 4.0 policies is proposed by the countries that have policies; 
the mean is 4.8. These figures are rather high, and might be 
explained by an overlap of classifications. As might have been 
anticipated, there tends to be a positive relationship between 
the number of population problems recognized and the number of 
policies proposed in the development plans.
Figure 5 gives a more realistic view of the population pol­
icies and problem recognition in the development plans by com­
paring them with the official positions of the governments con­
cerned.^ The dates of official policy adoptions are presented 
as well as the plan periods so that sequential comparisons can 
be made. Of the 60 countries studied, 22 countries (37 per 
cent) do not recognize a problem from rapid population growth,
^Nigeria, Uganda, Panama, and Swaziland, which had weak 
statements of policy in the plans, are in apparent contradic­
tion, with no official government policy but with a policy 
stated in the plan. The contradiction can be explained by 
different interpretations of the plan document or the fact 
that the official classification may be based on counter­
vailing information outside of the plan.
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while 38 countries (63 per cent) do recognize such a problem.
Of these, 26 countries (43 per cent) present a policy to reduce 
the rate of population growth in their plans. Of the remaining 
twelve countries that do recognize a population problem but have 
no policy in their plans, four have adopted official govemmant 
positions supporting a policy and a programme outside the plan, 
and four others actually support family planning programmes for 
nondemographic reasons. Thus, only four countries (Burundi,
Togo, Zambia, and Guyana) recognize a population problem in 
their plans but have no specific policy to reduce it and give no 
support to an official family planning programme.
Chapter 4, which begins the second part of this thesis, is 
a specific examination of population and planning in the develop­
ment plans of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Pakistan's First Five- 
Year Plan (1955-1960) never became operational and the general 
background of the plan —  economically, administratively, and 
politically —  was that of complete failure. Though population 
growth was regarded as a serious problem in the Plan, officials 
deliberately understated the rate of population growth in order 
to present a more optimistic picture. Virtually no policies 
were proposed to reduce fertility.
The Second Plan (1960-1965) gave much more attention to the 
problems of population growth stating that they 'threatened to 
wipe out the gains of development...* (p. 335). The policy ef­
forts directed by the Second Plan did not have a demographic 
impact for several reasons. There was little demand for con­
traceptives; the programme was administered through existing
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health facilities which did not reach most of the population 
and whose personnel, facing more critical clinical cases, did 
not actively promote contraceptive use; and only half of the funds 
proposed in the Flan were actually allocated.
The Third Plan's (1965-1970) objectives and programmes to 
reduce fertility were excessively ambitious. The strategy again 
faced the basic problem of insufficient demand for contraceptives. 
Administratively, it reli ed on existing political structures (rather 
than medical facilities) that were often uninterested in the ob­
jectives, and unwilling to work with little or no compensation.
The utilization of the local dais proved ineffective. There 
were logistical difficulties because the geographic scope of 
the programme was so wide. Finally, reports of bleeding caused 
by the IUD made the method unacceptable, and the monetary incen­
tive scheme implemented for IUD insertions, vasectomies, and 
tubligations was plagued with corruption.
Bangladesh's First Plan (1973-1978) gave considerable atten­
tion to population, but extremely adverse conditions in the 
country have made its implementation exceedingly difficult. The 
country's efforts since 1974 have not been reviewed in this study.
In Chapter 5 four conceptual frameworks incorporating theories 
of fertility decline were analyzed, and their relevance and utility
i
for development planning in Pakistan and Bangladesh was assessed. 
The family planning approach, (i.e., essentially supplying con­
traceptives and information about their use), remains the princi­
pal policy instrument for reducing fertility, though there remain 
substantial socio-economic-psychological barriers to this approach;
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and it has not been successfully implemented nor has it been 
demographically effective. Until there is greater motivation 
to control reproduction, the demand for contraceptives and the 
demographic impact of the family planning programme are not likely 
to substantially reduce the rate of population growth. In the 
long run the approach may have some demographic impact; and it 
remains the most politically acceptable and administratively 
and economically feasible intervention for reducing fertility.
Policies going beyond the family planning approach which 
attempt to directly influence the demand for reproductive con­
trol, such as the provision of old age support, monetary incen­
tives, stringent and coercive measures, are likely to be econom­
ically and administratively infeasible and politically unrealistic.
The demographic transition theory, which states that general 
economic development brings reduced mortality and greater demand 
for fertility control, remains fundamental to many assumptions 
employed by development planners. The historical experiences 
upon which this theory is based are found to be quite different 
from the present conditions of Pakistan and Bangladesh; these 
differences are assessed to determine which in general may post­
pone a decline in fertility and which may accelerate such a de­
cline. The source and pace of mortality decline, the high rate 
of growth, the growth in absolute size, the young age structure, 
the high level of fertility, and the unlikely prospect of uni­
versal education or nonagricultural employment (especially for 
women) all combine to generally impede the demographic transition 
as it occurred in Europe and other Western countries. Furthermore,
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migration is not likely to lessen the effects of population growth 
as it did in the West. On the other hand, the early and near 
universal marriage patterns of Pakistan present a greater 
potential for reducing fertility via a delay in the age of mar­
riage or in a reduction in the proportion marrying than existed 
in Europe. New birth control technology is more effective, it 
may require less frequent motivation, and the potential for safe 
medical abortions now exists. Modem communication systems which 
have a greater potential for permeating linguistic barriers and 
bringing a modernization of attitudes now reach remote rural 
areas. There is also evidence that where fertility is declining 
in other Third World countries, it is doing so more rapidly 
than it did in Europe and other Western countries.
Finally, the distributive and fertility decline hypothesis, 
which focuses on the underlying distributions rather than on ag­
gregate economic and social measures, is examined to evaluate 
more fully its relevance and application to Pakistan and Bangla­
desh. This approach raises issues about the redistribution of 
income growth which in turn raises issues about the bimodal 
trends in agriculture and rural development, the sector in which 
the vast majority of the people work and live. Development stra­
tegies which emphasize the rural poor are examined for their po­
tential impact upon fertility.
The available evidence from other countries on the fertility/
equity thesis is reviewed but because of the aggregate nature of
drawn
the data, few conclusions can be / about these relationships. 
Equity oriented growth strategies may in the short-run increase
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fertility though in the long-run they may result in reduced fer­
tility by the various indirect mechanisms discussed.
The approach analyzed in Chapter 6 attempts to integrate
the crucial issues faced by development planners in Pakistan and
Bangladesh: population, income distribution and the evaluation 
of alternative development strategies. It is an extension of the 
social welfare index which aims to incorporate the effects upon 
fertility of differential income growth. While it successfully 
illustrates some of these relationships and adds an important 
emphasis to the distributive-fertility aspect of alternative de­
velopment strategies, it cannot succeed, in this writer*s view, 
as an analytical tool because of its inherent simplicity. As we 
have seen, the available data on income distribution and f a m i l y  
size (Pakistan 1963/64, 1966/67, and 1968/69) is not of sufficient 
quality to be appropriately employed even in this simple framework.
A more complex model would have to overcome substantial methodologi­
cal difficulties and would require data of such sophistication that
it is not likely to become available.
Though development plans represent only one aspect of planning, 
their systematic content analysis does point to some tentative con­
clusions about the emphasis given to population in development 
planning. Perhaps the most important conclusion is that few plans 
are preparing to accommodate for the inevitable growth of the popu­
lation. This is particularly important for employment and educa­
tion.
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Policies for reducing fertility mainly rely upon the family 
planning approach. In the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh this 
approach has so far not been efficiently administered nor has it 
been demographically effective. Direct policies to influence re­
productive motivation may not be administratively or politically 
realistic. Broad changes in development strategy such as a rural 
based growth-equity emphasis may reduce fertility in the long-run 
by indirect mechanisms, but the evidence is not conclusive. Math­
ematical frameworks, though they may illustrate the importance of 
this distributive aspect of development strategy, lack both the 
sophistication and the appropriate data to be used analytically.
APPENDICES
A P P E N D IX  A  P o p u la tio n s  o f  A fr ic a n  c o u n tr ie s  in c lu d e d  in  
and exc lu d e d  fro m  s tud y , 1970 ( in  m illio n s )
Development plans analyzed Development plans not analyzed
Estimated Estimated
midyear 1970 midyear 1970
Country population Country population
Algeria 14 Angola 5
Botswana * Cape Verde Islands *
Burund i 4 Central A frican
Cameroon 6 Republic 2
Ethiopia 25 Chad 4
Ivory Coast 4 Com oro Islands •
Kenya 11 Congo, People’s
M ali 5 Republic o f *
M auritania 1 Dahomey 3
M auritius * Egypt 33
M orocco 16 Equatorial Guinea #
N igeria 55 French T e rr ito ry  o f
Senegal 4 the Afars and the Issas *
Somalia 3 Gabon *
South A frica 20 Gambia #
Sudan 16 Ghana •9
Swaziland * Guinea 4
Tanzania 13 Lesotho 1
Togo 2 Liberia 1
Tunisia 5 Libya 2
Uganda 10 Madagascar 7
Zambia 4 Malawi 5
M ozambique 7
Nam ibia (Southwest
Africa) *
N iger 4
Portuguese Guinea #
Reunion ♦
Rhodesia 5
Rwanda 4
Sao Tom e and Principe *
Seychelles *
Sierra Leone 3
Spanish N o rth  A frica *
Spanish Sahara *
_  -- - — U pper V o lta 5
Zaire (Dem ocratic
Republic o f  Congo) 17
S O U R C E :  U nited  Nations, Demographic Yearbook. 1970 (N e w  Y o rk , 1971). 
‘ U nde r one m illion .
A P P E N D IX  A. P o p u la tio n s  o f  A s ian  c o u n tr ie s  in c lu d e d  in  
and exc lu d e d  fro m  s tud y , 1970 ( in  m il lio n s )
D e v e lo p m e n t p lan s  ana lyzed  D e v e lo p m e n t p lans n o t an a lyzed
E s tim a te d  E s tim a te d
m id y e a r 1970 m id y e a r 1970
Country population Country population
Afghanistan 17 Bahrain *
Bangladesh 77 Bhutan *
India 550 B runei »
Indonesia 121 Burm a 28
Iran 29 China, People's
Iraq 9 Republic o f 760
Israel 3 Cyprus ♦
Korea, Republic o f 32 H ong Kong 4
Laos 3 Jordan 2
Lebanon 3 K hm er Republic
Malaysia 9 (Cambodia) 7
Nepal 11 Korea, Dem ocratic
Pakistan 35 People’s Republic o f 14
Philippines 39 Kuw ait •
Saudi Arabia 8 Macau •
Sri Lanka 13 Maldives Islands •
Taiwan 14 M ongolia 1
Thailand 36 Oman *
Turkey 35 Portuguese T im o r *
Vietnam, Republic o f 18 Qatar •
Ryukyu Islands 1
S ikk im *
Singapore 2
Syria 6
V ietnam , Dem ocratic
Republic o f 21
Yem en (Arab Republic) 6
Yem en, People's Republic o f 1
S O U R C E :  U n ited  N ations, Demographic Yearbook, 1970 (N ew  Y o rk , 1971). 
‘ U nder one m illion .
227
A P P E N D IX  A  P op u la tion s  o f  L a t in  A m e ric a n  and C a rib b e a n  c o u n tr ie s  
in c lu d e d  in  a n d  exc lu d e d  fro m  s tu d y , 1970 ( in  m illio n s )
Development plans analyzed Development plans not analyzed
Country
Estimated 
midyear 1 9 7 0  
population Country
Estimated 
midyear 1 9 7 0  
population
Argentina 24 A ntigua *
Barbados 3 Bahamas *
Brazil 95 Berm uda *
Chile 10 B ritish  Honduras #
Colom bia 21 B ritish  V irg in  Islands *
Costa Rica 2 B o liv ia 5
Dom inican Cayman Islands *
Republic 4 Cuba 8
El Salvador 4 Dom m ica *
Guatemala 5 Ecuador 6
Guyana * Falkland Islands *
H a iti 5 French Guiana ♦
Panama 2 Grenada *
Paraguay 2 Guadeloupe •
Peru 14 Honduras 3
Puerto Rico 3 Jamaica 2
Trin idad and M artin ique #
Tobago 1 M exico 51
Uruguay 3 M ontserrat *
Venezuela 10 Netherlands A ntilles *
Nicaragua
St. K it ts -N e v is -A n g u illa  
St. Lucia 
St. V incent 
Surinam
T urks and Caicos Islands 
U n ited  States V irg in  
Islands
2
*
#
#
#
SOURCE: U n ited  Nations^ Dem&gtapkK^w&ooXr-1970 (N e w  Y o rk , 1971). 
"U n d e r one m illion .
A P P E N D IX  B Development plans studied
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A fr ic a
Algeria
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Ethiopia
Ivory Coast
Kenya
M ali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Nigeria
Senegal
Somalia
South Africa
Plan Quadriennal 1970-1973; Rapport General. 1970.
Republic o f Botswana. 1966. Transitional Plan for Social 
and Economic Development.
Republic o f Botswana. 1970. National Development Plan 
1970-1975.
Republic o f Burundi. Plan Quinquennal de Developpement 
Economique et Social du Burundi 1968-1972: Developpe­
ment Economique, vol. 2, Developpement Social.
Federal Republic o f Cameroon, Ministry o f Economic 
Affairs. Second Five-Year Plan of Economic and Social 
Development (1966-1971).
Federal Republic o f Cameroon, Ministry o f Planning and 
Territorial Development. The Illrd Five-Year Develop­
ment Plan, 1971-1976, Temporary Edition.
Imperial Ethiopian Government. Second Five-Year Develop­
ment Plan (1963-1967).
Imperial Ethiopian Government. 1968. Third Five-Year 
Development Plan, 1961-1965 EC (A D  1968-1973). 
Addis Ababa.
Plan Quinquennal de D&eloppement Economique, Social, et 
Culturel 1971-1975.
Republic o f Kenya. Development Plan 1966—1970.
Republic o f Kenya. Development Plan 1970—1974.
Presidence du Government, Direction Generale du Plan 
et de la Statistique, Republique du Mali. Programme 
Triennal de Redressement Economique et Financier 1970—
1972.
Republique Islamique de Mauritanie. Deuxieme Plan de 
Developpement Economique et Social 1970-1973.
Mauritius Legislative Assembly. Public.Sector Development 
Program (1966-1970).
Four-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development 1971 — 
1975: vol. 1, General Analysis and Policies. Port Louis, 
Mauritius, 1971.
Morocco. 1968. Plan Quinquennal (1968-1972). Rabat.
Morocco, Secretariat d'Etat au Plan. Plan de Developpement 
Economique et Social, 1973-1977: voL 1, Perspectives 
Generates de Developpement.
Federation o f Nigeria^ FederaLMinistry of. Economic 
Development. National Development Plan (1962- 
1968).
Federation o f Nigeria, Federal Ministry o f Economic 
Development. Second National Development Plan 
(1970-1974).
Republique du Senegal. Troisiime Plan Quadriennal de 
Developpement Economique et Social, 1969-1973.
1963. First Five-Year Plan (1963-1967). Mogadiscio.
Planning and Coordinating Committee for Economic and 
Social Development. Short-Term Program (1968—
1970).
Somalia Democratic Republic, Ministry o f Planning and 
Coordination. Development Programme, 1971-1973.
Republic o f South Africa, Department o f Planning. Eco­
nomic Development Programme for the Republic of South ■ 
Africa (1966-1971).
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Republic o f the Sudan, Sudan Economic Planning Secre­
tariat. The Ten-Year Plan ofEconomic and Social Develop­
ment (196111962-197011971).
The Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Ministry o f Planning. 
Five-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development 19701 
71-1974/75.
Swaziland Government. 1969. Post-Independent Develop­
ment Plan (1969/1970-197311974). Mbabane.
Government o f Swaziland. Second National Development 
Plan, 1973-1977.
Development Plan for Tanganyika (1961/1962-1963/ 
1964).
United Republic o f Tanganyika and Zanzibar. 1964. Tan­
ganyika Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Develop­
ment (1964-1969). D ar es Salaam.
United Republic o f Tanzania, 1969. Tanzania Second Five- 
Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1969- 
1974). Dar es Salaam.
Republic o f Togo. Five-Year Development Plan (1966-
1970). Translated by Regional Technical Aids Center, 
American Embassy, Paris.
Ministere des Finances, de 1’Economie et du Plan. Plan de 
Developpement Economique et Social 1971—1975. Lome.
Republic o f Tunisia. 1965. Plan Quadriennal (1965- 
1968). Tunis.
Republique Tunisienne. IVe Plan de Developpement Econo­
mique et Social 1973—1976.
Work for Progress: Uganda’s Second Five-Year Plan (1966-
1971).
Uganda, Ministry o f Economic Development and Plan­
ning* Uganda’s Third. Five-Year Plan (1972-1976).
Republic o f Zam bia,,Office o f National Development and 
Planning. 1966. First National- Development Plan 
(1966-1970). Lusaka.
Republic o f Zambia, Ministry o f Development Planning 
and National Guidance. Second National Development 
Plan, January 1972—December 1976. Lusaka.
1967. T  bird Five-Year Economic and Social Plan of Afghani­
stan (1967-1971). Translated from Pushtu Kabul.
Planning Commission, Government o f the People’s 
Republic o f Bangladesh. Novem ber 1973. The First' 
Five-Year Plan, 1973-1978. Dacca.
Government o f India, Planning Commission. 1951. First 
Five-Year Plan. Delhi.
Government o f India, Planning Commission. 1956. Sec­
ond Five-Year Plan. Delhi.
Government o f India, Planning Commission. 1961. Third 
Five-Year Plan. Delhi.
Government o f India, Planning Commission, 1964. Mem­
orandum on the Fourth Plan. Delhi.
Government o f India, Planning Commission. Fourth Five- 
Year Plan: A Draft Outline.
Government o f India, Planning Commission. 1974. Draft 
Fifth Five-Year Plan 1974-1979, vols. 1 -2 . N ew  
Delhi.
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Republic o f  Indonesia, Departm ent o f  In form ation . 1969. 
The First Five-Year Development Plan (1969170-19731 
74), 5 vols. Djakarta.
Iran, Planning D ivis ion. 1963. Outline of the Third Plan: 
1341-1346 (1962-1967). Esfand.
Iran, Planning D iv is ion . 1968. Fourth National Develop­
ment Plan (1346-1351) (1967 -1972).
M arch 1970. Law No. 70 o f 1970: The National Develop­
ment Plan for the Fiscal Years 1970-1974. Baghdad.
State o f  Israel, Economic Planning A u th o rity . July 1972. 
Economic Development Plan 1972-1976, Summary. 
Jerusalem.
M in is try  o f  Finance, Economic Planning A u th o rity . May
1973. The Economic Plan, 1974-1978, Abstract and 
Summary. Jerusalem.
Republic o f  Korea. Summary of the First Five-Year Eco­
nomic Plan (1962-1966).
Republic o f  Korea. Second Five-Year Plan (1967-1971). 
Republic o f  Korea. 1969. Third Five-Year Economic Devel­
opment Plan (1972-1976). Seoul.
Royaume de Laos. Plan Cadre Developpement Economique et 
Social 1969-1974.
M in istere du Plan. Plan Sexennial du Developpement 1972-  
1977.
1965. First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970). Kuala Lum pur. 
1971. Second Malaysia Plan (1971 -1975). Kuala Lumpur. 
H is  M ajesty’s G overnm ent, N a tiona l Planning Council, 
M in is try  o f  Economic Planning. T heT hird  Plan (1965 -  
1970).
H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent, N ationa l Planning Com m is­
s io n .  1972. Fourth-Plan (1970-1975). Singha Durbar, 
Kathmandu.
G overnm ent o f  Pakistan, N ational Planning Board. 1957.
First Five-Year Plan (1955-1960). Karachi.
G overnm ent o f  Pakistan, Planning Commission. 1970.
Second Five-Year Plan (1960-1965). Karachi. 
G overnm ent o f  Pakistan. June 1965. Third Five-Year 
Plan (1965-1970).
G overnm ent o f  Pakistan, Planning Commission. 1970.
The Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1970-1975. Islamabad. 
Republic o f the Philippines, N ationa l Economic Council.
1971. Four-Year Development Plan FY 1972-1975. 
Manila.
K ingdom  o f Saudi Arabia, Central Planning Organization.
1970. Development Plan, 1390 A H (A D  1970). 
G overnm ent o f  Ceylon, Planning Secretariat. 1959. Ten- 
Year Plan (1959-1968). Colom bo.
G overnm ent o f  Ceylon, M in is try  o f Planning and 
Em ploym ent. 1971. The Five-Year Plan (1972-1976). 
Colom bo.
Taiwan Provincia l G overnm ent, Departm ent o f  Health.
June 1964. Ten-Year Health Plan (1966-1975).
Taiwan Provincia l G overnm ent, C ouncil fo r  In ternational 
Economic Cooperation and Developm ent. 1969. 
Republic o f China’s Fifth Four-Year Plan for Economic 
Development of Taiwan (1969-1972). Taipei.
Thailand, N ationa l Economic and Social Developm ent 
Board. 1973. The Third  National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1972-1976). Bangkok.
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Turkey First Five-Year Development Plan (1963 -1967). Ankare.31
Vietnam, Republic o f
Republic o f Turkey, Prime Ministry, State Planning Orga­
nization. 1973. New Strategy 1973—1995: Strategy and 
Basic Targets of Long-Term Development and the Third 
Five-Year Development Plan. Ankara.
A Summary of the Third Five-Year Development Plan 1973 — 
1977. Ankara.
Republic o f Turkey, Prime Ministry, State Planning Orga­
nization. 1973- A Summary of the Third Five-Year Devel­
opment Plan, 1973—1977. Ankara.
Republique de Vietnam, Direction Generale du Plan.
1972. Four-Year National Economic Development Plan 
1972-1975. Saigon.
Latin  A m erica and the  
Argentina
Barbados
Brazil
Chile
Colombia 
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Puerto Rico 
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Caribbean
Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo. Plan Trienal para la 
Reconstruction y la Liberacion Nacional, 1974-1977’.
Barbados Development Plan 1965—1968.
Barbados Development Plan 1969—1972.
First National Development Plan, 1972-1974.
Oficina de Planificacion Nacional. 1971. Resumen del Plan 
de la Economia Nacional 1971-1976. Santiago de Chile.
Plan de Desarrollo Economico y Social 1970—1973.
Oficina de Planificacion. 1974. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 
Version Preliminar, Enero 1974.
Oficina Nacional de Planificacion. 1968. Plataforma para 
el Desarrollo Economico y Social de la Republica Domtni- 
cana (1968-1985). Santo Domingo.
Consejo Nacional de Planificacion y Coordinacion Econ­
omica. Plan de Desarrollo Economico y Social 1973-1977. 
San Salvador.
Secretarfa General del Consejo Nacional de Planificacion 
Economica. 1970. Plan de Desarrollo 1971—1975. Gua­
temala City.
Government o f the Co-operative Republic o f Guyana, 
Ministry o f Economic Development. Second Develop­
ment Plan, 1972—1976, Draft.
Republique d’Haiti, Conseil Nacional de Developpement 
et de Planification. Plan d’Action Economique et Sociale 
1970-1971.
Republica de Panama, Presidencia de la Republica, Direc­
tion General de Planificacion y Administration. Estra- 
tegia para el Desarrollo Nacional 1970—1980.
Secretarfa Tecnica de Planificacion. 1970. Plan Nacional 
de Desarrollo Economico 1971—1975: Sintesis del Plan 
General y Sectorial.
Republica Peruana, Presidencia de la Republica. Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo para 1971-1975, voIs. 1, 4, 6 -9 .
Commonwealth o f Puerto Rico, Office o f the Governor, 
Puerto Rico Planning Board. The Four-Year Economic 
and Social Development Plan of Puerto Rico 1969-1972.
Government o f Trinidad and Tobago. Second Five-Year 
Plan, 1964-1968.
Government o f Trinidad and Tobago. Third Five-Year 
Plan, 1969-1973.
Republica Oriental del Uruguay. Plan Nacional de Desar­
rollo 1973-1977.
Oficina Central de Coordinacion y Planificacion de la 
Presidencia de la Republica. 1971. IV Plan de la 
Nation, 1970-1974. Caracas.
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A P P E N D IX  C N u m b e r o f  dem ographic parameters, popu lation  problem s  
recognized, and population  policies in 60 national developm ent plans and 
country efforts to reduce population  g ro w th  rate
Country effort
Population 1973 
Population Program contraceptive
Demographic problems Population Effort acceptance 
Country parameters recognized policies Index0 rates6
A fric a
Algeria
1970-1973 3 0 0 3 C N A
Botswana
1970-1975 5 4 6 4 d N A
Burundi
1968-1972 3 4 0 N A N A
Cameroon
1971-1976 5 0 0 N A N A
Ethiopia
1968-1973 0 0 0 N A N A
Ivory Coast 
1971-1975 2 0 0 N A N A
Kenya
1970-1974 6 3 3 6 2.0
Mali
1970-1972 3 0 0 N A N A
Mauritania
1970-1973 2 0 0 N A N A
Mauritius
1971-1975 7 7 4 20 8.8
Morocco
1973-1977 5 2 4 4 1.6
Nigeria
1970-1974 3 5 2 2 0.3
Senegal
1969-1973 5 0 0 N A N A
Somalia
1971-1973 0 0 N A N A
South Africa 
1966-1971 3 0 0 N A N A
Sudan
1970/71-
1974/75 0 0 0 3 e N A
Swaziland
1973-1977 5 3 2 3 d N A
Tanzania
1969-1974 6 5 0 3 C N A
Togo
19 71 -197 5 6 4 0 N A N A
1973-1976 8 8 6 12 5.2
Uganda
1971 /72-
1975/76 8 6 5 3 d N A
Zambia
1972-1976 6 4 0 N A N A
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Country effort
Population 1973 
Population Program contraceptive
Demographic problems Population Effort acceptance 
Country parameters recognized policies Index" rates"
Asia
Afghanistan
1967-1971 6 0 0 3 C N A
Bangladesh
1973-1978 8 9 14 3 1.8
India
1974-1979 8 7 13 19 2.6
Indonesia
1969/70-
1973/74 2 4 4 14 6.3
Iran
1967-1972 6 1 3 14 10.8
Iraq
1970-1974 4 1 0 N A N A
Israel
1974-1978 6 0 0 N A N A
Korea, Republic o f 
1972-1976 6 1 3 24 13.4
Laos
1969-1974 3 0 0 N A N A
Lebanon
1972-1977 1 0 0 N A N A
Malaysia
1971-1975 8 1 7 18 4.0
Nepal
1970-1975 7 9 5 6 1.5
Pakistan
1970-1975 8 8 6 8 1.0
Philippines
1972-1975 8 8 5 16 11.2
Saudi Arabia 
1970 7 0 0 N A N A
Sri Lanka 
1972-1976 5 4 3 12 8.0
Taiwan
1969-1972 6 4 0 24 15.7
Thailand
1972-1976 4 9 6 11 9.5
Turkey
1973-1977 8 3 2 6 0.9
Vietnam, Republic 
o f
1972-1975 5 1 2 N A N A
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Demographic 
Country parameters
Population
problems
recognized
Population
policies
Country effort
Population 1973 
Program contraceptive 
Effort acceptance 
Index" rates*
Lacin Am erica and the Caribbean  
Argentina
1974-1977 6 e / N A N A
Barbados
1969-1972 6 4 7 21 N A
Brazil
1972-1974 4 0 0 N A N A
Chile
1971-1976 2 0 0 16 7.0
Colombia
1970-1973 8 6 4 16 7.9
Costa Rica 
1974 5 1 0 21 18.2
Dominican Republic 
1968-1985 8 4 0 14 C 4.0
El Salvador 
1973-1977 4 2 0 13 4.0
Guatemala
1971-1975 8 9 2 9 1.7
Guyana 
1972-1976 6 1 0 N A N A
Haiu
1970-1971 1 0 0 3° N A
Panama
1970-1980 2 6 2 3 d N A
Paraguay
1971-1975 0 0 0 3 C N A
Peru
1971-1975 4 0 0 N A N A
Puerto Rico 
1969-1972 8 1 0 N A N A
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1969-1973 6 8 7 15 10.0
Uruguay
1973-1977 1 0 0 N A N A
Venezuela
1970-1974 3 5 0 7 ' 6.5
NA » Not available
aThe Population Programme Effort Index was originally devised iyom 
15 input factors that were scored 2 points for 'yes' and 1 for 'qualified 
yes' by Robert J. Lapham and W. Parker Mauldin, "National Family Planning 
Programs: Review and Evaluation," Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 3, No. 3, 
March, 1972. This scheme was further developed in Bernard Berelson, "An 
Evaluation of the Effects of Population Control Programs," in Population 
and its Problems: A Plain Man's Guide, ed. H.B. Parry, Oxford: Glarendon 
Press, 1974, pp. 133-168; and then in Ronald Freedman and Bernard Berelson, 
"The Record of Family Planning Programs," Studies in Family Planning. Vol. 7, 
No. 1, January, 1976, Appendix A, from which these data are taken.
(see footnotes next page)
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APPENDIX D
N u m b e r and type o f  population  policies proposed in developm ent plans o f 1970s, by country
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(cont. from page 234)
^As percentage of estimated nonusers. The basic acceptor data, originally 
found in Nortman, Ibid., are cited in Freedman and Berelson, Ibid., who 
made necessary estimates for the denominator of nonusers. 
cEstimated values from Freedman and Berelson, Ibid.
^Values estimated by the author.
eArgentina describes its population growth rate as too low.
^Argentina has a pronatalist and progrowth policy.
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A N D  INCOME BY H O U S E H O L D  INCOME GROUPS
236
SOURCE: R* H. Khandker 1 Dis-trHVm-M .*» ▼
Pakistan', Pakistan ? * . * * *  *»
1973, Economic and Social *T-\nc
-=*1VO
crv
KV
VO
cr\
bj
n- , *■{ *ci 5*5 O  V. —  —  • t 1'
3 J i 0 ' 0 ' - * - C 0 —- O < c , r | c |
-f-rtsC — O t l r l r ' ,  7 — ^  O
I vC t  ~ l  C  r~  -J- >c -  —  -  o
■ r|rn O  nt-3' "t ft'l O  
—  ci r i —  O
| -C r- r* ri -- ’c, O' r ' i
1 coot — *t t n  -o Oct -r m o c-cc "j> O' o
i ri t  r i X  'Ort x  -  O  
• b j  r ^ O o e d - C v t r v C O— flOt'COMC'C'C'C
—  r- O  -f vc -- O
-toot'OC Cint' O' O 
- r r n l '  V. O'  O'  O' O
ri'c'o t' O'tot C  O
! /cn rl 73 O  O  ri O  cn O  I I. M ’tOl'MC ? T1? O
, j o  y. m  »  o  *t >5 ^  r> 
I O  t " 0  o  n  —  —  r -  i -  , /
bj NNjiiCiW'O'tf^C niANoo—Ox*tm
5!!
<N Tf c- cl tn ~ t cl in -o'
O
o
■✓I —
“  oo
~'J I* 
>,y^ 
jc £
§5o  a
1 * S ^ g S 8 g S 8 3 i, -  —  r i  m  r f  i r ,  r -  7 . ^
! 5| J i i ! ! ! i i ! i
| “jOQOOOOO o/o o mOific-TOOSoo
3
Mvo
crv
<vovo
CN 3
£
3
o
I •_
fcJ
b j
b)
C’tmr'-t'-’TOvOO' — — O'"! ©
©  cl 90 c| —  O' cn O' —  VC >n <© ©  g
—  t  C  ^  r i  ' / I  C  f l ' £ > c  t vCVO O  
O O ® K 0 i o i * h M k | _ ,  O O  O
- co rn v, C O oo O r| •/) I' C O 
—  O —• O
c l  —  r*"i t ' -  O ' r~ t c c c  c  i "ci o  o
Cl  c t ' n i -  n c - v i w i C O Q
O c-'t-ooo 'ctcoo*?cl t  'Cl -O oo O O ON c> 2
ici "i ri ci ici r- m  x  ici so ^  3 o
OMt'COjiCtOC^cioO.-CVil't'OfMM'OOO
>cr- cj-tr'in — -t-ror- oc
O  —• cn "+  O' 7 3 0 * t M C \ ( T ' C ' 0  — ci'riiCr-MClJyO'tAC'O
t c ' c i o ' ^3 - r « o c i ' o  —  ■ x o ' i o i O
OCttC«icicnoo\oio\C\0
’- f o r ' a o O ' o \ o ' c i i > c i O
r l *  y  ~  ci © cn in t  w n  o  o  e  
OOOtoiooinccrio — — O
m  oc o  o  m  c-l i n  o  C ' r<,
O Cl
JO Ci.o n
3 a-'>^ ij IT 
“ • <y OC
£*EwJO O
a 2
viri-OnooOrnO
o-noicioooint - d r i -  —
I 0 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 0  . ‘ciO'OO'ciOOOin I -'-'f'iMci'tkir'
I I I I I I I I !
c/>
2 °Q 0 Q0 Q-~ 0  
*< o  vrj o  * o  o  O  O  
•— •— r i  CN c"> r f  »o
 ^ ■ O
-lodo
rf — <n —
■^oco
— —
0005
s
C_
o
6
c  o  o  o
■n o  O  o  r-O'nO
OSvo
OS
CO
VO
OSrH
bj
b j
cn VO -f -f 'n 'ci ci co — 'Ci — cn o 
O —'C ~  —  —  O v o c - c i m v n c i a o
- . r i c i - f  K -  — - ? c  c  'c i - t  c »  
O ’ttto^ tcl'OiOxci-.O-i
— -.lO C 'C ic i — M t-W C V C n
O c n c i c - ! L c l i —  o o o c i  —  O — i
c l  ©  m  O  r , nf- —.  c  I C  O ' cn  90 
» ic- 'C  - •  —  O  O
CiCN'tvj'tJ'CiCtOxlOO
O iC 'C itO —t  — 'C0 5 0 0 0 0 O rl*i-'OC003\OMMJ\I^ O
0 " C ' C i c i r i ' O C e o n o o O I O l O
O  —  c c n  -  n i ' o O ' O ' 3 ' O N O  -cncw^gioioioioio
'c i -et- m  —  o  O  O  cn c i  co  O ' O ' O  
oot'aci-ciisn^cioio— c, mc-ooC'O'C'O'O'C'O
cifnioi^ r'neor-icioociC'O
-'O'tvioir't'cnoioio'O'■'t'Or'OO'TiOO'MMJlO
m  m  ©  Cl rn r-» <c* vo cn cn ©  Cl
Ococfl'OOcmo<o-o I -
O M s O O i M C l X O T r M O —  •—
Ll! O  O  *C5 O  *c i  co O  4  C l  O  O  l o *  ^ « (n rs ^  —
| in o O  co o  O C ' c J i - o -
b. ooscn — tno—'tMOO ri c-| — i — i
lOct'—O'cioO'Cocn —
'^ l -i/ioo-'tr'C'Ci-CO —. ri d  —
O -f>JO cu 
2 "
3  2
^  o vJ^£0S 
x: o- 3
52
Cn 3 '5 5  un O S—  —  r i n  re t
c o < 
o  ic i I 
vn  r ~  i
;«o O 
-{<c» O
1 !
O O  jn O — c|
—> w ’t/i o < 
d  cn ■
11 » C3
| «
8 0
8• —. r»
APPENDIX E (Continued)
237
C/3
cu
D
O
cd
a
Uj
so
uz
- Io
UJ
V3
3
O
>•
23
UJ
•«"*
o
uz
1— 1
Qz
'<
co
OS
UJ
Z
o4
<
uj
Zo
N-4
H
<
-4
3
cu
O
cu
erf
Q
- l
O
33
UJ
CO
D
O
- *
vo
1
^  1
c |
NO Io x
r j
>
z
r i Cm-
3
C3
3 •>
u
1
(m
O
r/) to
Oto
n
c a.
r j
'■J
u
o
CL Km
~
—
w
0
vo ic \
O uj
> |"I
_ a.
3
C
3
u i
;i
r*.
1
1 a
;
'J-.
V Uj
to |rt•w
c
o a.
o Iwu 1
CL | s.
1*^
1
icivor-so-t'circoriCTvC
d r- so — ci »r ci o ■'f oci ci ici o r- oo 3». j, o
vo Cl d  -f cl :o 3 * t N O
4  *t 'o "t c  c  '‘I 'O :o C  « - i c i i o ' C c » 0\ ^ 0\ O
^ C - t - c v o c i i c o r l O
d  —  recrvovovXS —  -C S 3 C  
c i ^ i O r ' S S ^ C N O ' O
0 0 r ' C c c i ' O ' O -  ci —  o  
». I C  ' C t  U  * t  — 'O C  O
CI't'OCCOC\CM3\JiO
I *“*'•
^vTire— vo— oer— d t — —  O  
d  v£> <ci vo d  —  —  r—  00 Tf >n O
vqvO tI- —  d  oo vc cl rfooso O
_ d  —  O s d O N O N 'C i 'r } -  —  —  O
—  d  —  —  o
3S >C1 O  C~ V£> 3 V O  r~ lr Cl SO
W JvCOOCC^ GC Cl 31 
Cl C~ >C1 C. — OO t~~ — Cl — o
ri c  f' c, c r i  ic c,'' t  *t o
3>c icO '0 '0 " t V l l» 5' C ) C
d o O C ' ^ c l c 5 ' ' t C Q— n^tocsooocMJiO
T f o o t ' o c i ' c n -  o  —  0
O f v C C C I — o r j O v t C - Orl't'CC'MXSNC'O
clxci'T'Ci —  i c C ^ o c
_  »<■, c  C  o  M  r- c| v, vi c
—  c'c i —  d  so ^ -v ©• 3* c
o
V 0
-  «  t  M  ?  -t X  X  c  c  r- c, o  
O  1C S' 'Cl v '  T. r| O  C. ci IO C  o  —  "-i -r <o d  sc c  o\ os -3 ~
I re — C'O'r-^cjx) — Occi\oo
Uj ' o OO 'Cl 'C, O — re O vo OO ON d d
n ^ o c o o a o i O i a K ^ o
u
"I- O  —  f • — -  rc. t  c  o
o
MO vo
o ON
o rH
N
v o
v o
ON
rH
UJ
C \ T f ^ » C X - c - - t c
O U i O ' S N ’t X  —  C T . r l c i
^ *t >0 — Ci ri ri i
ci vc *r ci c  i -  Tt >c o —  •- o
E
3
u
i O C C O ' S T ' O r i h x o S i C  
I - c i i o c r - ' X O M C C C C O
Ncicccciccririaooo
O ’c c O t c i o c o e c i c 'c o- c , \ o c c o o ' c c ' c s \ o 6
- n c t - ' d ’ t o c c - c c  
O vci r e  O - r  3\ r e  as  SO re" d ’ —  C I
caeoeM x'c iiO ciO 'friji-}'^ . o
-rocivoiciciooo o
t C - C c r i V C C C ' O c n  O
c'COooijic^oocO'tMri o
O -r c c c. r c 'o vc c c o 
C ci C c, ti *t co r  Oitn 3 ci c 
—  M c i ^ i c ^ O C m U i C i O
„ in ci o ci r- c c. us « m t o
UJ i o' r| —  v o v c c \ v 3 * f d o o C ' ©  I Cl-r<cii0dcc<30'a'i'3i0
«OiCI*tCciTiciciTirsOO
O ’fCCl'IciMcicnoxOvO
- . e i o o c o e C o i C M C C
ci ci 'o ci ci c\ ci o  c  c  oi *r o
O  »  c  a  n  M  ■c o  'ci c  x  si O  
N ’ t ^ O C c o O v O l C C C  O
c t v i c c t o i o c  o - n  o
CMSOCI-OiCiOi-^vicio d
o  I
' ci 3 M O  C  3  '/I C, C  'Cl cl Tf ci O
I C ' t ^ ' C C - l c i c . o c u n i C O  — c i T 'C t 'X S 'O 'C S 'C
r- »r >ci 3  <o d  ici ct ci ci vc d  ©
- I a.
ON
v o
ON
CO
v o
ON
rH
UJ — © <ci Cl 'Cl o Cl 1C VC r- VC 13 o
©  vo VO CO ic ©  re d  d  ci —  ©  ©  g
—  co re ciI ic, y© ©  so O  ci so d  o  ©
o - t  "'f OO vci O  -3 d  os’ re -i o  —  d
ci —  re r-- O' d  •<* d  d  ©  c i *ci o  o
Uj
UJ
— 0, 
3
E
3
u
Uj
- tv o 3 c i3 s c -r - td 3 > c iic ©  
OcrsCvOvciicisorei—  X  ?! 31 O
d *c iv0 d s o 3 3 3 3 >3l 0
O  re ciici ©  ci d  »/i ci o  d  ©
— re^ Orf-reciicicoooiCvQ — re 'O r 'X C lC \O v O iO \0 \0
cidddicvc-)- — veddeo 
O't'tVOrfCrtl'r'ClriO
r~re*ci-t-'ocioo3vsoO'r— re o
O O i M O T i O l - ' t c i - O O O  ©  Cl c l — — O
■ t c i o o c o r ' O i v o o e M ' O  —  * t ©
doodov-ioicucid — © d o  ©
c l  c i  —  —  o
©  d  VO <3 r e  »ci d  <ci oo d  —  r e  C
—  c i v c i d r t - s o C T v r e d O O O O  ©  
—  c i  d  —  O
r e o v r e o v c i o c i o  —  ' O C ' O O
— e n ff iC o o ff ire re C v T to o o
Octsovorrreoivc-Tvosoood- e ^ ' v o c o o O ' O M j \ O v 5
—  d  ici c  ci e  —  'ci e  cl c  c• • • • OO......................... ...
O r c i c - i r r - r — ^ovcircvooocrso 
—  r e  VC C  SO O 'o v  Ov O ' O
cl co r e  e  'ci ^  O  ci ci -  t  d  o  
0 <c s r e r e ^ 3 N * 3 - S M c i C ' S & o dCirf^ VOWooOvOVOVOvO
te'-oe 1  'Cl 'Cl CI os —  'Cl —  re o  —
— ci Cl *l- sc — — 3- O V|0 'Cl -r ci c 
0 3 - - t s o ^ c i v o d o c c i  —  c — " —
—  —  v c c v O ti —  x ’ t s i c i ' c i e  ©  
O  3  c l  c  1 2  c l  c  vo  oo c i  —  O —  ©
ClvOiciOr j3- —  c i C 3 v e * t »  ©  
oecOTi — eic'o— — oo cr
■ a p p a r e n t  e r r o r ,  s h o u l d  b e  89.7
U «
o
z
o
H
D
a
c/3
Q
APPENDIX E (Contiausd)
— R ura l A rea  : Size D istribution o f Household Income — 1963/64
Household Monthly 
Income G roups 
( R s .)
Average
Income
(Rs.)
Percentage
of
Households
Population
per
Household
Earners
per
Household
Less than 50 . . • 37.57 3 .2 2.1 1.1
50 — 100 . . 77.85 19.4 3.8 1.2
100 — 150 . . 124.52 25 .4 5 .2 1.4
150 — 200 . 173.33 18.7 5.7 1.6
200 — 250 . . 221.75 11.2 6 .2 1.7
250 — 300 . . 272.04 8 .5 6.8 2 .0
300 — 400 . . 344.50 6 .4 7 .2 2.1
400 — 500 . .  \ 450.73 3 .2 7.7 2.1
500 — 700 . .  v 600.70 2 .5 9.3 2.5
700 — 900 . . 803.11 0 .9 9 .4 2 .4
900 & above 1153.83 0 .6 8 .6 2.3
All G roups 193.24 100.0 5.5 1.6
, —■ Urban Area  : Size Distribution o f Household Income — 1963/64
Household Monthly Average Percentage Population Earners
Income G roups Income of per per
(Rs. ) (R s.) Households Household Household
Less than 50 . . 42 .05 1.2 2 .0 1.2
50 — 100 . . 78 .92 12.6 3 .4 1.2
100 — 150 . . 123.44 23 .4 4.9 1.3
150 — 200 . . 170.44 20 .2 5 .9 1.5
200 — 250 . . 219.54 13.0 6.8 1.7
250 — 300 . . 269.66 7 .7 7.1 1.8
300 — ■ 400 . . 338.70 9 .4 7 .0 1.9
400 — 500 . . 439.05 4 .5 8 .2 2 .2
500 — 700 . . 575.71 3 .9 7 .4 2 .0
700 — 900 . . 779.26 2.1 8.8 1.8
900 & above 1114.88 2 .0 8 .5 2.1
All G roups 253.88 100.0 5 .9 1.6
. — Tota l A rea  : Size Distribution o f Household Income — 1963/64
Household Monthly 
Incom e G roups 
(Rs.)
Average
Incom e
(Rs.)
Percentage
o f
Households
Population
per
Household
Earners
per
Household
Less than 50 . . 38 .02 2 .8 2.1 1.1
50 — 100 . . 78 .02 17.9 3 .7 1.2
100 — 150 . . 124.30 25 .0 5.1 1.4
150 — 200 . . 172.65 19.0 5 .7 1.6
200 — 250 . . 221.20 11.6 6.3 1.7
250 — 300 . . 271.53 8.3 6 .9 1.9
300 — 400 . . 342.78 7 .0 7 .2 2 .0
400 — 500 . . 447.38 3 .5 7.8 2 .2
500 — 700 . . 593.30 2.8 8.7 2 .3
700 — 900 . . 793.37 1.2 9 .2 2 .2
900 & above 1134.31 0 .9 8 .6 2 .2
All G roups 202.63 100.0 5 .6 1.6
APPENDIX E (Continued)
R u ra l Area  : Size Distribution o f Household Income — 1966/67
M onthly Household 
Income G roups 
(Rs.) ,
Average
Income
(Rs.)
Percentage
o f
Households
Population
per
Household
Earners
per
Household
Less than 50 . . 41.20 0 .8 3.1 1.1
50 — 100 . . 80.37 16.7 3 .7 1.2
100 — 150 . . 123.45 26 .4 4 .7 1.4
150 — 200 . . 171.92 20.9 5 .5 1.7
200 — 250 . . 221.69 13.6 6 .2 1.9
250 — 300 . . 269.54 7.1 6 .9 2 .2
300 — 400 . . 343.02 7 .7 7 .7 2.3
400 — 500 . . 439.07 3 .4 8 .7 2 .5
500 — 750 . . 597.10 2 .5 8 .9 2.5
750 — 1000 . . 844.05 0 .7 10.6 3.3
1000 — 1500 . . 1158.67 0.1 5.7 1.7
1500 — 2000 . . 1714.22 0.1 8 .0 2 .0
2000 & above • 4393.33 (*) 11.0 1.0
All G roups 198.36 100.0 5 .6 1.7
(a) Less than 0.05
— Urban A re a : Size Distribution o f Household Income — 1966/67
M onthly Household 
Incom e G roups 
(Rs.)
Average
Incom e
(Rs.)
Percentage
of
Households
Population
per
Household
Earners
per
Household
Less than  50 34.44 0 .2 2.3 1.0
50 — 100 . . 81 .82 8.1 3 .3 1.2
100 — 150 . . 123.26 19.3 4 .2 1.3
150 — 200 . . 171.95 20 .7 4 .9 1 .4
200 — 250 . . 220.79 14.9 5 .9 1.6
250 — 300 . . 272.21 9 .7 6.1 1.7
300 — 400 . . 341.87 11.4 6 .9 1.8
400 — 500 . . 444.79 5 .7 7 .8 2 .0
500 — 750 . . 586.85 5.7 8 .0 2.1
750 — 1000 . . 841.71 2 .0 8.8 2 .0
1000 — 1500 . . 1155.40 1 .2 8 .4 2.1
1500 — 2000 . . 1624.13 0 .5 8.1 1.9
2000 & above 3161.16 0 .6 9.8 1.7
All G roups 280.50 100.0 5 .6 1.6
—  T ota l Area  : Size Distribution of Household Income — 1966/67
Monthly Household Average Percentage Population Earners
Income G roups Incom e of per per
(Rs.) (Rs.) Households Household Household
Less than  50 40 .69 0 .7 3.1 1.1
50 — 100 . . 80 .57 14.6 3 .7 1.2
100 — 150 . . 123.42 24 .6 4 .6 1 .4
150 — 200 . . 171.93 20 .8 5 .4 1.7
200 — 250 . . 221.46 13.9 6.1 1.8
250 — 300 . . 270.37 7 .7 6 .7 2.1
300 — 400 . . 343.65 8 .6 7 .4 2 .2
400 — 500 . . 441.10 4 .0 8 .4 2 .3
500 — 750 . . 592.68 3 .3 8 .5 2 .3
750 — 1000 . . 842.87 1 .0 9 .7 2 .7
1000 — 1500 . . 1156.12 0 .4 7 .8 2 .0
1500 — 2000 . . 1660.60 0 .2 8.1 1.9
2000 & above 3463.13 0 .2 10.0 1 .6
All Groups 218.71 100.0 5 .6 1.7
AFFSrn>IX E (Continued)
— R u ra l A rea  : Size D istribution o f Household Income — 1968/69
M onthly Household 
Income G roups 
(Rs.)
Average 
Income 
(R s.) -
Percentage
of
Households
Population
per
H ouseholds*
Earners
per
Household
Less than  50 40.03 1.3 2 0.1 1.2
50 — 100 . . 79 .68 15.0 3.5 1.2
100 — 150 . . 124.85 " 28.3 4 .5 1.5
150 — 200 . . 172.96 21.1 5 .5 1.7
200 — 250 . . 221.70 14.0 6.1 2 .0
250 — 300 . . 270.76 . 7 .5 6 .4 1.9
300 — 400 . . 339.11 7 .6 7 .8 2 .4
400 — ' 500 . . 438.50.4 2 .9 8.1 2 .7
500 — 750 . . 5 ^ 6 0 .2 2 1.8 8 .6 2 .5
750 — 1000 . . 833.88 0 .3 11.8 3.0
1000 — 1500 . . 1319.00 0.1 7 .0 1-7
1500 — 2000 . . — — — —
2000 & above. 2352.00 0.1 7 .5 1.0
All G roups 189.87 100.0 5 .4 1.7
. — Urban A rea  : Size Distribution of Household Income — 1968/69
M onthly Household Average Percentage Population Earners
Incom e G roups Income of per per
(Rs.) (Rs.) H ouseholds H ousehold Household
Less than 50 40.00 0 .2 3 .3 1.3
50 — 100 ... 82.81 5 .6 3.1 1.1
100 — 150 . . 123.40 17.6 4 .0 1.2
150 — 200 . . 171.91 20 .4 4 .9 1.4
200 — 250 . . 22 1 .1 9 ' 15 .2 5 .5 1.5
250 — 300 . . 270.47 11.4 6.1 1.6
300 — 400 . . 337.47 14.1 6 .7 1.7
400 — 500 . . 439.62 5 .2 7.3 1.9
500 — 750 . . 592.13 6 .0 7 .9 2 .0
750 — 1000 . . 851.50 1.9 8 .4 2.1
1000 — 1500 . . 1160.12 1.3 8 .2 1 .7
1500 — 2000 . . 1689.65 0 .4 7 .5 1.4
2000 & above .. 2934.37 0.8. 8 .7 2.3
All G roups 293.43 100.0 5 .6 1.5
— Tota l A rea  : Size D istribution o f Household Income — 1968/69
M onthly Household Average Percentage Population Earners
Income G roups Income of per per
(Rs.) (R s.) H ouseholds Household Household
Less than  50 . . 40.03 1 .0 2 .2 1.2
50 — 100 . . 80.01 12 .7 3 .5 1.2O18 124.61 2 5 .6 4 .4 1.5
150 —  200 . . 172.71 20 .9 5 .4 1.6
200 — 250 . . 221.57 14.3 6 .0 1.8
250 —  300 . . 270.66 9 .9 6.3 1.8
300 — 400 . . 338.50 8 .5 7 .4 2 .2
400 —  500 . . 438.91 9 .2 7 .8 2 .4
500 —  750 . . 576.65 3 .5 8 .2 2 .3
750 —  1000 . . 845.72 2 .8 9 .5 2 .4
1000 — 1500 . . 1193.22 0 .4 7 .9 1.7
1500 — 2000 . . 1689.65 0.1 7 .5 1.4
2000 &  above . . 2804.96 0 .3 8 .4 2 .0
All G roups 215.06 100.0 — s x 1.7
■^apparent error, should be 2.1 
^apparent error, should be 560.22
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APPENDIX G
The Calculation of Income Elasticity of Household Size*^
Using Period (Arc) Data, Rural Pakistan, 1963/64
Monthly
Household
Income
Groups
(Rs.)
Persons
Per
Household
X.
1
X + 1
n
X
n
Average 
Monthly 
1 Household 
Income 
(Rs.)
Monthly 
Household 
Income 
Per Per3on
Yi
Y + 1 n
Yn
Income 
Elasticity 
1 of Household 
Sizevt .
>I1
0 - 30 2.1 37.57 17.89
50 - ICO 3.8 0.8095 77.85 20.5 0.1459 5.5483
100 - 130 5.2 0.3684 124.52 23.95 0.1683 2.1889
150 - 20C 5.7 0.0962 173.33 30.41 0.2697 0.3567
200 - 230 6.2 0.0877 221.75 35.77 0.1763 0.4974
250 - 300 6.8 0.0968 272.04 40.01 0.1185 0.8169
•300 - 400 7.2 0.0588 344.50 46*46 0.1612 0.3648
400 - 300 7.7 0.0694 450.73 58*54 0.2600 0.2669
500 - 700 9.3 0.2078 600.70 64.59 0.1033 2.0116
0 0 1 vo 0 0 9.4 0.0108 803.11 85.44 0.3228 0.0335
900 - Plus 8.6 -0.0851 1153.83 134.16 0.5702 -0.1492
All Groups 5.5 193.24
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APPENDIX G (Continued)
The Calculation of Income Elasticity of Household Size fj ^
Using Period (Arc) Data, Rural Pakistan, 1966/67
Monthly
Household
Income
G-roups
(Hs.)
Persons
Per
Household
X.
 1______
X + 1 
n
X
n
- 1
Average
Monthly
Household
Income
(Rs.)
Monthly 
Household 
Income 
Per Person 
Y.i
Y + 1 
n
n
- 1
Incoire 
Elasticity 
of Household 
Sizevf .
'I1
0 - 5 0 3.1 41.20 13.3
50 - 100 3.7 0.1935 80.37 21.7 0.6316 0.3064
100 - 150 4.7 0.2703 123.45 26.3 0.2120 1.2754
150 - 200 5.5 0.1702 171.92 31.3 0.1901 0.8953
200 - 250 6.2 0.1273 221.69 35.8 0.1438 0.8854
250 - 300 6.9 0.1129 269.54 39.1 0.9218 1.2248
300 - AGO 7.7 0.1159 343.02 44.5 0.1381 0.8392
00100-+ 8.7 0.1299 439.07 50.5 0.1348 0.9634
500 - 750 8.9 0.0230 597.10 67.1 0.3287 0.0700
750-1000 10.6 0.1910 844.05 79.6 0.1863 1.0253
1000 -1500 5.7 -O.4623 1158.67 203.3 1.5540 -0.2975
1500 -2000 8.0 0.4035 1714.22 214.3 0.0541 7.4574
2000 - Plus 11.0 0.375 4393.33 399.4 0.8619 0.4351
All Groups 5.6 198.36 35.4
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APPENDIX G (Continued) -
The Calculation of Income Elasticity of Household Sizeyj^
Using Period (Arc) Data* Rural Pakistan* 1968/69
Monthly
Household
Income
G-rouns
(Rs.)
Persons
Per
Household
X.
1______
X + 1
n
X
n
- 1
Average
Monthly
Monthly
Household Yn+ 1 
Household Income _____
Income
(Rs.)
Per Person Y
Y.i
n
Income 
Elasticity 
1 of Household 
Size*v» .
'I1
0 - 50 2.1 40.03 19.1
50 - 100 3.5 0.6667 79.68 22.8 0.1937 0.2906
100 - 150 4.5 0.2857 124.85 27.7 0.2149 1.3294
150 - 200 5.5 0.2222 172.96 31.4 0.1336 1.6637
200 - 250 6.1 0.1091 221.70 36.3 0.1561 0.6991
250 - 3C0 6.4 0.0492 270.76 42.3 0.1653 0.2975
300 - 100 7.8 0.2188 339.11 43.5 0.0284 7.7109
400 - 500 8.1 0.3846 438.50 54.1 0.2437 0.1578
500 - 750 8.6 0.0617 260.22 30.3 -0.4399 -0.1403
750 -1000 11.8 0.3721 833.88 70.7 1.3333 0.2791
1000- 1500 7.0 -0.3636 1319.00 188.4 1.6648 -0.2184
1500- 2000 - -
2000- Plus 7.5 2352.00
All Groups 5.4 189.87
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APPENDIX G (Continued)
The Calculation of Income Elasticity of Household Size^ ^  
Using Period .(Arc) Data, Urban Pakistan, 1963/64
Monthly
Household
Income
G-roups
(Rs.)
Persons
Fer
Household
X.
 1______
X + 1
n
X
n
- 1
Average
Monthly
Household
Income
(Rs.)
Monthly 
Household 
Income 
Per Person
Y + 1 n
n
income 
Elasticity 
1 of Household 
SizeM .
M 1
0 - 3 0 2.0 42.05 21.0
50 - 100 3.4 0.7000 78.92 23.2 0.8768 0.7983
I C O -  130 4.9 0.4412 123.44 25.2 0.0862 5.1176
130 - 200 5.9 0.2041 170.44 28.9 0.1468 1.3900
200 - 230 6.8 0.1525 219.54 32.3 0.1176 1.2966
230 - 300 7.1 0.0441 269.66 38.0 0.1765 0.2500
300 - 400 7.0 0.9859 358.70 48.4 0.2737 3.600
400 - 500 . 8.2 0.1714 439.05 53.5 0.1054 1.6269
500 - 700 7.4 -0.0976 575.71 77.8 0.42*2 -0.2148
700 - 900 8.8 0.1892 779.26 88.6 0.1388 1.3630
-900 -FKxs 8.3 -0.0341 1114.88 131.2 0.4808 -0.0709
All G-roups 5.9 253.88
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APPENDIX G (Continued)
The Calculation of Income Elasticity of Household Sizajj
Using Period (Arc) Data , Urban Pakistan, 1966/67
Monthly
Household Persons X + 1
Income Per ■
G-rouos Household n
(as.) ______
- 1
Average
Monthly
Monthly
Household Y + 1 
Household Income
Income
(Rs.)
Per Per3on 
Y.
- 1
n
Income 
Elasticity 
of Household 
Size-d .
0 - 5 0 2.3 34.44 15.0 '
50 - 100 3*3 0.4348 81.82 24.8 0.6533 0.6655
100 - 150 4.2 0.2727 123.26 29.3 0.1815 1.5030
150 - 2C0 4.9 0.1667 171.95 35.1 0.1980 0.8420
200 - 250 5.9 0.2041 220.79 37.4 0.0655 3.1145
250 - 300 6.1 0.3390 272.21 44.6 0.1925 0.1761
0
 
0
 
-d-100 6.9 0.1311 341.87 49.5 0.1099 1.1937
400 - 500 7.8 0.1304 444.79 57.0 0.1515 0.8609
500 - 750 8*0 0.0256 586.85 73.4 0.2787 0.0920
750 -1000 8.8 0.1000 841.71 95.6 0.3025 0.3306
1000 -1500 8.4 -0.0455 1155.40 137.5 0.4383 -0.1037
1500 - 2000 8.1 -0.0357 1624*13 200.5 0.4582 -0.7795
2000 - Plus 9.8 0.2099 3161.16 32226; 0.6090 0.3447
All G-roups 5*6 280.50 50.1
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APPENDIX G (Continued)
The Calculation of Income Elasticity of Household Size7
Using Period (Arc) Data, Urban Pakistan, 1968/69
Monthly
Household
Income
G-roups
(Rs.)
Persons
Per
Household
X.
x
X + 1
n 1
Average
Monthly
Household
Income
(Rs.)
Monthly 
Household 
Income 
Per Person
Yi
Y + 1
n - 1
Y 
n
Income 
Elastic: 
of Hous< 
Size-vj . 
7(1
X 1 
n
0 - 5 0 3.3 40*00 12.1
50 - ICO 3.1 -0.0606 82.81 26.7 1.2066 -0.0502
ICO - 150 4.0 0.2903 123.40 30.9 0.1573 0.1845
150 - 2C0 4.9 0.225 171.91 35.1 0.1359 1.6553
200 - 250 5.5 0.1224 221.19 40.2 0.1453 0.8427
250 - 3C0 6.1 0.1091 270.47 44.3 0.1020 1.0696
300 - 4C0 6.7 0.0984 337.47 50.4 0.1377 0.7143
400 - 500 7.3 0.0896 439.62 60.2 0.1944 0.4606
500 - 750 7.9 0.0822 592.13 75.0 0.2458 0.3343
750- 1000 8.4 0.0633 851.50 101.4 0.352 0.1798
1000 -1500 8.2 -0.0238 1160.12 141*5; 0.3955 -0.0602
1500-2000 7.5 -0.0854 1689.65 225.3 0.5922 -0.1441
2000 - Plus 8.7 0.1600 2934.37 337.7 0.4971 0.3219
All Groups 5.6 293.43 32.4
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